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ABSTRACT
Turnover of Appointed County Administrators in 
Large American Counties
by
Robert John Tekniepe
Dr. Christopher Stream, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Public Administration 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Researchers have suggested that American counties are emerging as leaders in local 
governance. This is mainly attributed to the fact that counties are being called upon to 
provide a whole host o f new services to an ever-growing suburban and an incorporated 
areas population. County administrators are known to play a critical role in the provision 
of these services, however, researchers know very little about the factors contributing to 
county administrator turnover. Several empirical analyses have explored tenure and 
turnover patterns of top-level government executives, yet these analyses have principally 
focused on local governments, e.g., municipalities.
This paper is intended to extend existing research by examining how factors 
contributing to government performance, political uncertainty, and community instability 
affect appointed county administrator turnover in large American counties. This paper 
also attempts to determine whether an appointed administrator/managers’ level of
111
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education, tenure, race and gender had statistically significant predictive or explanatory 
strength with regards to turnover.
This study incorporates a mixed-methods strategy of analysis. The quantitative 
component employs a dual-model (2-stage) approach that allowed for additional 
comparative analysis. The qualitative component incorporates interviews with present 
and past appointed county administrators aimed at guiding in the selection of explanatory 
variables contained in the research models, and development o f the specific research 
questions and related hypotheses.
The quantitative study sample consists o f data collected on the 32 largest U.S. 
counties with eouncil-manager forms of government (based on 1990 U.S. Census data). 
The models were estimated using a pooled cross-sectional panel beginning with year 
1992 and ending with year 2005. The unit o f analysis was appointed county 
administrators within large American counties. The Cox proportional regression 
procedure, a form of duration analysis was employed to determine casual-effect.
The findings o f this research study suggest that certain political uncertainty, 
community instability, fiscal performance and select administrator profile factors 
influence appointed eounty administrator general turnover. The results of this study also 
suggest that certain political uncertainty, fiscal performance and community instability 
factors influence appointed county administrator push-induced departures, and certain 
fiscal performance, community instability and select administrator profile factors 
influence appointed county administrator pull-induced departures.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Prologue
Given the considerable impact that appointed eounty administrator turnover could 
have on county governments, it is startling to find that so little research has been 
performed in this area. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggested that successful 
organizational performance is a direct reflection on the decisions made by the 
organization’s top executive. Brady and Helmich (1984) echoed this notion and furthered 
the theory that top-executive turnover can have traumatic effects on any organization. 
While the greatest amount of research on appointed top-executive turnover has been 
performed in the private sector, research in the public sector has been somewhat limited. 
This is especially true in the case o f American counties. Therefore, it is essential that we 
understand the dynamics and factors that contribute to appointed administrator career 
movement and turnover in county governments.
A review of the literature offered an abundance of theoretical perspectives on top- 
executive career movement. Chapter 2 contains a discussion of the important components 
and limitations of the most frequently cited theories of executive career movement and 
acts as a platform for the selection of the best-suited theory for this research study, i.e., 
push and pull motivation theory.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Research Study Overview 
This research study, therefore, is a culmination of interests regarding appointed 
county administrator turnover in large American counties couched in push and pull 
motivation theory.' Feiock, Clingermayer, Stream, McCabe, and Ahmed (2001) 
described push factors as characteristics of an administrator’s present state that force 
them to search for and locate a position elsewhere. These factors include internal conflict 
between commission or council members, leadership uncertainty, and general hostility in 
the workplace. Pull factors on the other hand refer to opportunities for professional, 
financial, or personal advancement in other positions or organizations.
To better understand how the theoretical viewpoint of push and pull motivation 
theory could increase the ability to explain county administrator turnover, explanatory 
variables of previously developed models that examined the push and pull factors, and 
their resultant effects on top municipality executive turnover, were broadly applied to the 
32 largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government as 
defined by the National Association of Counties (2006). Subsequently, this sample served 
as the basis for the research contained in this study.
Important to note is that an appointed county administrator’s job title in the 
Commission-Administrator form of government may vary from county to county, e.g., 
county administrator, county manager, chief executive, chief operating officer, etc. 
Therefore, for purposes o f ease and uniformity, the appointed administrator will simply
' The origin o f  push and pull m otivation theory can be traced as far back as the late 1800s (see Ravenstein, 
1885, 1889). Push and pull m otivation theory has long been used to describe the dynamic process o f  an 
individual’s p sychological factors such as needs, level o f  satisfaction and goals, and the relationship  
between these factors and an individual’s m otivation to m ove from locale to locale, or workplace to 
workplace.
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be referred to as the “administrator” from this point on in this research study. Also, the 
National Association o f Counties’ definition of the Commission-Administrator form of 
government ineludes a derivative form o f government called Commission-Manager 
(Chapter 3 discusses this derivative form of government in detail). Again, for purposes of 
ease and uniformity both forms of government will simply be referred to as the 
“Commission-Administrator form of government” throughout this research study. The 
result of this research study was a series of quantitative analyses, supported by a 
qualitative component based on a cross sampling of present and past county 
administrators.
The application and use of push and pull motivation theory over other career 
movement theories to county administrator turnover was alluring because of the limited 
research that had been eondueted in this domain. Although important progress has been 
made over the past century “in advancing our knowledge base about the role, functions, 
and activity o f American county governments,” there are still significant “voids still left 
in our knowledge base about the American county” (Benton, 2003, p. 471). This research 
study was intended to fill one such void. By extending the application of push and pull 
motivation theory to large American counties with a Commission -Administrator form of 
government, and by demonstrating that similar methods used to explain top municipality 
turnover could similarly be applied to appointed county administrator turnover, theory 
building and proposition testing within the studies of American counties could be 
advanced.
The application and limitations o f the General and Push/Pull models of county 
administrator turnover contained in this researeh study are eertainly noted. For example.
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it is unsure whether the models contained in this research study would yield similar 
results in American counties with mid-size or small populations.
Regardless of the limitations, the resulting analyses in this research study are an 
important first step in understanding administrator turnover in American counties. More 
specifically, the analyses provide a starting point for development and specification of a 
single plausible model that might identify and test basic assumptions o f county 
administrator turnover in American counties of varying sizes.
Research Problem
A review o f literature has shown that top-executive turnover has profound effects on 
organizational policy, programs and fiscal commitments. One ean therefore theorize that 
eounty administrator turnover would have similar effeets on eounty policy, programs, and 
fiscal commitments. Although several empirical studies have explored the factors that 
account for the length o f top-exeeutive tenures in the public sector (DeHoog & Whitaker, 
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Clingermayer, Feiock, & Stream, 2003; Feiock et al., 
2001; Feioek & Stream, 1998, 2002; MeCabe, Feioek, Clingermayer & Stream, 2006; 
Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991), a review of the literature suggested no 
empirical research has been undertaken that specifically explore the factors that account 
for turnover o f appointed eounty administrators.
Benton (2003, p. 473) stated that, “somewhat forgotten has been the emergence of 
counties as leaders in local governance and as providers of a whole host of new serviees 
to an ever-growing suburban and even incorporated area population.” It follows, 
therefore, that county administrators should play a critical role in the provision of these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
services as well. We know, however, little about factors that contribute to county 
administrator turnover.
Purpose of the Research Study
There were three purposes o f this research study. The first purpose was an attempt to 
explain turnover in appointed county administrators in large American counties with a 
Commission-Administrator form of government by using push and pull motivation 
theory. An examination would be made o f how push and pull factors within the domains 
of political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, and community instability (as 
well as select administrator profile measurements) impaet turnover of county 
administrators.
The second purpose of this research study was to determine whether previous 
methods used to explain top municipality executive turnover could also be applied to 
explain appointed county administrator turnover.
The third purpose o f this research study was to provide a starting point for 
development and speeification o f a single plausible model that could explain appointed 
eounty government administrator turnover in American counties of varying populations.
While eounties with large populations have distinct characteristics that set them aside 
from mid-sized and small counties, the approaeh to examine large American counties 
may prove extensible to analyses of administrator turnover in Ameriean eounties with 
lesser populations.
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Research Approach
This research study attempted to illustrate the applicability o f previously developed 
models that examined city manager turnover in municipalities to administrator turnover 
in large American counties. The research study employed both descriptive and inferential 
statistics in a quantitative research approach. Model building and specifieation were 
assisted, based on interviews o f a cross-sectional sampling of present and past county 
administrators thought to be familiar with the factors that may lead to county 
administrator turnover.
As previously mentioned, this research study was broadly based on study methods of 
turnover among appointed top municipality executives that explored the push and pull 
factors related to political conflict, as well as fiscal stress and speeific eommunity 
characteristics (Feiock et ah, 2001; McCabe et ah, 2006). In previous studies, the 
researchers employed a dependent variable that was a dichotomous measure of top 
municipality executive turnover and covariates hypothesized to influence and mediate the 
dependent variable. The covariates included measures of turnover among elected 
commission members, eommunity characteristics that measured a community’s level of 
instability, and factors that gauge government fiscal conditions, e.g., bond ratings.
The first theoretical model developed and tested in this research study was the 
General Model of county administrator turnover. Development o f the General Model first 
began by incorporating similar measurements of political uncertainty and community 
characteristics previously used in the study of top municipality executive turnover. Next, 
government fiscal performance and eounty administrator profile measurements were 
added. By including government fiscal performance and county administrator profile
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
measurements, it was thought the overall explanatory powers of the General Model could 
be enhanced. Figure 1-1 provides an illustration of the General Model of county 
administrator turnover.
County Environment
Political
Uncertainty
Community
Instability
Administrator
Turnover
Fiscal
Performance
Administrator
Profile
Figure 1-1. General Model of county administrator turnover.
In the General Model it was theorized that positive correlations existed between 
factors that contribute to greater political uncertainty, poorer governmental fiscal 
performance, and eounty administrator turnover. Additionally, it was theorized that 
positive correlations existed between administrator profiles (higher educational levels, 
female gender, and non-white race) while negative correlations existed between 
administrator profiles (increased tenure and internal recruitments) and county
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administrator turnover. The general research questions and related hypotheses to be
addressed by the General Model are contained in Table 1-1.
Table 1-1
General Model Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
General research question Related hypothesis
Q1 : What is the relationship between H I: A positive correlation exists betw een higher
measurements o f  political uncertainty and county levels o f  political uncertainty within the
administrator turnover? com m ission  and county administrator turnover.
Q2; What is the relationship betw een H2; A p ositive correlation exists betw een poor
m easurem ents o f  governmental fiscal performance governm ental fiscal performance and county 
and county administrator turnover? administrator turnover.
Q3: What is the relationship between H3: A positive correlation exists between
m easurem ents o f  com m unity instability and increased com m unity instability and county
county administrator turnover? administrator turnover.
Q4: What is the relationship betw een county H4: A  positive correlation exists betw een higher
administrator profile measurements and county levels o f  education, non-w hite race and fem ale
administrator turnover? gender, w hile a negative correlation exists between
increased tenure and internal recruitments and 
county administrator turnover.
To further study the eause-and-effeet relationship between political uncertainty, 
government fiscal performance, community instability, county administrator profile 
measurements and county administrator turnover, a Push/Pull Model of county 
administrator turnover was developed. The Push/Pull Model differed from the General 
Model such that it further examined the push and the pull properties of 15 explanatory 
variables deemed appropriate on county administrator turnover.  ^In the Push/Pull Model 
of county administrator turnover, it was theorized that factors contributing to political 
uncertainty, poor governmental fiscal performance, community instability, and select
 ^ In the Push/Pull M odel the dependent variable (turnover) w as treated as a dichotom ous variable that 
further classified  administrators’ departures as push-induced or pull-induced.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
administrator profile characteristics affect “coerced” or “involuntary” county 
administrator turnover (push-induced) as well as “voluntary” turnover (pull-induced). 
Figure 1-2 provides an illustration of the Push/Pull Model of county administrator 
turnover.
County Environment
Political
Uncertainty
Community
Instability
Pushed
Turnover
Pulled
Turnover
RetirementFiscal
Performance
Administrator
Profile
Figure 1-2. Push/Pull Model of county administrator turnover.
The general research questions and related hypotheses of the Push/Pull Model differ 
from the General Model in the sense that they provided a second stage, or additional 
window of opportunity to further explore the relationships of the push and pull factors, 
and the grounds or reasons for which an appointed county administrator chose to leave
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office. The general research questions and related hypotheses to be addressed by the
Push/Pull Model of county administrator turnover are provided in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2
Push/Pull Model Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
General research question Related hypothesis
Q1 : What are the push/pull relationships betw een HI : The greater the political uncertainty within the
measurements o f  political uncertainty and county com m ission , the more likely the county
administrator turnover? administrator w ill be pushed out o f  office.
Q2: What are the push/pull relationships betw een H2: Poor governmental fiscal performance is more
measurem ents o f  governm ental fiscal performance likely to lead to a county administrator being
and county administrator turnover? pushed out o f  office.
Q3; What are the push/pull relationships between H3: The greater the instability within the
measurements o f  com m unity instability and com m unity, the more likely the county
county administrator turnover? administrator w ill be pushed out o f  office.
Q4: What are push/pull relationships betw een H4: Administrator profiles (higher educations,
county administrator profile measurem ents and longer tenures) have a pull affect on administrator
administrator turnover? turnover.
The time dimension of the research approach was retrospective. In other words, 14 
years worth of observations of the dependent variable and covariates were collected and 
compiled, beginning with year 1992 and ending with year 2005. A pooled cross-sectional 
time-series was considered essential to ensure a rich description of the sampled counties 
contained within this research study.
The research observations were limited to data for the 32 largest American counties 
with a Commission-Administrator form of government. Counties were selected based on 
April 1, 1990, population estimates obtained from the 1990 U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
The limitation of using the 32 largest American counties with a Commission- 
Administrator form of government arose due to the fact that accurate data on American 
counties with mid-sized and small populations were sparse and not easily obtainable prior
10
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to year 1992. Furthermore, it was thought that using inaccurate data o f mid-sized and 
small American counties could have a negative impact on the validity of this research 
study.
Also included in this study were the solicited responses from a cross-sectional 
sampling of present and past county administrators. By including this qualitative 
component in the research study, it was felt that “first hand” experiences would add to 
model construction and hypotheses building, and subsequently support the study’s 
quantitative results. Table 1-3 illustrates the cross-sectional sampling strategy used in the 
selection of present and past county administrators for inclusion into the qualitative 
portion of this research study.
Table 1-3
Qualitative Research Sampling Strategy
Reason for county administrator leaving office
Num ber o f  individuals to be interviewed Pushed Pulled Currently in office
1 X
1 X
2 X
Structure o f the Research Study 
In this chapter, the research study problem, purpose of the study, and general research 
approach (both quantitative and qualitative) were provided.
Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature important to the topic of this research 
study, beginning with assessment o f the most important theoretical perspectives on career 
development and movement. Previous research o f private and public executive turnover
1 1
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is then examined. Chapter 2 eontinues with an appraisal o f factors that are thought to 
contribute to county administrator turnover. The purpose of this examination was to 
provide a framework for the formulation o f “specific” research study questions and 
hypotheses to be tested in Chapters 5 and 6.
In Chapter 3, a brief overview of the origin and history of American counties is 
presented, followed by a discussion of the three basic forms o f county governments, i.e.. 
Commission, Commission-Executive, and Commission-Administrator/Manager forms of 
government. Chapter 3 then explores the principal role of county governments, and 
finishes by examining the primary roles and functions of county administrators.
A discussion of the conceptual background of the methodology used in this research 
study is presented in Chapter 4. Next, the specific research questions and related 
hypotheses for both the General Model and Push/Pull Model are outlined, and 
comprehensive models of county administrator turnover are offered.
Chapter 5 provides a through description o f the research study design, i.e., unit of 
analysis, target population, sample, and issues regarding validity. The chapter continues 
with a discussion of the research model, relational measures, data collection, data 
sources, and coding procedures for both the dependent variable and covariates, and cross- 
sectional interviews. Next, the chapter presents the methods o f analysis used to 
investigate the cause-effect relationships between the dependent variable and covariates 
including statistical software selection, treatment of missing data and issues regarding 
multicollinearity. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the quantitative procedures 
important to the Cox proportional regression procedure and the qualitative research
12
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methodology used in the supplemental cross-seetional interviews o f present and past- 
appointed county administrators.
Chapter 6 provides the findings o f the General Model analyses. This examination 
includes both descriptive data analyses and a form of duration analysis, i.e., the Cox 
proportional hazards regression procedure.
Chapter 7 in turn, provides the findings o f Push/Pull Model analyses by also using 
descriptive data analyses and the Cox proportional hazards regression procedure.
Chapter 8 summarizes the results of the General and Push/Pull Model analyses and 
draws important conclusions. The chapter continues by discussing the theoretical and 
practical implications of this research study, including the contributions and limitations of 
the study. The chapter concludes by outlining future research considered to be important 
for the continuation of this area of study.
A chapter outline o f this research study and important components of each is 
contained in Figure 1-3.
13
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Chapter One Chapter Five
Chapter Two Chapter Six
Chapter Three Chapter Seven
Chapter Four Chapter Eight
Results o f the General 
Model o f Appointed 
County Administrator 
Turnover
Discuss Study Results, 
Draw Conclusions and 
Make Recommendations
Define Measurement 
Variables and Methods of 
Analyses
Results of the Push/Pull 
Model o f Appointed 
County Administrator 
Turnover
Formulate Research 
Questions and Hypotheses
Review Related Literature 
with Focus on Factors 
Contributing to County 
Administrator Turnover
Define Research Problem 
and Purpose of Study, 
Specify Contributions and 
Limitations of Research 
Study
Research History, Forms 
and Roles of American 
Counties and County 
Administrators
Figure 1-3. General outline o f the research study.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Theoretical Perspectives on Career 
Development and Movement 
Career movement is a way of describing how individuals move from one position to 
another. Arthur, Hall, and Lawrence (1989) described career as being the unfolding 
sequence of events of an individual’s work experience over the course of time. Schein 
(1992) portrayed career as “a set of occupational experiences and roles that make up a 
person’s work life” (p. 207).
Traditionally, career movement has been viewed as vertical. That is, individuals 
generally aspire to “climb up” an organization’s hierarchy. Career movement has also 
been viewed from a time dimension where individuals develop their skills and become 
more competitive over time; and from a geographical and physical dimension where 
individuals move from one organization to another, or from one position to another 
within the existing organization (Olsson, 2003). Arthur and Rousseau (1996) termed the 
geographical dimension as boundaryless careers because it viewed individuals moving 
across boundaries of separate employers. Arthur and Rousseau also viewed the physical 
dimension as organizational careers, or those that described individuals going vertical.
15
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A review o f the literature identified three broad groups of career development and 
movement theories. Those groups are (a) structural theories that focus on identifying an 
individual’s characteristics and work-related tasks, (b) developmental theories that center 
on individual’s career development over time, and (c) motivational theories that focus on 
what motivates an individual to seek career fulfillment. Reviewed below are the principal 
assumptions and limitations of major theories within each group, and how they apply to 
this research study.
Structural Theories
Trait and Factor Theory
The first career choice theory to be expounded on was trait and factor theory 
developed by Frank Parsons in the early 1900s. Parsons (1909) put forth the posit that the 
best possible career choices required adherence to three basic steps, i.e., self knowledge, 
knowledge of the work environment, and the matching of an individual’s personal 
characteristics with the requirements of the position.
In the first step, Parsons emphasized the importance of assessing an individual’s 
characteristics (abilities, interests, values, and needs), which he termed “traits.” Parsons 
keyed abilities as what an individual was capable of doing or potentially could do in the 
future, while characterizing interests as an individual’s preference o f activities deemed 
important for his or her career. Parsons viewed value and needs as a set of cognitive 
principles that guide an individual’s behavior and act as a benchmark to judge the 
behavior of others.
The second step in Parsons’ theory related to the “factor” aspect. Sharf (1997) 
described this step as the need for acquiring three aspects of the work environment, i.e..
16
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types of oceupational information, type o f classification systems, and trait and factor 
requirements. The final step placed importance in the “match” of an individual’s personal 
assessment to the job eharacteristies.
Klein and Wiener (1977) summarized trait and factor theory as (a) individuals have a 
measurable set of traits; (b) oceupations require spécifié individual’ traits for success; (c) 
the matching of an individual’s unique traits and an occupation’s requirements is 
accomplishable and for the most part straight forward; and (d) the closer the match 
between an individual’s traits and an occupation’s requirements, the higher the likelihood 
o f success.
While trait and factor theory can be used to assist in career development, it has 
limited use in explaining top publie exeeutive turnover. As Gothard and Mignot (1999) 
suggested, the theory’s underlying value is to assist individuals in the field of career 
eounseling and guidance by providing the basic principles of properly matching 
individuals to occupations (job and career selection).
Work Adjustment Theory
Work adjustment theory first appeared in the literature in 1964 (Dawis, England, & 
Lofquist, 1964). Later versions of work adjustment theory were published by Lofquist 
and Dawis (1969) and Dawis and Lofquist (1984). The theory’s principal assumption is 
that an individual “seeks to achieve and to maintain correspondence with the 
environment. As individuals respond to their environment, their responding becomes 
associated with reinforcers in the environment” (Stemple, 2004, p. 14). Job reinforcers 
may include, but are not limited to, aehievement, advancement, authority, and benefits.
17
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Dawis et al. (1964) recapitulated work adjustment theory by suggesting that (a) work 
can be viewed as the interaction between an individual and their work environment; (b) 
an individual brings specific skills to the work environment so as to perform certain 
required tasks; (c) a mutually acceptable exchange of compensation exists between the 
individual and work environment, e.g., financial remuneration and safe work 
environment; (d) to maintain the relationship between both the individual and the work 
environment, eaeh party must continue to meet each other’s requirements (Dawis et al. 
termed this correspondence)', (e) to achieve and maintain correspondence, both parties 
must be satisfied with the relationship (Dawis et al. termed this work adjustment)', and (f) 
tenure is the primary measurement of satisfaction or “satisfactoriness.”
In summary, work adjustment theory’s principal usefulness is in its application to 
explore aspects of an individual’s job satisfaction and success. In line with this concept, 
the theory provides an excellent framework for the career-counseling field to match client 
job satisfaction to amenable work environments. Its application to the study of top public 
executive succession, however, is thought to be problematic because it does not address 
or attempt to identify the specific factors that lead to top public executive turnover. 
Vocational Choice Theory
Holland (1973) offered a developmental process to career development, which has 
been termed vocational choice theory, based upon an individual’s life history of 
responding and adjusting to a work environment’s demands. Similar to trait and factor 
theory, Holland posited that individuals search for work environments that match their 
personality type.
18
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In Holland’s (1997) theory, four assumptions exist. First, “In culture, most persons 
can be categorized as one o f six personality types: realistic, investigative, artistic, social, 
enterprising, or conventional” (p. 2). Second, “There are six kinds of environments: 
realistic, investigative, artistic, social, enterprising, or conventional” (p. 3). Third,
“People search for environments that will let them exercise their skills and abilities, 
express their attitudes and values, and take on agreeable problems and roles” (p. 4). 
Fourth, an individual’s behavior is “determined by an interaction between personality and 
environment” (p. 4). Holland further theorized that successful career choices depended 
solely on how well an individual knows themselves, their personality types and 
environments, and that intelligence, gender and social class can influence an individual’s 
career choice.
Vocational choice theory has been extensively used as a theoretical base for the 
development of computerized career choice tests. The theory has also provided a 
consistent organizational structure for assisting individuals in the career-counseling field 
match individuals to the proper work environment. Although vocational choice theory 
has proven results in the career-counseling field, it is thought to have limited application 
in explaining top public executive turnover.
Developmental Theories
Social Learning Theory
Krumboltz (1979) introduced the social learning theory in an attempt to streamline 
the process of career choice and counseling. The theory, which is broadly based on the 
general social leaning theory of behavior developed by Bandura (1979), suggested that an 
individual’s life events are important factors in determining career choices. Following
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this logic, Mitchell and Krumboltz (1990) further proposed that and individual’s 
“educational and occupational preferences represent self-observation generalizations 
about interests, values, and task approach skills that have arisen as a result of various 
learning experiences” (p. 168), or life events.
According to Mitchell and Krumboltz (1990), career decision-making is predicated 
on four important factors. The first factor was termed genetic endowments and special 
abilities, which included qualities that could inhibit an individual’s career opportunities, 
e.g., ethnicity, gender, physical characteristics, and ability to learn from experiences. The 
second factor, or environmental conditions and events, encompasses aspects that are 
generally out o f an individual’s control, e.g., social, cultural, political and economic 
forces. The third factor, labeled learning experiences, takes into account an individual’s 
“unique history o f learning experiences that results in his or her chosen career path” (p. 
146). Krumboltz further distinguished learning experiences into three types: (a) 
instrumental learning experiences, (b) associative learning experiences, and (c) vicarious 
learning experiences. The final factors, or task approach skills, included skills such as 
problem solving, work habits, and an individual’s emotional and eognitive responses.
Krumboltz and Baker (1973) suggested that the application o f social learning theory 
is especially important to an individual’s career decision-making (occupational choice) 
because it allows an individual to recognize an important decision situation, define the 
decision or task realistically, examine self-observation, consider the alternatives, gather 
the information as it relates to the alternatives, and determine which sources of 
information are reliable, accurate and relevant. Soeial learning theory, however, has 
limited application to the study of top public executive turnover because the theory’s
20
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principal objective is to assist career counselors and individuals (through self­
observation) make career decisions and plan actions.
Social Cognitive Career Theory
Social cognitive career theory (Lent, Brown, & Hackett, 1994) is a relatively new 
theory in the field of career development that has built upon Albert Bandura’s (1986) 
social cognitive theory. The theory places importance on self-efficacy, outcome 
expectations and personal goals as eritical factors in an individual’s academic and career 
plans and choices, and further attempts to incorporate other elements that may supersede 
an individual’s pragmatic career choiees, e.g., gender, race, culture, genetic endowment, 
and unexpected life events.
According to Lent et al. (1994) self-efficacy relates to “people’s judgments of their 
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required to attain designated types 
of performance” (p. 83). Outcome expectations on the other hand, are the preferred 
consequences o f an individual’s course o f action, while personal goals are defined as an 
individual’s efforts that are required to take on any given activity or endeavor.
Lent et al. (1994) envisioned social cognitive career theory as an evolutionary process 
beginning in the early days o f an individual’s life and progressing through adulthood. 
During one’s lifespan, an individual’s view of successful academic activities and career 
choices becomes increasingly more focused. As Lent et al. noted, essential to the process 
is the degree in which an individual views his or her ability to be successful at the 
activity, and the degree in which compensation for performing the activity is satisfactory. 
Simply stated, if  an individual pereeives limited obstacles to the success o f an academic 
endeavor or career choiee action (coupled with adequate compensation in the case of a
21
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work activity), a stronger degree of interest and action on the part of the individual would 
ensue.
The strength of social cognitive career theory is in its ability “to provide a framework 
for explaining both academic and career (choice) behavior” through the measurement of 
an individual’s self-efficacy and outcome beliefs (Smith, 2002). Since social cognitive 
career theory emphasizes the role of an individual’s self-system and beliefs, the theory’s 
application has drawbacks in the quantitative analysis o f factors contributing to political 
uncertainty, fiscal performance and community instability and their effects on top public 
executive turnover. The theory, however, does have strengths in that it assists in the 
development of questions contained in the qualitative component of this research study. 
Life-Span Theory
One of the most noteworthy career developmental theories is life-span theory (Super, 
1990). Super’s theory is unique in that it encompassed the entire life-span of an 
individual, and demonstrated how various psychological and environmental factors 
affected an individual’s self-concept, the principal factor that determines an individual’s 
approach to career development. Zunker (1994) suggested that “vocational self-concept 
develops through physieal and mental growth, observations of work, identification with 
working adults, general environment, and general experiences” (p. 30).
Principal in Super’s life-span theory are five stages o f an individual’s growth. The 
first stage was termed the growth stage (birth to 15 years of age), where individuals form 
attitudes, interests and needs, and develops a basic understanding of the work 
environment. Next came the exploratory stage (15 to 24 years of age), where individuals 
collect relevant information, establish tentative career choices, and develop the
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appropriate skills. The third stage, termed the establishment stage (25 to 44 years of age), 
was the period in an individual’s life where entry-level skills are developed through work 
experience. The fourth stage, or the maintenance stage (45 to 64 years of age) was where 
individuals continue to improve and adjust to the work environment and career to 
improve their positions. The final stage, termed the decline stage (65 years and older), 
was where an individual’s output declines and preparation for retirement begins.
Super further suggested that an individual goes through five vocational maturity 
stages during their life-span due to gained life-experiences. Super termed the first stage 
the crystallization stage (14 to 18 years of age), where individuals develop and plan a 
tentative vocational goal. Next came the specification stage (18 to 21 years of age), 
where individuals firm up their vocational goals. The third stage was called the 
implementation stage (21 to 24 years of age), where individuals train for and begin 
employment in eonjunction with their goals. The stabilization stage (24 to 35 years of 
age) followed next, where individuals confirm their career choice by continuing to work 
in their chosen vocational field. The final stage, or the consolidation stage (more than 35 
years of age), was where individuals focus on the advancement of their career.
Life-span theory’s strength resides in the study o f career choice counseling and 
developmental psychology because o f its view that individual development and change 
occurs over time. For purposes o f this research study however, it is thought to have 
limited ability in explaining the factors that affect turnover of top public executives. This 
is due to the fact that life-span theory recognizes that change occurs in a social and 
historical context, not as a scientific observation.
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Motivational Theories
Ambition Theory
Schlesinger (1966) theorized that eareer decisions could be predicted based on the 
potential benefits of alternative positions as well as the probability of an individual 
achieving those positions. Further, Schlesinger suggested that individuals make career 
choices based on opportunities, personal aspirations, and the status they expect to gain in 
the future. While ambition theory was primarily developed to study the career decision 
habits of elected officials, its fundamental assumptions are worth exploring in relation to 
appointed top public executives.
An individual’s ambition, as Schlesinger argued in ambition theory, could take on 
three forms. Additionally, Schlesinger suggested that each type of ambition could be used 
to predict an individual’s career choice behavior.
The first form was termed discrete ambition, where individuals assume a position for 
a pre-set period of time, generally considered short-term. The second form was termed 
static ambition, where an individual seeks a position with a long tenure as his or her goal. 
The third form was termed progressive ambition, where individuals search for a position 
with the intention of obtaining a higher and more attractive position in the future.
In summary, the strength o f ambition theory is its ability to guide research into the 
political careers and aspirations of elected officials. By focusing on the costs, benefits 
and probabilities associated with a politician’s career ambitions, political behavior can be 
predicted. The theory’s application to appointed top public executive turnover, however, 
is thought to be problematic because (a) the theory focuses on elected officials and not 
appointed officials; and (b) the theory does not address the effeets of negative factors on
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the individual’s career, e.g., political uncertainty, poor fiscal performance, and 
community instability.
Push and Pull Motivation Theory
Push and pull motivation theory has long been used to describe the dynamic process 
o f an individual’s psychological factors, such as needs, level of satisfaction, and goals, 
and the relationship between these factors and the uncomfortable levels o f conflict that 
may exist within an individual’s personal environment and/or work place.
The origin of push and pull motivation theory can be traced as far back as the late 
1800s (Ravenstein, 1885, 1889). From a migration standpoint, Ravenstein suggested that 
push factors such as an individual’s dissatisfaction with life situations and their locales, 
and pull factors such as the appealing attributes of distant places could be used to explain 
migratory patterns of individuals. Further migratory motivation factors as Ravenstein 
pointed out included war, overcrowding, and freedom and rights.
Similarly, push and pull motivation theory has been used in an attempt to explain an 
individual’s travel desires, and to develop marketing plans to foster tourism policies 
(Sukbin, McLeary, & Uysal, 1995). Sukbin et al. suggested that tourist motivation (and 
the subsequent marketing o f the tourism industry) should focus on both the push and pull 
factors of individuals. Push factors, as Sukbin et al. explained, were the negative internal 
forces that facilitated an individual to travel. Pull factors, on the other hand, were the 
external forces or positive attributes of the destination.
Many researchers have successfully applied the principles of push and pull 
motivation theory to top-executive turnover in the private sector (Hall, 1989; Helmich, 
1974; Lundberg, 1986). Similarly, researchers have attempted to apply the principals of
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push and pull motivation theory to top-exeeutive turnover in the publie seetor, however 
the extent of the results have been somewhat limited (Murdaugh, 2005; Orosz, 1991 ; 
Wechsler & Rainey, 1988).
Lee and Mitchell (1994) suggested that push factors reflect the degree to which 
current work or life situations cause sufficient discomfort or dissatisfaction to warrant 
generation and evaluation of alternatives. Relations between withdrawal behavior and 
work attitude variables such as job fulfillment, job pressure, and pay level, also eontribute 
to the push process, leading individuals in both the private and public sectors to consider 
alternative employment (Lee & Mitchell, 1994; Mobley, Griffith, Hand, & Meglino, 
1979). Youngblood, Mobley, and Meglino (1983) put forth the hypothesis that higher 
turnover may sometimes reflect the differences between an individual’s work role 
expectations and actual experiences. These differences result in outside jobs and 
organizations appearing more attractive, therefore perpetuating employee turnover.
Conversely, pull factors are generally lures that encourage individuals to leave their 
current positions, e.g., professional, financial, or personal advancement (DeHoog & 
Whitaker, 1990). A job search motivated by the pull proeess generally reflects the costs 
of searching in relation to the probability of finding a new position. From this 
perspective, the degree at which an individual actively searches will be positively related 
to the income an individual believes his or her knowledge, skills and abilities can obtain 
(see Lippman & McCall, 1979), and inversely associated with the perceived costs o f the 
search (Kormendi, 1979). Individuals currently employed may incur low search costs 
because the loss in “utility” from not finding alternative employment is offset by the 
benefits of the current position (Hall, Lippman, & McCall, 1979).
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Labor economics literature suggested that search costs may vary due to an 
individual’s ability to network, and the degree in which an individual is “visible” in his or 
her profession (Devine & Kiefer, 1991). Additionally, the degree to which an individual 
is perceived as instrumental in an organization’s success may also be an important pull 
factor.
After reviewing multiple theoretical perspectives on career development and 
movement, it was determined that push and pull motivation theory was the most 
applicable theory to couch the quantitative analysis component contained in this research 
study. The principal reason for selecting this theory was because of its theoretical 
framework and ability to isolate and analyze specific factors that may affect an appointed 
county administrator’s departure or non-departure career decision-making process. 
Additionally, push and pull motivation theory has the ability to isolate factors that may 
contribute to an administrator’s induced or non-induced departure.
Further, no such research was uncovered in the review of literature that applied push 
and pull motivation theory to appointed county administrator turnover. This indicated that 
the selection and usage of push and pull motivation theory in the analyses contained in 
this research study would forge new ground in the body of knowledge.
Private Sector Executive Turnover
Significant research in the private sector has shown that executive turnover can 
critically affect an organization’s performance (Droege & Hoobler, 2003; Shaw, Delery, 
Jenkins, & Gupta, 1998; Sheehan, 2001). Brady and Helmich (1984) supported this idea 
by suggesting that top-executive turnover can be a traumatic event for any private
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organization because it affects not only the employees within the organization, but the 
entity’s economic security as well. Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) theorized that the 
degree of trauma caused by executive turnover is compounded by the fact that 
organizations are, in many eases, a reflection of their leadership.
Grusky (1960) was one o f the first researchers to apply a scientific approach to the 
study of executive turnover. From Grusky’s work developed a early field of study that 
eould be categorized into four principal areas; (a) the extent to which organizations 
promote top executives from within the organization compared to external recruitments, 
(b) the relationship between organizational size and executive turnover, (c) post­
succession performance and the frequency o f executive turnover, and (d) leadership 
styles and organizational characteristics (Carlson, 1962).
The area of study receiving the most attention in the 1960s was successor origin. Both 
Carlson (1961) and Grusky (1964) contributed to the field of top-executive turnover by 
first defining “insiders” and “outsiders,” and second by establishing a starting point in 
which to analyze the relationship between top-executive turnover and its resulting 
consequences. Carlson for example, determined that top executives promoted from within 
the organization generally received lower compensation, achieved a less important level 
of status, and made fewer changes to the organization.
Although the area o f successor origin garnished most o f the attention in early 
research, insight was also gained in the relationship between organizational size and the 
rate of top-executive turnover. Grusky (1964) and Trow (1961) for example, determined 
that top-executive turnover rates varied significantly when the organizational size was
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taken into account. Further, the researchers determined that large organizations 
experienced higher top-executive turnover rates when compared to smaller organizations.
The third area where contributions were made by early researehers was in the domain 
o f post-succession performance and the frequency o f executive turnover. Within this 
domain, three theoretical viewpoints were developed.
Grusky (1963) termed the first viewpoint as the vicious cycle theory, which suggested 
that recurrent turnover was disruptive to an organization. The second viewpoint has been 
known as the common sense theory, where organizational performance improved with the 
replacement of a top executive. The third viewpoint was described as the ritual 
scapegoating theory, which suggested that top-executive replacement was a method of 
signaling to outsiders of the organization that change was taking place to address poor 
performance (Gamson & Scotch, 1964).
The fourth area where contributions were made by early researchers of top-executive 
turnover was in the domain of leadership styles and organizational characteristics, and 
their resulting effects on organizational performance. Kesner and Sebora (1994) 
described this domain as succession contingencies. The principal contributors to research 
in this domain included Kotin and Sharaf (1967), who studied top-executive attributes 
and leadership styles and their impact on organizational performance, and Gouldner 
(1954) and Guest (1962), who investigated the organizational structure and performance 
of prior executives and the resulting effect on the ability of newly appointed executives to 
affect positive ehanges in the organization.
The study o f successor origin and charaeteristics, and succession frequency, 
continued throughout the 1970s. Bimbaum (1971), for example, proposed the concept of
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industry familiarity. In his study of university and college presidents, Bimbaum 
challenged the traditional view o f insiders and outsiders by suggesting that top executives 
who were trained in similar institutions when compared to the recruiting organization 
exhibited a greater degree of fostering organizational stability. Helmich and Brown 
(1972) and Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) also found similar results as Bimbaum in their 
study of top executives who were recruited from within a similar career field (or industry) 
versus individuals recmited from outside the career field.
The 1970s also provided a new perspective of suceessor characteristics. Helmich 
(1975, 1977), for example, began to investigate the linkage between a successor’s 
leadership style and his or her need for fulfillment, i.e., social fit and esteem. From his 
research, Helmich was able to conclude that successors in large organizations were able 
to experience career development and personal growth when compared to successors in 
smaller organizations. It was not surprising that Helmich’s research revitalized other 
researchers to further study the concept o f “best fit” as well.
The leading researchers of the “best fit” concept in the 1970s were Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1977), Hall (1976), and March and March (1977). While Pfeffer, Salancik, and 
Hall were able to establish an empirical relationship between certain characteristics of top 
executives and the career fields they choose, e.g., level and type of education, March and 
March suggested that these characteristics might be unrelated to the criteria used in the 
selection process.
Empirical research in the 1970s also continued to explore the frequency of top- 
executive succession. For example, Flelmich (1974a, 1974b, 1975) examined 
administrator characteristies and their effect on succession frequency, while Crain,
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Denton, and Tollison (1976), and Pfeffer and Salancik (1977) furthered research on 
organizational size, age and type.
Kesner and Sebora (1994) suggested that the 1980s and 1990s “ushered in a time of 
reflection for succession researchers” (p. 8). While Gordon and Rosen (1981), Kohler and 
Strauss (1983), and Brady and Helmich (1984) put forth the effort to capsulate the 
progress that was made in the past 20 years of succession research, new researchers were 
furthering the studies of successor origin (Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Dalton & Kesner, 
1983; Reinganum, 1985; Worrell & Davidson, 1987; Zajac, 1990). Some of the most 
notable contributions of these researchers included the analysis of an organization’s 
performance, organizational size, and market effects on top-executive succession.
Similarly, new researchers continued the studies of suceession rates (Benston, 1985; 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; DeAngelo & DeAngelo, 1989; Morck, Schleifer, & Vishny, 
1988). One o f the most important breakthroughs in succession rate research of the 1900s 
came when Miller (1993) determined that infrequent top-executive turnover resulted in 
poor organizational performance, an observation echoed by Bommer and Ellstrand 
(1996).
Two relatively new areas of study that surfaced during this period of top-executive 
turnover research included succession planning, and succession and the executive board. 
Mahler (1980) was considered one of the first researchers to investigate succession 
planning and elevate its importance to the organization. Rhodes and Walker (1984), and 
Hall (1986) and Freidman (1990) followed Mahler’s research by examining 
organizational succession planning approaches, the evolution of succession-planning, and 
the role of management incumbents’ development and learning cycle.
31
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Early research on succession and the executive board was pioneered by Helmich 
(1980), Salancik and Pfeffer (1980), Weisbach (1988), and Puffer and Weintrope (1991). 
Important observations in this area of research included a higher incidence of turnover 
when top executives did not meet the expectations of the board, and top-executive 
turnover was only prevalent when the executive boards were dominated by members 
from outside the organization.
More recently, researchers o f top-executive turnover have focused on the 
organizational structure (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997), the effect o f unsolicited takeover 
bids (Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004; Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001), and the 
makeup of top managerial teams (Fee & Hadlock, 2004) as explanatory variables of 
executive turnover.
Public Sector Executive Turnover 
While the research of top public executive turnover is somewhat limited, Murdaugh 
(2005) suggested there was “a sufficient body o f literature to allow one to organize those 
efforts into research which has examined federal, state, and municipal (including county) 
executives” (p. 21). The following is a summary of the research of top public executive 
turnover.
Research at the Federal Level 
Much of the literature associated with the turnover of appointed federal executives 
has focused on the political dimensions of the appointed executive and his or her 
relationship with career federal employees. Covington (1985), for example, suggested 
that levels of stress and uncertainty occur between politically appointed federal
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executives and career federal executives, resulting in a blurred understanding of the 
organizational hierarchy. Joyce (1990), on the other hand, pointed to the lack of 
interaction between appointed federal executives and career federal employees due to 
differing communication styles.
The literature also suggested that a high degree of organizational turmoil follows the 
turnover of politically appointed federal executives (Covington, 1985; Heclo 1988; Joyce 
1990). Interestingly, the literature review found no research that focused on the specific 
factors that could explain appointed federal executive turnover other than the change in 
administration.
Research at the State Level 
As with research at the federal level, the literature associated with turnover of 
appointed state executives has also focused on the political dimensions of the process 
with emphasis on governor appointments. Abney (1988) for example, examined the 
influences of appointed state executives on an elected governor.
Roberts (1988), on the other hand, analyzed the impact appointed state executives had 
on the effectiveness of the organization. Roberts also compared the tenures and stability 
of political appointees versus bureaucratic appointees across 50 states. In his research, 
Roberts found that bureaucratic appointees tended to have more stability, leading to 
lengthier tenures than political appointees.
Other researchers have studied the methodology of state political appointments, the 
impact political appointments have on the organization, and the effect political 
appointments have on incoming administrations (Sherwood & Chackerian, 1988;
Roberts, 1988; and Rogers & Halachmi, 1988, respectively). As with research at the
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federal level, the literature review found no research that focused on the specific factors 
that could explain appointed state executive turnover other than the change in 
administration.
Research at the County and Municipal Level 
There has been a general lack of research by the academic community regarding 
appointed administrator turnover in county governments as compared to municipalities 
(Kammerer, Farris, DeGrove, & Clubok, 1962; Schneider & Park, 1989). This is 
especially true in the area of county administrator turnover. Schneider and Park suggested 
this might be so because of the absence of easily defined theoretically driven research 
agendas.
Svara ( 1999) suggested that the study of top-executive turnover in local government 
entities was important because these executives play an increasingly complex and 
interrelated role in both the substance and the process of local governance. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that the study of executive leadership and its importance in 
governance at the munieipal level is a common and recurring topic in the contemporary 
literature (Nalbandian, 1999, 2000; Svara, 1990, 1998).
Researchers have become more attuned to the fact that top executives, once viewed as 
neutral forces with limited roles, play an increasingly important role in an organization’s 
success. Interestingly, traditional separation between a top public executive’s 
“administrative” roles versus “political” roles has, in many ways, been observed to be 
more symbolic than factual (Miller, 2000; Stillman, 1974). Miewald (1984) contended 
this broader view o f public executives was evident as far back as Woodrow Wilson’s era.
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when Wilson suggested that “the real function of Administration is not merely 
ministerial, but adaptive, guiding and discretionary” (p. 18).
Nalbandian (1999) posited that top municipality executives are expected to take on 
the role o f “community building” by facilitating the democratic processes between 
government and the community. As Nalbandian emphasized, top executives are 
becoming increasingly responsible for bringing forward issues and information before the 
elected governing board. By providing the board with information that supports their 
reeommendations and direeting employees to earry out specific programs, top public 
executives have become an integral part of the organization’s policy-making process. 
Considering this fact, it is easy to understand why researchers have found that policy 
proposals frequently begin with top executives and not with the commission or council 
(Martin, 1990; Morgan & Watson, 1992; Newell & Ammons, 1987).
Because top county and municipality executives play an ever-increasing role in policy 
formulation and implementation, the turnover o f executives in local public entities can 
have a far-reaching negative effect on an organization’s success. This concept of negative 
effects was noted in recent research on top municipality executive turnover, where 
researchers theorized that persistent executive turnover affects the implementation of 
local municipality innovations such as new approaches to service delivery, ability to enter 
into long-term debt obligations, or commitment to contracting services (Clingermayer & 
Feiock, 2001; Feiock & Clingermayer, 1993).
Wright (1969) and Banovetz (1995) built upon this concept by putting forth the 
premise that top county and municipality executives play a key role in the formulation of 
economic development policy, a recurring theme in the review o f literature. Renner
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(2001) reaffirmed this idea in reviewing the International City/County Managers’
(ICMA) 2000 National State o f the Profession survey results, by finding that top 
executives identified economic development as one o f the principal issues of any 
jurisdiction.
Further, in the 2000 National State of the Profession survey, Renner discovered that 
the 10% of top municipality executives who left their jobs on their own accord in the 
previous year cited pull factors such as career advancement and opportunities in larger 
organizations. It follows, therefore, that career paths o f successful public executives 
generally reflect a progression to increasingly larger organizations.
Buckwalter and Parsons (2000) noted that managers o f municipalities generally begin 
their careers as an assistant to a city manager, gradually being pulled out o f their assistant 
position and securing a city manager post with a smaller municipality, and later a larger 
organization. Buckwalter and Parsons also suggested that it was not uncommon for top 
municipality executives to have worked for several municipalities over their careers, and 
that pull factors to leave for positions with greater opportunity was inherent in their 
overall plans o f career advancement.
In local municipalities, push factors such as political uncertainty and differences in 
policy between administrators and governing board members have also been known to 
accelerate an executive’s departure (Clingermayer et al., 2003; DeHoog & Whitaker, 
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006; 
Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991). To illustrate this point, Renner (2001) 
uncovered that in a single year, 3% of public executives who held the position of top
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municipality executive left their job reluctantly. Of those, 10% were dismissed, 20% 
were forced resignations and 70% were pressured to quit.
Factors Contributing to County 
Administrator Turnover
As previously discussed, researchers have long explored the factors that account for 
public executive turnover. Additionally, most studies have focused on factors 
contributing to top-executive turnover in municipalities.
Some research studies have suggested that political conflict and uncertainty, fiscal 
stress, and characteristics o f a community’s instability, play major roles in public 
executive turnover (Boynton & DeSantis, 1990; Clingermayer et al., 2003; DeHoog & 
Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 
2006; Newell, Ammons, & Glass, 1989; Renner, 1990; Stillman, 1974; Whitaker & 
DeHoog, 1991). Other studies have explored the effect of administrator profile factors 
such as administrator tenure, age, level of formal education, salary and benefits, degree of 
job satisfaction, career advancement, and decision to enter retirement (Banovetz, 1995; 
Barber, 1988; Feiock & Stream, 2002; Porter & Steers, 1973; Renner, 2001; Stein, 1990; 
Watson & Hassett, 2003, 2004; Werbel & Bedeian, 1989; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991; 
Wright, 1969).
The factors contributing to top public executive turnover receiving the most attention 
by researchers are political conflict and uncertainty. The review of literature suggested 
that Goodnow (1900), was the first to give political conflict attention. In his book Politics 
and Administration, Goodnow argued that attempts by politicians to control a
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jurisdiction’s administrative function was liable to produce “inefficient administration in 
that it makes administrative officers feel that what is demanded of them is not so much 
work that will improve their own department, as compliance with the behests of the 
political party” (1990, p. 83). Researchers have considered reformed governments, such 
as the Commission-Administrator form of government, as a type of government that 
exhibits, to a lesser degree, signs o f political conflict (although some degree of political 
conflict always exists).
Conflict in County Government
The review of literature suggested that the relationship between “conflict” in public 
organizations and top public executive turnover has been of interest to researchers since 
the early 1960s (see Kammerer et al., 1962). Important to note is that the literature review 
uncovered a limited number of empirical studies that explored the area of conflict and 
county government. Menzel (1992) suggested this to be somewhat surprising considering 
the increased influence o f counties on the public such as the expansion of service delivery 
roles. This has led researchers to suggest a need for a better understanding o f conflict in 
county government (Benton, 2003).
Conversely, numerous empirical analyses were found that explored the notion of 
conflict and municipal governments. The review of literature clearly suggested that local 
government researchers have focused on conflict related to municipalities much more so 
than their county counterparts (Huelsberg & Lincoln, 1986; Jenks, 1994; Svara, 1999). 
Since conflict is considered a “universal” concept that affects county and local municipal 
governments alike, it was deemed important to discuss the study results of both.
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Lineberry and Fowler (1967) were the first to empirically analyze conflict and county 
government. Interestingly, in their study the researchers suggested that “reformed” 
county governments such as the Commission-Administrator form of government were 
less likely than “traditional” county governments to experience adversarial patterns of 
hostility. As Lineberry and Fowler proposed, this was principally due to the greater 
degree of central authority, relative insulation from community conflicts, and the 
tendency for shared values between commission and council members and appointed 
administrators.
The review of literature also suggested that counties play critical roles in the 
provision o f public services; however, as some researchers have pointed out, very little is 
known about the influences of organizational conflict and a county’s ability to provide 
these services. Salant (1989) categorized the public service functions of American 
counties into four groups: (a) administrative arms o f the state, (b) traditional 
governments, (c) regional governments, and (c) local governments. The administrative 
arm can generally be considered the principal area where American counties exert the 
most influence over the provision o f public services. Salant highlighted “indigent health 
care” at the county level as a prime example of state mandated services where counties 
have significant influence.
In another research study, Svara (1990) proposed that conflict was greater in counties 
with professional administrators as compared to counties without professional 
administrators. This occurrence, as Svara hypothesized, might be attributable to the 
inability of some county administrators to foster a facilitative-participatory relationship 
with commission or council members.
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Svara suggested that this phenomenon could be attributed to an administrator’s failure 
to understand and define his or her role in a fragmented government structure with 
complex inter-governmental relationships. As Svara implied, contrasting role 
expectations between commission and council members, and the administrator may cause 
this phenomenon. Because of these factors, Svara was led to conclude that role 
uncertainty was a leading cause o f conflict in county government. Svara recommended 
that future research on county government conflict should include an exploration 
component that further studies role expectations among commission and council 
members, and administrators.
Lewis and Taylor (1990) also explored role expectations among county 
administrators. In their study, the researchers primarily examined the attitudes and roles 
of county administrators from a national perspective, focusing primarily on trying to 
understand “what the county manager does, why, and what difference it makes” ^  (p. 11).
Menzel (1996), in a comparative study of county and municipality political structures, 
suggested that fragmentation combined with complex intergovernmental relationships 
were principal factors differentiating county governments from city governments. As a 
result of these dynamics, Menzel suggested that county administrators many times 
confront varying degrees of conflict that are considerably different in scope than their 
counterparts in municipalities.
 ^ Interestingly, in a study conducted by Streib and Waugh (1991), the researchers found similar results as 
Svara (1990) and L ew is and Taylor (1990). Streib and W augh pointed to adversarial relationships between  
board and council mem bers, and administrators, as a com m on im pedim ent to im proving m anagem ent 
capacity in county governm ent.
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Klase, Pops, and Mok (1996) proposed a conceptual model o f county government 
conflict based on past literature of organization and environmental relationships (Kast & 
Rosenzweig, 1979; Katz & Kahn, 1982; March & Simon, 1958; Thompson, 1967). In 
their study, Klase et al. attempted to identify the factors that affected county conflict. The 
researchers proposed a model that accounted for the general environmental factors in 
which local governments operated and experienced conflict, e.g., general economic 
conditions, geographic uniqueness, social diversity, and political dimensions. 
Additionally, the researchers’ model examined the detailed task environment of county 
governance and conflict. They concluded that factors such as partisan elections, shared 
administrative authority, and fragmentation of authority, all contributed to adversarial 
environments for county administrators, both general and task-specific.
The studies on county governments performed by Svara (1996), and DeSantis and 
Renner (1996), both supported earlier research of Lineberry and Fowler (1967), when the 
researchers concluded that traditional county governments were frequently criticized for 
being less responsive to citizen demands when compared to reformed governments. 
DeSantis and Renner also found that traditional governments were less capable of 
adapting to changes in the demographic and social character o f their jurisdictions when 
compared to reformed governments. The study results o f DeSantis and Renner also 
mirrored earlier research by Kessel (1962) that put forth the posit that reformed 
governments were synonymous with communities that had socially homogeneous values 
and reduced levels of conflict, while unreformed governments were generally found in 
socially heterogeneous communities with higher levels of conflict.
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The review of literature suggested that the type and degree o f county conflict might 
differ depending on the form o f government a county chose to incorporate, e.g., the 
Commission-Administrator form of government versus the Commission-Manager form 
of government (Morgan & Kickham, 1999). As previously discussed, the first type of 
government, called the county administrator plan, incorporates an administrator who 
generally has limited authority in the appointment o f department heads. Because county 
administrators operate under closer supervision by the commission or council, it has been 
hypothesized that they have much less opportunity to shape county policy (see DeSantis 
& Renner, 1993), an attribute that may lesson the degree of conflict between appointed 
administrators and commission or council members (Klase, Pops, & Mok, 1996; Streib & 
Waugh, 1991 ; Svara, 1990). DeSantis & Renner further posited that in the weakest 
version of the administrator plan, the administrator “primarily performs tasks and gives 
advice at the request of the council” (p. 23).
This differs from the second type, which is called the “county manager plan,” where 
the county manager has the authority to appoint department heads. In the county manager 
plan, the appointed manager generally possesses authority similar to that of a city 
manager. Further, under this plan the county manager sets the legislative agenda, 
formulates the budget, appoints department heads, and oversees the general county 
operations (Benton, 2002). Because o f the greater authority of appointed executives in the 
county manager plan, the degree o f conflict between the manager and commission 
members may be greater.
In a study that reviewed the research on both county and municipality governments in 
the 1990s, Pammer, Lightle, and Watson (2000) determined that inherent differences
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existed between the two. Unlike municipalities that principally function with a Council- 
Manager form o f government, American counties that use a Commission-Administrator 
form of government generally do not vest the county administrator with all o f the 
executive functions as their city counterparts.
Pammer et al. (2000) expanded this area o f thought by proposing that complex 
intergovernmental relationships placed burdensome requirements on county 
administrators to understand their responsibility in influencing the execution of various 
public services. Pammer et al. also explored the methods as to how administrators deal 
with county issues in a fragmented political structure. In their study, they concluded that 
administrators value a facilitative-participatory form of rapport with governing 
eommission members and departmental staff alike. The researchers further eoncluded 
that increased rapport between eounty administrators and governing eommission 
members effectively reduced conflict within the county government structure.
Conflict in eounty government is derived from many sources. These sources might 
include political uncertainty, organizational turf battles, and competition for declining 
resources (Klase & Song, 2000). Klase and Song posited that demands on county 
governments by citizens, and politieal and special interest groups, also contributed to the 
increased intensity and duration of conflict within a county organization.
Political Uncertainty 
Kammerer et al. (1962) suggested that political uncertainty may be common 
explanatory factors o f top public executive turnover. In their study of 39 top municipality 
executive turnovers in ten Florida Cities, the researehers uncovered political disputes as 
the principal factor for two-thirds of the involuntary departures. Banfield and Wilson
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(1963), in their book City Politics, reinforced the idea that political uncertainty played a 
critical role in most municipalities. In their work, Banfield and Wilson discovered that 
municipalities with larger populations were more likely to have a greater degree of 
politieal conflict than their smaller counterparts. The researchers also noted that when 
conflict was not suppressed, “politics in the small community tends to be more bitter, 
more divisive, and more explosive than politics in the large city” (p. 26). Banfield and 
Wilson, as well as Lineberry and Fowler (1967), agreed with and suggested that the 
degree of political conflict and uncertainty within local governments is one o f the most 
crucial determinants in an appointed administrator’s decision to leave their position.
Researchers have posited that not all top public executives approach political conflict 
and uncertainty the same. Downs (1967), for example, elassified publie executives into 
five types, each with their own approach to political conflict. Downs called the two self- 
interested types climbers and conservers. As Downs explained, climbers were mostly 
foeused on their own career advancement in lieu of organizational goals and objectives. 
Conservers, on the other hand, were foeused on maintaining what they had with the least 
amount of effort. The three public-spirited types, as Downs explained, were zealots, 
advocates, and statesmen. While zealots were considered more strongly committed to the 
success of a particular policy, advocates and statesmen were more pragmatie and took a 
global view by concentrating on the overall good of the organization.
Zeigler, Kehoe, and Reisman (1985) also studied political uncertainty. Based on data 
from the early 1980s, the researchers reviewed executive career patterns as they related to 
top-executive career advancement. Their research fell short, however, because they did 
not investigate the relationship of political uncertainty to top-executive turnover.
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In a more recent study, DeHoog and Whitaker (1990) found that disagreements 
between commission and council members, and top public executives, indirectly 
influenced an administrator’s decision to voluntarily leave his or her position. As 
DeHoog and Whitaker suggested, this preemptive move by an administrator may be a 
strategic move before conflict with the council reaches the “firing point” (p. 369).
The theory that top public executives voluntarily leave their positions due to political 
conflict and uncertainty prior to being dismissed is also found in later studies. For 
example, in a study of top municipality executive turnover conducted by DeSantis and 
Newell (1996) one experienced city manager was quoted as saying, “Get out before they 
fire you”  ^(p. 3).
In that same year, Svara (1990) put forward the idea that there were two patterns of 
interaction in local governments. The first had its foundation embedded in conflict while 
the other was based on cooperation. In local governments that operated in conflict, 
distrust is pervasive because goals are incompatible. The prevailing motto, as Svara 
explained, was, “do it to them before they can do it to you’” (p. 30). Svara further 
suggested that a government which principally operates in the realm of conflict “is 
inherently ungovernable” because there are no common goals or values between the 
separate parties (p. 31 ).
Echoing earlier works (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967), Svara 
(1990) further advocated that reformed governments were less likely to be conflict-prone. 
The one exception to this rule, as Svara explained, was when a local government did not
" In the D ehoog  and Whitaker 1990 study, top m unicipality executives found in h igh-conflict situations 
were tw ice as likely to quit their job s as compared to top m unicipality executives that were not in what they 
considered a high-conflict position.
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have “evenly balanced political factions” (p. 53). Svara put forward the idea that, “In 
these cities the shift of a council majority from one faction to another is likely to be 
accompanied by replacement of the manager” (p. 53).
In a lengthy follow-up study of top municipality executive turnover one year later, 
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that political conflict and uncertainty had not 
been studied in depth by local government scholars, and that the common belief amongst 
researchers was that top public executives in the Council-Manager form of city 
government leave their jobs because o f career advancement, not because o f preemptive 
reasons due to being “under fire” (p. 164).
In their study of 133 top municipality executives in Florida between 1986 and 1990, 
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) found that political conflict was a frequently cited cause of 
turnover, and that the “type” of conflict made a difference. For example, policy conflicts 
and style disagreements were more apt to cause turnover than conflicts that were caused 
by underlying commission factions. The researchers also found a correlation between the 
turnover in commission members and increased top municipality executive turnover.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) proposed two models of political conflict contributing 
to top public executive turnover. The first model suggested an internal struggle for 
control amongst the commission members. In this model, the commission members are 
typically divided into two factions, each struggling with the other for control. Whitaker 
and DeHoog suggested that if  the struggle expanded to include the top public executive, 
it could signal the executive’s departure.
The second model pointed to a discord between the top public executive and the 
commission members themselves. In this model, the actions or conduct of either party
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becomes a major issue. Beeause the executive typieally serves at the “will” of the 
eommission, confliets between the two eould easily contribute to an executive leaving his 
position.
The researchers further concluded that top public executives who departed their 
positions of city manager cited considerable political uncertainty or conflict as a principal 
reason for exiting. Interestingly, confliet between commission members and executives 
was more a cause of departure than internal conflict among commission members.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) also found that conflict within the commission led to 
involuntary or forced appointed executive turnover only when the executive became 
entangled or aligned. The researchers, for example, discovered that nine o f the executives 
studied left their jobs because they lost the commission majority support. Additionally, 
the researchers found that in six of the nine cases, an election amongst the commission 
changed the balance of power of the governing board, ushering in a faction that was 
opposed to the existing appointed top executive.
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) also posited that internal commission conflict had a 
contributing effect on top municipality executive turnover because of its ability to create 
high levels of frustration on the part of the executive. In many ways, Whitaker and 
DeHoog’s study results mirrored the research o f 30 years prior, when Kammerer et al. 
(1962), and Banfield and Wilson (1963), put forth the idea that conflict played a critical 
role in top public executive turnover. Whitaker and DeHoog’s study also added credence 
to their earlier study in 1990, which found that political environments with high levels of 
uncertainty and conflict led top municipality executives to depart their positions at twice 
the normal rate.
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DeSantis and Newell (1996) found similar turnover patterns o f top municipality 
executives in a later study. As with Whitaker and DeHoog’s (1991) research, DeSantis 
and Newell estimated that political conflict attributed to roughly one-half o f all 
departures o f top municipality executives. This differed somewhat from the earlier study 
by Kammerer et al. (1962), which concluded that two-thirds of the turnover in top 
municipality executive positions were involuntary and caused by conflicts between 
commission members and top municipality executives.
Five years later, Renner (2001) reported the most striking dissimilarity in previous 
studies and the influence of political conflict on top public executive turnover when she 
presented the results of the 2000 ICMA State of the Profession survey. Renner’s results 
concluded that of the 10% of top municipality executives who had changed positions in 
the previous year, only 3% were terminated. Furthermore, of the 3% who changed jobs, 
10% were fired, 20% were forced to resign, and 70% were pressured.
Other studies have found comparable results, pointing to the fact that political conflict 
among commission members produced unbearable working environments for top public 
executives, effectively creating a push effect that led to executive turnover (Box, 1993; 
Kaatz & Gabris, 1996; Kaatz, French, & Prentiss-Cooper, 1999; Loveridge, 1971; Renner 
& DeSantis, 1993, 1994; Svara, 1991).
Svara (1995) and Protasel (1995) speculated that the origin of political conflict could 
be found in the vagueness of public policy and administration duties between governing 
commissions and top public executives. More specifically, the researchers suggested that 
responsibilities between commission members and top municipality executives in the 
domain of strategic mission formulation, administrative policy, and the day-to-day
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management of a city’s operation, were sometimes blurred. Even though the classic 
policy-administration dichotomy model puts forth a doctrine of separation of 
responsibilities, Svara and Protasel both suggested models with mixed responsibilities 
would be better utilized in the real world.
Denton and Pisciotte (1993), and Golembiewksi and Gabris (1995), both pointed out 
that the Council-Manager form of city government continues to change in ways that 
requires increased partnership and interaction between governing board members and top 
appointed public executives. Streib (1992) and Brimeyer (1993) both posited that this 
development is largely caused by the need for top executives to work more closely with 
commission and council members, community leaders, and ordinary citizens, to build 
consensus and formulate and address policy issues (ICMA, 1995). Because close 
relations are required to ensure cooperation with stakeholders in the community, it is 
important that the efforts o f top executives are not perceived as an infringement on the 
policy-making responsibilities of the commission or council.
Some researchers have posited that varying value orientations of governing 
commission members and top executives can have an intensifying effect on political 
conflict and uncertainty, i.e., self-promoting activities (Brimeyer, 1993; ICMA, 1958). 
Because governing commissions ultimately have the power to dismiss top executives, 
executives have an elevated interest in establishing and nurturing good relationships with 
commission and council members.
Carnevale (1995) suggested that trust was an important key to establishing good 
relations. As Carnevale put forth, trust is a set of expectations such as honesty, 
responsiveness, and competency, that elected commission and council members, and top
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executives, should expect from each other in the performanee o f their duties. McClelland 
(1985) proposed that trust between commission and council members, and top 
executives, could be enhaneed if  one party pereeived the other as supportive of their 
goals, were efficacious in their actions, took into account their concerns, and participated 
in the decision-making process. McClelland also suggested that the lack o f any o f these 
qualities would effeetively denote distrust, thereby increasing the potential for political 
conflict and uncertainty.
A study by Berman (1997) found similar results to those of earlier researchers 
(Brimeyer, 1993; Streib, 1992). In Berman’s study, the researcher assessed the efficacy of 
trust-building strategies of city managers in municipalities with populations greater than 
50,000, and posited that increased involvement by top municipality executives in 
community leadership was the most significant threat (as well as opportunity) affecting 
municipality council-manager relations in recent years.
According to Berman (1997), “The potential threat to council-manager relations from 
activities such as visible leadership in community-based strategic planning, increased 
coordination of public and private services, development of public-private partnerships, 
cultivation o f media relations, etc., is that these activities may be perceived as infringing 
on council’s policy-making responsibilities and as influencing community politics”
(1997, p. 2). As Berman explained, “These community-based activities need not 
necessarily have detrimental affects on council relations”  ^ (p. 2). Svara (1990) and 
Watson and Hassett (2003) put forth the theory that two models existed between
 ^ Specifically , top m unicipality executives could use their com m unity-based activity roles as an opportunity 
to foster increased cooperation with council mem bers and, therefore, effectively  reduce political conflict 
(Berman, 1996; Carnevale, 1995; Svara, 1995).
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governing boards and top-executive interaction. The first was based on conflict, the 
second on cooperation. Interestingly, both studies suggested that in municipalities that 
display characteristics o f the conflict model, consensus building between the two parties 
regarding community goals was near impossible because the prevailing motto was “do it 
to them before they can do it to you’” (Svara, p. 53).
Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that political uncertainty and conflict o f this 
nature played an important role in shortening a top municipality executive’s tenure. In 
their study, Whitaker and DeHoog concluded that political conflict, for the most part, was 
counterproductive and harmful to local governance. As Whitaker and DeHoog pointed 
out, commission members or top executives that pursue selfish or personal objectives 
may divert resources or delay action at the expense of the public well-being. Similarly, 
the researchers brought forth the opinion that “firing of competent, public-spirited 
managers because they refuse to violate laws or professional ethics, or because o f petty 
jealousies, costs (local governments) the effective executive leadership which that 
manager provided” (p. 156).
A further review o f recent literature on political conflict and uncertainty alluded to 
the notion that political conflict among commission and council members often preceded 
the departure o f a top public executive (Pammer, Marlowe, & Dustin, 1999). Svara 
(1999) suggested this was espeeially the case when there was a shift in the majority on a 
governing board.
Kaatz (1996), on the other hand, concluded that turnover in a commission might 
indicate an underlying political controversy that ultimately draws a top executive into 
disagreement with commission members. Based on his research of Chicago-area
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municipalities, Kaatz suggested that turnover in the local governing board was directly 
correlated with higher turnover in local top executives.
Svara (1999) built upon this idea by putting forth the theory that publie executive 
turnover could be related to “short term visions” of governing board members (p. 50). In 
his study of council-manager relations in over 30 cities in the United States with 
populations in excess of 200,000, Svara determined that seven out o f every ten top 
munieipality executives felt that council members foeused more on “short-term” 
problems (or failures) versus “long-term” matters.^
While the literature review was rich in empirical studies supporting the view that 
political conflict and uncertainty acted as a precursor to top-executive turnover in local 
governments, it lacked research that addressed strategies o f redueing political conflict. As 
Golembiewski and Gabris (1995) argued, one way for top public executives to reduce 
political conflict is to create “management teams” where the executive’s role changes 
from “chief implementer to chief facilitative change agent” (p. 244). In Golembiewski 
and Gabris’ study of top municipality executives, the researchers suggested that by 
creating management teams, top exeeutives could garnish more support from key 
stakeholders, therefore reducing the possibly of involuntary turnover. As the researchers 
stated, “exchanges of support can buffer turbulence, for example, or see individuals 
through the inevitable rough spots that might otherwise induce turnover” (p. 244).
Similarly, Pammer, Marlowe, Janet, and Dustin (1999) identified several strategies 
that top public executives eould use to gain the support and confidence of commission 
and council members, thereby reducing political conflict. The researchers posited that the
In his research, Svara also alluded to the idea that top m unicipality executives w ere generally held 
accountable for these failures.
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most important strategy was the creation of an agenda to which internal stakeholders’ 
roles and expectations could be identified to further consensus building. Furthermore, the 
researchers argued that for this strategy to succeed, succinct goals had to be established to 
serve as the foundation for a mutually cooperative relationship.
A second strategy put forth by Pammer et al.(1999) to reduce political conflict was 
for top public executives to devise “new eollaborative approaches enabling staff and 
council members to discuss policy-related issues in a forum outside a formal council 
meeting” (p. 161).
Many researchers have forwarded the opinion that top public executives should 
always respond to the governing board members’ requests and inquiries in a timely 
manner. Similarly, many studies have shown that when top public executives provide 
timely information, explain the rationale for actions taken, respond promptly to citizen 
requests, and give “credit” to commission and council members (to help boost their 
public images), political conflict and uncertainty within the public organization could be 
minimized (Gabris & Kaatz, 1994; Marshall, 1992; Mathis, 1993).
Government Fiscal Performance
A  review o f the literature suggested that researchers have only recently begun to use 
government fiscal performance factors as explanatory variables in models of top public 
executive turnover. Additionally, the review of literature found no such studies that 
specifically pertained to county administrator turnover. While the studies uncovered 
during the literature review do not explicitly apply to county administrator turnover, a 
discussion of their results was deemed relevant to this research study.
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The first such study noted was performed by Feiock et al. (2001). In this study the 
researchers examined whether increased tax burdens led to greater turnover o f top public 
executives (measured in per capita property tax revenue). The study results suggested that 
growth in property tax revenue had no significant effect on top public executive turnover.
Similarly, one year later a study by Feiock and Stream (2002) uncovered that only 
modest effects existed between top-executive turnover and a municipality’s fiscal policy, 
i.e., level of taxing, spending, and borrowing.
Most recently, McCabe et al. (2006) proposed that the fiscal status of municipalities 
might contribute to an appointed top public executive’s decision to leave his or her 
position. The researchers further theorized that a top executive’s performance might be 
inconsequential in municipalities that exhibit strong fiscal capacity, low taxes, and low 
debt.
McCabe et al. (2006) also posited that top executives in smaller and more 
homogenous municipalities might exhibit less turnover. In their study, the researchers 
measured fiscal stress as a function o f the municipalities’ level of per capita property tax, 
bond rating, and per capita long-term debt. The results of their study mirrored those of 
earlier research suggesting that a municipality’s fiscal condition, i.e., debt level and 
property tax, had no significant influence on top-executive turnover.
Community Instability
In the review o f literature, no studies were found that applied community instability 
factors to county administrator turnover. The review o f the literature did find research 
however, on community instability factors as they relate to top municipality executive 
turnover. Because of the parallels between top municipality executive turnover and
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county administrator turnover, it was thought to be appropriate to discuss the results of 
these studies.
Stillman (1974) was one of the first to determine that in municipalities, population 
size was a dominant factor in top-executive turnover. Subsequent studies have yielded 
similar results (Boynton & DeSantis, 1990; Newell et al., 1989).
Feiock et al. (2001) suggested that demographic factors, such as a community’s level 
of affluence and ethnic diversity, might be indicators of divisions or “cleavages” within a 
community. Furthermore, Feiock et al. posited that measurements of cleavages within a 
community may be useful in explaining top municipality executive turnover. Using a 
pooled cross-sectional sample o f cities within the United States with populations o f at 
least 75,000 in 1989, the researchers determined that top executives serving in more 
wealthy and homogenous communities exhibited lesser frequency of turnover. 
Conversely, the researchers found that top executives serving in heterogeneous 
communities tended to have shorter tenures and higher turnover rates than their 
counterparts.
Two years later, Watson and Hassett (2003) performed a study of “long-serving” 
municipality executives (20 or more years o f continuous service with the same 
municipality) using the ICMA’s 2000 National State of the Profession Survey. The 
researchers found that most top executives came from relatively homogenous, politically 
stable municipalities with populations of 30,000 or less. Furthermore, many o f the long- 
serving top executives examined in the study were raised in the communities in which 
they were employed, suggesting that top executives are not as mobile as once believed.
55
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Interestingly, Watson and Hassett (2004) further examined top executives in large 
municipalities and discovered a positive relationship between the size of the municipality 
and the amount o f compensation the executive received. This may be due to the fact that 
large municipalities require an executive compensation package that is proportionate to 
the executive’s role and responsibility.
Researchers have also attempted to link population growth to a community’s level of 
instability. Recently, researchers have found that top executives in communities that 
experience little or no growth, as well as those that experienced rapid and sustained 
growth, were equally as likely to leave their positions (McCabe et al., 2006). This 
phenomenon as McCabe et al. suggested, demonstrated the importance of economic 
development within a community and its relationship to top-executive turnover.
While the literature review found no specific empirical studies correlating economic 
development and top public executive turnover, it has been proposed as an important 
investigative factor in the research of this topic (Wright 1969). Accurately measuring the 
influence a top public executive exerts on community economic development, however, 
is problematic considering the difficulty in defining parameters against which to measure. 
Given these difficulties, researchers have used the economic accomplishments of the 
jurisdiction to simulate the performance of top public executives with reasonable proxy 
(Fiorina, 1981).
One such study performed by Arnold (1990) examined congressional action. Arnold 
determined that poor outcomes (or results) were more likely to lead to “blame” as 
compared to good outcomes. Following this line of reasoning, Arnold theorized that poor 
economic growth within a community in the short term could lead to dissatisfaction
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within the governing commission towards the executive, effectively contributing to the 
executive’s pushed departure. Conversely, Arnold posited that good long-term economic 
growth within a community might be a sign of a top executive’s ability to successfully 
oversee multiple programs, therefore increasing the executive’s opportunity to be pulled 
out of his or her position.
Appointed local government executives have increasingly been assigned the 
responsibility of managing a jurisdiction’s economic development (Banovetz, 1995). 
Renner (2001), in her analysis of the ICMA’s 2000 National State of the Profession 
Survey, found that top executives identified economic growth as a key issue within their 
jurisdictions.
Stein ( 1990) also reviewed the economic development practices o f top executives in 
municipalities as they relate to pull factors. Stein suggested that top executives could 
leverage successful developmental policies within their jurisdictions to obtain more 
prestigious positions in larger communities, a theory also supported by the later work of 
researchers Feiock and Stream (2002).
More recently, McCabe et al. (2006) determined that the economic conditions of a 
municipality, both in magnitude and duration, had a measurable influence on top- 
executive tenure. McCabe et al. proposed that while top municipal executives were able 
to convincingly take credit for the economic successes of their jurisdictions, so could they 
be blamed for the jurisdiction’s economic failures. Furthermore, the researchers 
suggested that by concentrating on the economic successes and failures of a municipality, 
it could be possible to measure the magnitude and degree of both the push and the pull 
factors affecting top public executive turnover.
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McCabe et al. (2006) built upon this idea by advancing the concept that top 
executives in municipalities that experienced sustained economic growth could be 
afforded career-advancing opportunities by being pulled to more lucrative positions in 
larger municipalities. Conversely, top executives in municipalities that experienced 
declining economic conditions would more likely be pushed from their positions.
Administrator Profile 
In a review of the literature, a number of researchers were found to suggest the 
importance o f advanced education in the vocation of public administration of local 
government. Banovetz (1971) stated that many early top municipality executives were 
civil engineers by vocation, selected because they were technicians “employing neutral 
competence rather than as leaders in policy development” (p. 82). According to 
Banovetz, the challenges of forming public policy faced by early top public executives 
did not have the “immediacy” as those facing contemporary public executives (p. 82). 
Barber (1988) also studied this domain and concluded that graduate degrees in public 
administration and public policy have become the “preferred graduate degree” over 
earlier civil engineering degrees (p. 697).
In a study conducted by Renner (2001), the researcher discovered that by the turn of 
the 2U‘ century 63% of all top municipality executives had obtained an advanced degree, 
with most degrees being in public administration, urban planning, or public policy. 
Similarly, Watson and Hassett (2002) found that 69% of long-serving top executives in 
municipalities with populations under 30,000 had a graduate degree.
The ability of top executives to exhibit “mobility” appeared to be a common thread in 
the literature reviewed. Paul (1981) and Barber (1988) proposed that mobility was a
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principal strategy to a public executive’s career advancement plans, and that executives 
commonly sought and accepted management positions with increasingly larger 
organizations. Similarly, Descants and Newell (1996) found that nearly 80% of top public 
executives in large municipalities came from outside the community.
Watson and Hassett (2004) suggested that many larger organizations are beginning to 
nurture “homegrown” executives through internal career paths. This has led researchers 
to posit that the percentage of top public executives that come from “outside” an 
organization may be diminish significantly in future years. This may be partially due to 
the increased availability and access to graduate-level public administration education in 
faster growing communities. If this theory holds true, homegrown local professionals 
from within large communities will rise to the top of public organizations, prompting 
earlier literature o f public executive mobility to be altered to include the category of 
“local professionals.”
In earlier studies, researchers also found evidence that increased tenure strengthened 
the tendency for employees to remain at their place of employment (Porter & Steers, 
1973). Mobley et al. (1979) confirmed this earlier work and suggested that as an 
individual’s tenure increased, the probability of the individual leaving his or her position 
decreased. Likewise, researchers Cotton and Tuttle (1986) found compelling evidence in 
their meta-analysis that a negative relationship existed between tenure and turnover.
Other researchers have, by and large, supported the hypothesis of these earlier studies 
(Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990; Lucas, Parasuraman, Davis, & Enis, 1987).
The review of literature suggested that researchers of Council-Manager forms of city 
government have long theorized that most top executives change positions numerous
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times during their professional careers. Similarly, it is common belief amongst current 
and future top municipality executives that securing the most lucrative publie 
management positions requires an individual to make multiple job changes during ones 
career. This echoed the theories o f researchers who have posited that short job tenures of 
top executives in local municipalities are principally due to job market searching by these 
individuals for more lucrative and politically stable positions (DeHoog & Whitaker,
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Feiock & Stream, 1998; Kaatz et al., 1999; Renner & 
DeSantis, 1994).
Some researchers, however, have found evidence that a small group of top executives 
experience lengthy careers in a single municipality. For example, in Watson and 
Hassett’s (2003) study of 146 current and past city executives (who had at least 20 years 
of service in the same municipality), the researchers found that most executives with 
lengthy tenures were from smaller municipalities with populations o f less than 100,000. 
Furthermore, the researchers concluded that those communities tended to be politically 
stable and homogeneous. Watson and Hassett also found that the majority of these 
executives were males of Caucasian descent with above-average education who had 
strong cohesive relationships with the governing commission members.
In a similar study, Watson and Hassett (2004) examined the career paths of 113 
appointed top city executives in communities with populations over 100,000. The 
researchers concluded that a positive correlation existed between top executives who had 
a high degree of management latitude, and longer tenures.’ Many executives in the study 
also suggested that a high degree o f management latitude was paramount in the
’ Important to note is that those w ho participated in the study cited managem ent latitude as the third leading 
factor contributing to extended tenures.
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
performance of their duties, and that nurturing an atmosphere o f trust from governing 
commission members early on was instrumental in acquiring longer-term managerial 
discretion.
Top public executives have also been described as “principled agents” who “do not 
shirk, subvert, or steal on the job even when the pecuniary and other tangible incentives 
to refrain from these behaviors are weak or non-existent” (Dilulio, 1994, p. 282). Dilulio 
proposed that top executives who act with loyalty to the organization, personally accept 
and endorse its mission, and communicate their support to employees throughout the 
organization, exhibit less turnover than their peers.
Renner’s (2001) report on the State of the Profession survey suggested that the 
average tenure of top public executives in municipalities is now nearly 7 years, doubling 
since 1965 when it was roughly 3 V2 years. According to the report, the researcher found 
that the average tenure for top public executives in large municipalities with a Council- 
Manager form of government was slightly less at 6 V2 years. This appears to contradict 
previous literature regarding top-executive tenure in large municipalities that alluded to 
increased political instability as a principal factor limiting executive tenure (Banfield & 
Wilson, 1963).
Average tenures of top municipality executives, for the most part, have increased over 
the past few decades. Renner (2001) suggested that a high degree o f job satisfaction and 
reduced forced turnover rates might be principal factors contributing to this trend. 
Whether or not this trend will continue is an area of continued debate among many 
researchers. For now, however, shorter top-executive tenures will remain the norm due to 
push factors such as political uncertainty, poor government fiscal performance, and
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community instability, as well as pull factors such as incentives associated with career 
advancements.
General Factors
The review of literature found that factors influencing top-executive turnover, such as 
compensation and benefits, ranked low compared to other factors, i.e., feeling valued and 
serving in the public interest (Patton, Witt, Lovrieh, & Fredericksen, 2002). In a study of 
long-serving top city executives eonducted by Watson and Hassett (2003), similar results 
were found. Additionally, Watson and Hassett noted that the “quality of life” some public 
executives enjoyed after 20 years or more of service was valued more than their actual 
compensation and benefits. Watson and Hassett found that some long-serving top 
municipality executives conveyed the importance of their public service role to the 
citizens of the community over pay and benefits.
Buckwalter and Parsons (2000) found that high level o f job satisfaction among top 
public executives was a key factor in reducing top-executive turnover. In their study of 
800 top executives in local municipalities, the researchers noted that most executives who 
enjoyed a high level of job satisfaetion attributed the job fulfillment to their “sense of 
success” (p. 19). In a comparable study of long-serving public executives, Watson and 
Hassett (2002) found similar results when they concluded that the prineipal reason for 
reduced turnover in top munieipality executive positions was a high level o f job 
satisfaction.
Renner (2001) also found job satisfaction to be an important factor in top-executive 
tenure and retention. In her research, Renner diseovered that an overwhelming majority
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of top public executives (97%) felt that their eareers had been “successful,” while 22% of 
those surveyed said they were “highly satisfied with their jobs” (p. 40).
An examination of earlier literature also uncovered research suggesting that a 
relationship existed between an individual’s age and length of tenure. Porter and Steers 
(1973), for example, concluded that a strong “negative” relationship existed between age 
and tenure. Mobley et al. (1979) also found that “age...is consistently and negatively 
related to turnover” (p. 493). Similarly, later meta-analyses advocated that turnover 
deelined with age, suggesting that older employees are less likely to leave their positions 
than their younger counterparts (Cotton & Tuttle, 1986). This may be due to the inherent 
difficulties experienced by older employees in obtaining similar employment (Werbel & 
Bedeian, 1989). Some researchers have pointed to age discrimination as a principal factor 
in the difficulty of older employees securing further employment (McGoldriek & 
Arrowsmith, 1993; Perry, Kulik, & Bourhis, 1996).
More recent literature, however, has disputed these earlier theories. Healy, Lehman, 
and McDaniel (1995), for example, found that no statistically significant relationship 
existed between age and turnover.
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CHAPTER 3
U.S. COUNTY GOVERNANCE 
History of American County Government
The word “county” can be traced back to the French word “conte,” meaning the 
domain of a count. Webster defines county as “the largest territorial division for local 
government within a state of the U.S.” The Anglo-Saxon county called “shire” is the 
basis of Webster’s definition. The origin of Ameriean county government dates back to 
the shire system in early English history, although there are even earlier examples of 
county forms o f government (Municipal Research and Services Center o f Washington, 
2006).
In the early 16'*’ century, the basic unit of local government in New England colonies 
was the town. Soon thereafter, colonists adopted the shire structure o f government for 
purposes of addressing a broader range of colony issues, such as economic and 
geographic needs. Conversely, in the southern states counties generally developed 
without townships or subdivisions such as colonies.
As America grew, new states adopted either the New England or southern state 
design. Interestingly, during the authoring of the United States Constitution, the founding 
fathers did not provide for local governments, rather leaving the ehoice of local
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governance to eaeh individual state. Subsequently, this led to early state constitutions 
viewing county governments as an extension, or arm, of that state.
As America pushed westward, counties advanced as the primary local unit of 
government, providing the delivery of public services in large regions where rural 
populations were widely dispersed. Following the turn o f the 20^ century, increasing 
populations, trends towards suburban development, and the government “reform” 
movement gave strength to the role of local governments such as counties. These 
eombined developments, in many ways, provided the necessary elements for greater 
urbanization in the mid-20‘'’ eentury. Additionally, due to the reform movement, counties 
began to gain greater independence from state influence, and started to be viewed as a 
provider of an ever-widening range of services (Iowa State Association of Counties, 
2006).
For Ameriean eounties to fulfill their newly perceived responsibilities however, they 
needed to aequire more authority and political power. To accomplish this task, counties 
had to eliminate the long-standing “pereeption” of limited authority. This required 
counties to develop more respect and cooperation from other government entities. The 
National Association of Counties (2006) summarized this situation as follows: “The 
battle, then, was twofold: First, expand county government’s eapacity to address local 
challenges; second, secure counties a “seat at the table” when city, state and federal 
authorities eame together” (p. 10).
With the population growth of rural areas in the United States during the mid-20'^ 
century, non-urbanized counties also began to increase their power base. Many non-
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urbanized counties attempted to leverage this newly acquired influence to further gain 
expanded “home rule” from their respective state legislatures.
The National Association o f Counties (2006) suggested home rule as following one of 
two general models. In the first model, states delegated to the county limited and 
specifically defined powers, while continuing to maintain control over critical functions 
such as revenue and fiscal policy. In the second model, sometimes called the charter 
model, states permitted counties to adopt a form of local constitution that included a 
broader scope of authority, with county voter approval. This authority covered many 
aspects of county governance such as the determination o f organizational structure, the 
imposing of taxes to generate revenues, and the autonomy in the spending of monies on a 
broad continuum of service-related programs and activities.
The home rule movement o f the 20'^ century in many ways signaled a new era for 
American counties. First, counties were given the authority to decide for themselves their 
own form of government rather than being mandated to choose from the limited forms of 
government formerly prescribed by state statutes or law. Second, counties were able to 
apply for more resources to meet public demands (National Association of Counties, 
2006).
The National Association of Counties further classified American counties into three 
broad categories. These eategories ineluded the (a) Commission form of government, (b) 
Commission-Executive form of government, and (c) Commission-Administrator (or 
Manager) form of government.
The form of county government with the longest history is the Commission form of 
government, where the qualified electors o f the county elect either a single or multi-
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member board that direetly manages the county’s affairs in lieu of employing a 
professional administrator.
Proponents o f the Commission form of government have suggested that it is the most 
democratic form of government, because independent eleetions o f key individuals within 
the government structure limit the potential of corruption. Proponents further suggest that 
the Commission form of government offers more “checks and balances.”
Opponents, on the other hand, suggest that the Commission form of government lacks 
a strong executive component. Opponents further advocate that a diffused power 
structure contributes to vague responsibilities and, due to the absence of a professional 
administrator, important decisions may tend to be politically driven.
Due to the inherent “management” limitations o f the Commission form of 
government, some American counties have elected to incorporate a form of government 
that includes a professional administrator position, e.g., Commission-Exeeutive or 
Commission-Administrator form of government.
The overall responsibilities o f a professional administrator vary from county to 
county, but are generally limited to the administration and operation of county programs. 
Also, professional administrators hold a variety of titles, e.g., chief executive, chief 
exeeutive officer, or chief administrative officer.
Forms of American County Government 
There are numerous forms of county governments within the United States, eaeh 
governed by their respective state’s statutes, laws and regulations. As previously 
mentioned, most American county governments can be classified into three basic
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categories: Commission, Commission-Executive, and Commission-Administrator forms 
o f government. Under each form of county government, many administrative 
responsibilities are vested by state constitution or statute to independently eleeted row 
officers, e.g., county clerk, county coroner, county sheriff, and county treasurer (National 
Assoeiation o f Counties, 2006).
Elected board or governing board members in Ameriean counties are most frequently 
called commissioners or supervisors, although there are many more titles that have been 
adopted. Many governing board members o f counties in the State of Louisiana, for 
example, are ealled parish police jurors, while governing board members of counties in 
the State of New Jersey are called freeholders.
The form of government adopted by the qualified electors of a county is dependent on 
a multitude o f factors. Factors may include population, the number of rural and urban 
communities, tax revenue bases, and the availability of administrative resources. While 
some counties choose to operate within a form of government incorporating streamlined 
and centralized decision-making attributes, such as the Commission-Executive or 
Commission-Administrator forms of government, other counties choose a form of 
government that is more decentralized, with dispersion among many interests, such as the 
Commission form of government. A more in-depth discussion of the three basic forms of 
county government follows.
Commission Form o f  County Government 
In the Commission form o f county government, legislative authority and executive 
powers are generally shared by a group of individuals elected to a commission or council. 
Legislative authority may include the power to enact county ordinances or regulations, or
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adopt budgets. Executive powers may also include the administration of county policies 
or regulations, and the appointment of county employees. In most instances, the county 
governing body consists o f an elected board or commission composed of three 
commissioners or supervisors. In counties with larger populations, the board size may be 
increased accordingly. Figure 3-1 provides an illustration of the traditional Commission 
form of county government (excluding row officers).
Voters
Board o f  Commissioners
Commis­
sioner
Commis­
sioner Chairperson
Commis­
sioner
Commis­
sioner
Supervises Supervises Supervises Supervises Supervises
Public
Works Fire
Finance
And
Administration
Public 
Flealth and 
Welfare
Leisure
Services
Figure 3-1. Traditional Commission form of government.
Interestingly, the Commission form of government does not afford the opportunity for 
one executive to oversee a county’s operations.^
M any tim es in the C om m ission form o f  governm ent, the board or council share the administrative and 
legislative functions with other county offic ia ls w ho are elected by county voters, e .g ., county clerk, 
treasurer, sheriff, coroner, and/or assessor. This shared function o f  authority m ay vary from county to 
county.
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A few counties within the United States, although not predominant, consist o f one 
elected official who is vested with the legislative authorities and executive powers 
normally reserved for a commission or council with multiple elected officials. Figure 3-2 
illustrates the Sole Commissioner form o f county government (excluding row officers).
Voters
Elect
Sole Commissioner
Supervises
Fire
Public
Works
Leisure
Services
Public 
Health and 
Welfare
Finance
And
Administration
Figure 3-2. Sole Commissioner form of government.
Commission-Executive Form o f  County Government 
The Commission-Executive form of county government consists of an elected board 
and an elected county executive or administrator. The underscoring principle of this form 
of government is the separation o f powers. A county executive is generally considered 
the chief administrative officer o f the county. Typically, the county executive has the 
authority to veto regulations or ordinances enacted by the commission or council, and
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appoint and dismiss county department heads. Figure 3-3 presents the typical structure of 
the Commission-Executive form of county government (excluding row officers).
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appoints appoints
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Director
Public
Safety
Director
Public
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And Parks 
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C hief
Executive
Officer
Board o f 
Commissioners
Figure 3-3. Commission-Executive form of government.
Although the Commission form of government has been the predominant county 
government structure in the United States, many counties in the recent past have turned to 
the Commission-Executive, or Commission-Administrator (or Manager) form of 
government. This has lead to the Commissioner-Executive form of government becoming 
the most accepted form of county government in the United States (County Executives of 
America, 2006). Many states, such as Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, have added to
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this shift by mandating that county executives head counties within their respective 
states. The National Association of Counties (2006) has estimated that more than 40% of 
American counties have shifted to a type o f government that incorporates either an 
elected executive or appointed county administrator.
All Commission-Executive forms of county government operate within an adopted 
charter. An adopted charter details the roles and authority of the commission or council 
and other elected officials, and delineates the roles and authority o f other appointed 
positions within the county government. While American counties are ultimately subject 
to state laws, under home rule the adopted charter allows the county the expanded ability 
to exercise a greater role in the formulation and execution of county policies as they 
deem fit.
As previously mentioned, the primary responsibility of the county executive is to 
serve as the chief executive officer of the eounty, while the commission or council 
function as the county’s legislative body (County Executives o f America, 2006). In rare 
cases, a county manager is appointed by the commission or council to aid a county 
executive in the functional operations of county programs. Other elected officials within 
the Commission-Executive form of government may include the county attorney, sheriff, 
treasurer, and public administrator or manager.
Directly elected by the voters, county executives are ultimately accountable to the 
qualified electors of the county and are obligated to carry out a host o f administrative 
functions in accordance with the terms and conditions o f an elected representative. 
County executives, for example, generally direct county policy and work cooperatively 
with the county commission or council. County executives also exercise the power to
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appoint and dismiss employees from county positions, oversee the development of the 
county budget, and provide a legislative voice when approving or vetoing proposed 
regulations and ordinances. In many cases, county executives are tasked with the 
responsibility of overseeing all county services, ineluding criminal justice, social and 
health services, welfare, waste treatment, taxes, business and economic development, 
recreation, disaster and natural/environmental assistance, and other programs specific to 
the needs o f the county (County Executives of America, 2006).
Commission-Administrator/Manager 
Forms o f  County Government
Although the Commission-Administrator and Commission-Manager forms of 
government were considered synonymous for purposes of this research study, it is 
important to note that there is a subtle distinction between the two; Administrators in the 
Commission-Administrator form of government generally do not have the authority to 
appoint and dismiss department heads. This authority usually rests with the commission 
or council. Conversely, in the Commission-Manager form of government, administrators 
are generally vested with the powers to appoint and dismiss department heads.
Figure 3-4 illustrates a typical Commission-Administrator form of county 
government (exeluding row officers). For comparative purposes, an illustration of a 
typical Commission-Manager form of county government (also excluding row officers) is 
provided in Figure 3-5.
The first administrator position legally defined by ordinance occurred in Staunton, 
Virginia, in 1908. In 1912, Sumter, South Carolina, became the first local government to 
adopt a charter incorporating the basic principles of the Commission-Administrator form 
of government, followed closely by Dayton, Ohio, in 1914.
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Figure 3-4. Commission-Administrator form of government.
The first American counties to officially adopt the Commission-Administrator form 
of government were Arlington County, Virginia, and Durham and Robeson Counties, 
North Carolina, in the 1930s. Since its establishment, the Commission-Administrator 
form of government has become the most popular o f all forms of county governments in 
American counties with populations of 5,000 or greater.
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Figure 3-5. Commission-Manager form of government.
The Commission-Administrator form of government generally consists of an elected 
board of commissioners or council, and an administrator that is appointed by the 
governing board. The administrator operates as the chief administrative officer of the
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county and is responsible to the governing board for all county affairs placed under his or 
her direction by county regulations, laws, or ordinances. The operating powers of this 
form of county government are either general or self-governing as determined by the 
qualified electors of the county.
The principal strength o f the Commission-Administrator form of government is its 
ability to combine the strong political leadership of elected governing board members 
with the strong managerial experience o f an appointed administrator.® In the 
Commission-Administrator form of government, the appointed administrator serves at the 
pleasure of the board.
Many American counties have chosen the Commission-Administrator form of 
government for two reasons. First, this form of government allows elected governing 
board members the ability to represent the community as leaders and policymakers by 
focusing their time on policy issues that are perceived as responsive to the citizens’ needs 
and wants. Second, the county benefits from the professional expertise of an 
administrator who ensures the day-to-day operations o f the county are efficiently 
executed, and that all the citizens o f the county are being served.
It is again important to note that in the Commission-Administrator form of 
government, the commission or council may terminate the administrator at any time he or 
she is perceived as unresponsive to the board’s needs. In one sense, an administrator’s 
responsiveness in the Commission-Administrator form of government is continuously 
being tested.
’ In one sense, this form of government establishes a representative system where all the legislative powers 
are concentrated within the board or council, and where board members appoint a professionally trained 
administrator to oversee the delivery of county services.
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Role of County Government
County governments, as with all forms o f government, are an institution formed with 
the intent to provide public services to its citizens that they cannot provide themselves. 
County governments also regulate activities that are overall considered harmful to the 
community.'® Contemporary American counties, however, are quickly moving into other 
service delivery areas as well, e.g., assisting in the administration of programs related to 
consumer protection, economic development, employment and training, planning and 
zoning, and water and air quality.
Wiseman (2004) suggested that the role o f county governments could be delineated 
into four primary areas. First, counties imply a “place that one calls home rather than a 
governmental management system” (p. 88). Although this concept may be overdone, 
Wiseman suggested that this role provides a useful lens in explaining the way citizens 
identify with the place where they live.
Second, Wiseman (2004) put forth the idea that counties provide a means o f citizen 
access to the federal system. Citizens rarely discern the appropriate jurisdiction for 
solutions deemed the responsibility of government; rather, citizens choose to address the 
issues deemed important to them at the level they to which they have access, i.e., the 
local level.
Third, Wiseman (2004) theorized that “citizens generally have a very real perception 
of their relationship with democratic government,” and that when demands are made, 
responses (positive or negative) are expected (p. 88). Wiseman termed this role as
Historically, the role of American counties has been focused on the performance of state mandated 
duties, e.g., assessment of property, record keeping of vital statistics, maintenance of rural roads, 
administration of elections and judicial functions, and indigent relief (National Association of Counties, 
2006 ).
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“■governmental demand and response” (p. 89). In many ways, qualified electors of the 
county feel that their best opportunity to obtain a response from government is at the 
municipal or county level.
Fourth is the issue of service delivery. Wiseman proposed that citizens primarily view 
the delivery o f services at the local level. Many times the local level is that of the 
American county. In many instances, county citizens view any deletions or changes from 
the array of services that a eounty provides as serious, implying service delivery is a 
paramount role of American counties.
The function of American counties as service-delivery units can vary significantly 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. One case in point is that most American counties are 
called upon to construct and maintain local roads. Some counties, such as those in the 
State of North Carolina, however, have no responsibility in the construction and repair o f 
local roads. The National Association of Counties (2006) further pointed out that service 
variations from county to county exist in the domain of social service provisions such as 
indigent care, and utility services such as the supply of water.
Similarly, disparity also exists between counties and local municipalities relating to 
the delivery of core services, e.g., planning, zoning, and building permits. In many 
regions of the country, local municipalities are viewed as the principal provider of 
services to incorporated areas, while counties are only required to provide services to 
unincorporated areas.
The inconsistency in service deliveries can also be observed when state-to-state 
program mandates are examined, such as Medicaid. In Alabama, for example, Medicaid 
is administered by the state, and counties have no fiscal or administrative responsibility.
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Conversely, in Iowa, counties fund 100% of the non-federal share for certain Medicaid 
services, such as waivers, and 50% of the non-federal share for other Medicaid services, 
such as case management (National Association o f Counties, 2006).
Furthermore, the mix o f services provided by American counties is many times a 
“shared responsibility” between a county and a local municipality. Fire and police 
protection are two such examples.
In the past few decades, county governments have extended their role as service 
delivery units in response to the ever-changing economic and political landscape in which 
they serve (Lobao & Kraybill, 2005). Since contemporary American counties are 
emerging as the fastest growing general-purpose government in the United States, their 
role in economic development and public service activities is also advancing. American 
counties are more and more being looked upon as a promoter o f local economic 
development and a provider o f expanded social “safety nets.”
County services referred to as safety nets are services that address a core group of 
citizens whose social, financial, physical, or mental conditions limit their ability to access 
and receive conventional medical care and related support services. The expanded role of 
American counties as providers of social safety nets includes making available major 
health services, such as health care for the uninsured, mental health, public health 
outreach, and substance abuse treatment services. While federal and state funds exist to 
support many of these programs, American counties are further allocating monies from 
their general funds to augment federal and state efforts to meet the local health care 
needs.
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Taxes continue to be the primary source of revenue for American counties. Many 
state constitutions, laws, and statutes mandate the sources of revenue upon which a 
county may draw. ' ' American counties spend their revenues on a number of public 
needs, such as educational and social services, transportation, public safety, and the 
protection of the environment. The U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006) reported that in 
2000-2001 American counties, on average, spent 14% of their revenues on educational 
services, 11% on social services, and 6% on public safety.
Contemporary American counties have been categorized as enigmatic hybrids of state 
and local government, acting sometimes as agents of the state, sometimes as county 
governments, and other times as municipal governments (Hoene, Baldassare, & Shires, 
2002). This concept supports the notion that American counties are frequently viewed as 
performing dual functions; first as a service delivery arm of the state, and second as a 
local point of government.
Throughout the United States, counties have provided, and continue to provide, a 
myriad o f services through numerous public bodies and agencies. In the course of 
providing these services, American counties have acted as a local economic stabilization 
force by employing millions of professional, technical, and clerical personnel. The U.S. 
Bureau of the Census (2006) estimated that there are nearly 2,500,000 individuals 
employed full-time by counties throughout the United States. Most full-time county 
employees provide public services in the areas of education, medical care, police and fire
" A ccording to a 2001 National A ssociation  o f  C ounties study titled, County Revenue Patterns: A Survey 
o f  Authority Practices, the single most important revenue source for American counties is property taxes, or 
roughly 31 % o f  the general revenue funds. Sales tax is the second largest revenue source for American  
counties, or 14% o f  the general fund.
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protection, corrections, streets and highways, public welfare, health, and the operation of 
a judicial system.
Role of County Administrator
It has been suggested that the principal role of a county administrator is to effectively 
oversee and manage the delivery o f local programs and services (County Executives of 
America, 2006). In counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government, the 
administrator’s duties, for the most part, include the following tasks and responsibilities 
in the delivery of those services:
1. Supervision o f all county offices, departments, boards, commissions, and 
agencies under the general control of the governing board, subject to the general 
direction and control of the board. Also, in the case of county managers, the 
appointment o f department heads;
2. Execution of all ordinances and resolutions of the governing board, and all laws 
of the state subject to enforcement by the county;
3. Preparation and submittal o f administrative codes and/or regulations that 
incorporate the details o f administrative procedures for the provision of county 
services to the governing board;
4. Preparation, submittal and administration of an annual budget and long-range 
expenditure plan, including a financial plan for raising revenues to the 
governing board;
5. Preparation and submittal of financial and administrative activity reports at the 
end of the fiscal year to the governing board;
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6. Act as principal liaison between the governing board and all other departments, 
boards, and commissions;
7. Appointment and dismissal (with the approval o f the governing board) of all 
appointed county officers, employees, and agents, except those who are elected 
by the people or whose appointment is otherwise provided for by law;
8. Implementation of policies and guidelines mandated by both federal and state 
laws and statutes;
9. Recommendation of necessary and desirable state legislation that supports the 
county’s goals and objectives;
10. Research and recommend the establishment and modification of county 
policies;
11. Representation regarding the county’s relations with the public, the press, and 
other governmental entities; and
12. Response to citizen inquiries, complaints and requests.
In summary, professional administrators have brought to American counties the 
experience and training of administering local government projects and programs. 
Commission and council members, and county citizens alike, have grown accustomed to 
the need of professional administrators to provide complete, accurate, and objective 
information on a myriad of county policies and programs.
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Conceptual Background 
The review of literature produced reoccurring themes that emphasized the profound 
effects o f local municipality top-executive turnover on city policies, programs, and fiscal 
commitments. This research study theorized that county administrator turnover would 
have similar effects on county policies, programs, and fiscal commitments. Numerous 
research efforts have been made to establish the relative suitability of various explanatory 
variables accounting for turnover of top executives in municipalities (Clingermayer et al., 
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006); however, 
no similar research efforts have been undertaken to date in an attempt to explain 
appointed county administrator turnover.
One of the principal purposes of this research study was to examine factors thought to 
contribute to appointed county administrator turnover in American counties, both in 
terms of general turnover and push/pull dynamics. In Chapter I , the research study 
problem was posed and theoretical models formulated depicting “general” researeh 
questions and hypotheses. The focus o f the literature review in Chapter 2 and the cross- 
sectional interviews with past and present county administrators formed the basis for 
selecting appropriate covariates, and developing “specific” research questions and
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hypotheses investigated in the empirical analyses conducted in Chapters 6 and 7. This 
chapter outlines the specific research questions and model-related hypotheses. The first 
section of this chapter provides the hypotheses for each of the 21 covariates in the 
General Model, denoted as Hypothesis a. The second section provides the hypotheses for 
each of the 15 covariates in the Push/Pull Model, denoted as Hypothesis b.
General Model - Research Questions and Hypotheses 
It has been established that the turnover of top executives in local municipalities is 
affected by political conflict and uncertainty within the governmental entity. It has also 
been ascertained that turnover o f top executives in municipalities is affected by the 
municipality’s fiscal performance, relative measurement o f stability within the 
community, and select administrator profiles. This research study proposed that similar 
relationships existed between these domains and appointed county administrator turnover 
in large American counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government.
The first model developed in this research study, the General Model, included a 
number o f explanatory variables that measured key dimensions thought to influence 
appointed county administrator turnover. The key dimensions (or domains) thought to 
influence county administrator turnover included political uncertainty, government fiscal 
performance, community instability, and select administrator profile characteristics.'^ 
Past studies have put forth the argument that any one domain may precipitate the 
departure or turnover o f a top publie executive. This study, on the other hand, suggested
Additionally, by including precise measurements (or covariates) within each of the four domains, it was 
thought that the general research questions provided in Chapter 1 could be further refined, allowing for the 
testing of more specific research questions and hypotheses.
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that models incorporating multiple domains could provide a better methodology in 
explaining appointed administrator turnover in large American counties.
Important to note is that up to this point in the research study, the ruling body of the 
public entity has been specifically referred to as the governing board, governing council, 
and/or commission. For purposes of uniformity, the public entity ruling body will simply 
be referred to as the commission from this point forward.
Political Uncertainty Domain
Political uncertainty as a determining factor o f top public executive turnover has been
a topic of research for nearly 50 years (see Kammerer et al., 1962). Many earlier
researchers theorized that political conflict and political uncertainty were principal
reasons why top public executives left their offiee (Banfield & Wilson, 1963; Lineberry
& Fowler, 1967). Recent studies of top public executive turnover have found that
disagreements between commission members and top public executives had measurable
effects on the decision of a top executive to leave his or her position (DeHoog &
Whitaker, 1990; Desantis & Newell, 1996).
The importance o f political uncertainty in appointed county administrator turnover
was also reflected in the interview responses with past and present county administrators.
For example. Interviewee #I responded;
I would strongly agree as to the importance of political uncertainty and appointed 
county administrator turnover, only because elected officials serve at the will of their 
constituents, and constituents can be very demanding. This leads elected officials to 
change in the wind, and when things aren’t going so well they take it out on the 
executive.
Similarly, support of the political uncertainty domain was indicated by Interviewee #2 
when they said:
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As a county manager, I expect success in the performance o f my job functions, but I 
also expect critieism from commission members. In some of the deeisions I’ve made,
I have not been able to count on the political support from commission members.
This has, to some extent, added to the uncertainty of my career.
Interviewee #4, on the other hand said:
I knew of times when commission members did nasty things to each other and asked 
me to do things I  was not very comfortable with. This created political and moral 
conflicts. One example would be asking that individuals be promoted people into 
positions they were not qualifiedfor.
Not all interviewees were totally convinced that political uncertainty was a dominant
factor in appointed county administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #2 said:
I think what you term political uncertainty has some impact on administrator 
turnover. In my case, I was there for 13 years, and I made it through a major scandal.
1 guess political uncertainty could be a factor in some administrators deciding to leave 
office, while others it’s not.
To explore the role of political uncertainty and appointed county administrator
turnover, the General Model put forth in this study contained four attributes thought to
accurately measure the domain of political uncertainty: (a) short-term commission
member turnover, (b) mid-term eommission member turnover, (c) commission leadership
turnover, and (d) partisanship/non-partisanship in commission member elections - change
in commission party control. The use of these attributes permitted the study to focus on
measurements o f those key attributes when developing specific research questions and
related hypotheses in the General Model.
Interestingly, Interviewee #3 strongly agreed with the selection of the four
aforementioned attributes when they stated:
In terms of your four measurements, I think they would accurately reflect (or 
measure) political uncertainty.
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The specific research questions and related hypotheses for the domain of political
uncertainty follow.
Short-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 1 ; What is the relationship between short-term commission 
member turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1 a; The greater the short-term commission member turnover, the more 
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between short-term commission 
member turnover (measured as the percentage change of commission members in any 
one-year time frame) and an appointed administrator’s decision to seek alternative 
employment. In the Commission-Administrator form of county government, the decision 
to appoint or dismiss an administrator is made solely by the commission members 
(National Association of Counties, 2006). A discord between the administrator and new 
commission members (or conflicts between the two) is thought to contribute to 
administrator turnover. Additionally, when new members are elected to a commission, a 
shift of the commission majority from one faction to another could occur, followed 
closely by the replacement of the administrator (Svara, 1990).
Mid-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member 
turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 2a: The greater the mid-term commission member turnover, the more 
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
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It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between mid-term commission
member turnover (measured as the cumulative percentage change of commission
members in a rolling two-year time frame) and an appointed administrator’s decision to
seek alternative employment. Inclusion of this measurement was deemed prudent because
it is thought that adversarial relationships between commission members and
administrators build over time. DeHoog and Whitaker (1990) defined this elevated level
of disagreement as the “firing point.” It is thought that it could take a longer period of
time for new commission members to build commission majority and execute plans for
an administrator’s departure.
Interviewee #2 echoed DeHoog and Whitaker’s theory when they suggested:
I strongly agree with your mid-term commission turnover measurement (two-year 
horizon), only because the seeds fo r  the dirty deed (forced administrator departure) 
might take that long. 1 personally think that a three to five-year horizon is more 
appropriate, only because the commission does not want to give the public the 
appearance o f  being unstable.
Leadership Turnover
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between commission leadership
turnover and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 3a: The higher the frequency o f  commission leadership turnover, the more
likely an administrator will depart his or her position.
It is hypothesized that a positive correlation exists between commission leadership
changes (measured as the percentage change of commission leadership in any one-year
time frame) and an administrator’s decision to seek alternative employment. Commission
chairpersons maintain an increased level of authority and visibility over fellow
commission members, exerting and subtly shaping a wide array of official county actions
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(National Association o f Counties, 2006). It is therefore thought that changes in the 
commission chairperson could influence a commission’s overall decision to retain or 
dismiss an appointed administrator.
Commission Partisanship -  Commission Party Control
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between partisan and non-partisan 
commissions, and changes in commission party control and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 4a^ Partisan commissions result in higher administrator turnover when 
compared to non-partisan commissions.
Hypothesis 4a2. Partisan commissions that experience a change in party control 
result in higher administrator turnover when compared to no change in party control.
It is posited that a positive correlation exists between partisan commissions 
(measured as commission electoral structures that incorporate partisan election processes) 
and administrator turnover. Political cross-pressures arise within commissions when 
partisan election processes exist within the county (as compared to counties with non­
partisan election processes). It is also thought that cross-pressures created along party 
lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to political instability 
ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. Whitaker and DeHoog (1991) suggested that 
if the political instability expanded to include the administrator, it could signal the 
departure of that administrator. Similarly, if  an administrator becomes entangled or 
aligned with the minority party side, an administrator may seek alternative employment.
Similarly, it is theorized that a positive correlation exists between changes in 
commission party control (measured as a change in any given year in the majority of 
commission members’ affiliation with the Democratic or Republican party from the
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previous year) and administrator turnover. Past research suggests that cross-pressures
created along party lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to
political instability, ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. If an administrator
becomes entangled or aligned with the minority party side, this could precipitate the
administrator’s decision to seek alternative employment.
Interviewee #3, however, offered the opposite view on the importance o f commission
partisanship and appointed county administrator turnover when they suggested:
I ’m not so sure that commission partisanship is that important. No matter which party 
a commission member is aligned with, they seem to have their own individual 
agenda, and something the administrator needs to adjust to accordingly.
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the specific research questions and related
hypotheses contained in the General Model regarding the relationship between political
uncertainty measurements and administrator turnover.
Table 4-1
General Model - Political Uncertainty Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific  research question Related hypothesis
Q] : What is the relationship betw een short-term  
com m ission m em ber turnover and administrator 
turnover?
Q2: What is the relationship betw een mid-term  
com m ission m em ber turnover and administrator 
turnover?
Q3: What is the relationship betw een com m ission  
leadership turnover and administrator turnover?
Q4: What is the relationship betw een partisan and 
non-partisan com m issions and changes in 
com m ission party control and administrator 
turnover?
H 1 a: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a 
one-year percentage com m ission  mem ber turnover 
and administrator turnover.
H2a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
rolling tw o-year percentage com m ission m em ber 
turnover and administrator turnover.
H3a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists between  
com m ission  leadership changes and administrator 
turnover.
H4a,: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between  
partisan eom m issions versus non-partisan  
com m issions and administrator turnover.
H4a2: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between  
changes in the party control o f  partisan 
com m issions and administrator turnover.
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Government Fiscal Performance Domain
Government fiscal performance as an explanatory factor of top public executive 
turnover has only recently become a topic o f research in local municipalities with 
somewhat inconclusive results (Feioek et al., 2001; Feioek & Stream, 2002; McCabe et 
al., 2006). The review o f literature, however, found no such research relating to 
government fiscal performance and top public executive turnover within American 
counties.
In the past 15 years, a number of models have been developed to measure the fiscal 
performance of local governments. Some of the conceptual approaches, or lenses, 
researchers have developed include financial position, fiscal stress, fiscal crisis, and 
financial condition, and incorporate different county financial aspects in to assess 
whether local governmental entities are embodied with certain financial difficulties.
Berne (1992), for example, focused on the study o f future assets and liabilities.
Berne and Schramm (1986), on the other hand, suggested that a model of government 
fiscal performance could focus on measurements o f a community’s needs, i.e., conditions 
affecting service provisions, and public policies affecting the local government entity. 
Greenberg and Hiller (1995) put forth the theory that three basic indicators could measure 
a government’s fiscal condition: (a) sustainability, (b) flexibility, and (c) vulnerability. 
Other researchers have proposed that a government’s fiscal performance could simply be 
measured from cash, budgetary, long-run, and service-level solvency lenses (Groves, 
Godsey, & Shulman, 1981; Kloha, Weissert, & Klein, 2005).
Leatherman and Deller (2001) pointed out that fiscal performance and evaluation 
methods generally use ratios o f various types and follow them over time. One such
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method was the Financial Trend Monitoring System (FTMS) developed by the
International City/County Management Association (Groves & Valente, 1994).'^
A second method o f measuring local government fiscal performance was the Ten-
Point Test of financial condition (Brown, 1993). This method utilized a series of ratios
related to a local government’s revenue, expenditures, debt structure, and operating
position, and measured these ratios against other local governments o f similar size. While
some researchers have concluded that this method was the easiest to use, not all o f the
necessary information needed to perform the analysis was readily available in county
annual financial statements (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998).'"'
The importance of government fiscal performance in county administrator turnover
was also echoed by the interviewee responses with past and present county
administrators. For example. Interviewee #1 was adamant when they said:
A county’s fiscal performance absolutely affects an administrator’s ability to retain 
their appointed position. My creating variables that measure activity in the General 
Fund, you are capturing the core group o f  county (fiscal) activity; and
County administrators are frequently placed in the position of saying “no, no, no” to 
elected official’s requests for projeet funding. This, in turn, can create friction 
between commission members and the administrator. If the friction becomes to great, 
the administrator might choose to voluntarily seek alternative employment. Similarly, 
if the level of disagreement becomes unsuitable for commission members, an induced 
departure may begin.
Interviewee #3 had similar thoughts when they stated:
I agree that a county’s fiscal performance could facilitate an administrator’s 
departure. This is especially true if the administrator is a spender or a conservative.
The FTMS w as based on a series o f  36 indicators that are tracked over time. Unfortunately, many o f  the 
indicators included information not available in a county’s Com prehensive Annual Financial Report 
(CAFR).
This method o f  measuring local governm ent performance w as principally developed for use in smaller 
m unicipalities and counties, and its application to larger units o f  governm ent has not been tested.
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Likewise, the same goes for the commission. Both the administrator and the 
commission must be on the same page in this respect. I guess you could say my 
predecessor was a spender. Because of a change in the commission many years ago, 
tax restraint became the norm. This shift in fiscal policy did not bode well with 
regards to my predecessor’s relationship with the commission that eventually 
contributed to his departure.
Interviewee #4 also agreed with the assessment of a county’s fiscal performance on
appointed administrator turnover when they said:
I strongly agree with your assessment o f a county’s fiscal performance as a 
measurement of county manager turnover.
In an attempt to understand the role of government fiscal performance on county 
administrator turnover, six attributes of fiscal performance were proposed and included in 
the General Model. These were a county’s (a) cost burden, (b) income growth, (c) 
revenue dependency, (d) financial outlay, (e) short-term stability, and (f) long-term 
stability. Development and inclusion of these attributes allowed the ability to focus on 
measurements of these key attributes and further develop specific research questions and 
related hypotheses.
Interviewees #1 and #2 concurred with the aforementioned attributes when they said, 
respectively:
I strongly agree with the measurements you have chosen; and
In my rnind, the six variables you have chosen appear to accurately measure a 
county’s fiscal performance.
Interviewees #3 and #4, however, offered additional suggestions as follows:
Your measurements for fiscal performance seem reasonably good. It would be useful 
is you were able to measure internal budget performance, because I think managerial 
success is highly related to the organization’s internal budgeting process. In other 
words, “Which department gets what?”; and
Another important aspect of fiscal performance is the internal (departmental) fights 
fo r  the limited funds. Also, it does not necessarily depend on the fiscal performance
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measurements that you have indicated, however, the internal (departmental)
performance that ultimately reflects on good management.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses in the domain of government 
fiscal performance follow.
Cost Burden
Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county’s cost burden and 
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 5a: The larger a county’s cost burden, the more likely an administrator 
will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between a county’s cost burden 
(measured as tax revenue equity or the ratio of total property tax revenue to a county’s 
total population) and administrator turnover. Inclusion of this measurement was 
considered prudent simply because property tax issues are considered highly charged and 
visible (Feioek et al., 2001). As with past studies of top municipality executive turnover, 
it is thought that high levels of property tax revenue burdens could lead to higher levels 
of county administrator turnover.
Income Growth
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between a county’s income growth and 
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 6a: The smaller a county’s income growth, the more likely an 
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between a county’s income growth 
(measured as a one-year change in tax revenue) and administrator turnover. Researchers 
have suggested that income growth is an indicator o f whether a community’s economy is
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expanding (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998). Researchers have also theorized that counties 
experiencing higher levels of income growth are able to maintain higher levels of 
sustainability of the community’s well being. Higher levels of income growth also afford 
top public executives’ flexibility to respond to economic changes and new financial 
circumstances within the limits of the county’s tax-paying abilities (Greenberg & Hiller, 
1995).
Revenue Dependency
Research Question 7 What is the relationship between a county’s revenue 
dependency and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 7a: The larger a county’s revenue dependency, the more likely an 
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is thought that a positive correlation exists between a county’s revenue dependency 
(measured as a ratio between intergovernmental transfers and total revenue) and 
administrator turnover. Intergovernmental revenues as a percentage of total revenues are 
an indicator of a county’s dependence on income from both the state and federal 
governments. While large amounts o f intergovernmental revenue could be good if 
counties are paying for services mandated by the state or federal government, potential 
cutbacks in funding could place counties and appointed administrators in precarious 
positions of having to look for money elsewhere (Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998). 
Financial Outlay
Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county’s financial outlay, or 
expenditures and administrator turnover?
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hypothesis 8a: The larger a county's level o f  expenditures, the more likely an
administrator will leave his or her position.
The argument is put forth that a positive correlation exists between a county’s fiscal
outlay (measured as a ratio between total expenditures and total population), and
administrator turnover. Increasing per capita expenditures is indicative that “the cost of
providing services is increasing faster than the county’s ability to pay, or that productivity
is declining and the government is spending more to support the same level of service”
(Honadle & Lloyd-Jones, 1998, p. 83). It is thought that higher service costs and
declining productivity rates are directly related to higher levels of administrator turnover.
Short-term Stability
Research Question 9: What is the relationship between a county’s short-term
(financial) stability and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 9a: The unhealthier a county’s short-term (financial) stability, the more
likely an administrator will leave his or her position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between counties that exhibit healthy
short-term stability (measured as a one-year change in total expenditures) and
administrator turnover. As in hypotheses 8a, increasing expenditures is indicative of
increasing service costs and declining productivity. Conversely, decreasing expenditures
is indicative o f lower service costs and increasing productivity.
Interestingly, Interviewee #2 suggested that short-term financial shortfalls do not
always precipitate departures when they explained:
I had short-term financial shortfalls in the past, however I was always able to weather 
through it. The best an administrator can do is make what you consider the best 
decision possible and present it to the commission, and leave it up to them to decide.
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Long-term Stability
Research Question 10: What is the relationship between a county’s long-term
(financial) stability and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 10a: The unhealthier a county’s long-term (financial) stability, the more
likely an administrator will leave his or her position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between counties that exhibit healthy
long-term financial stability (measured as a county’s bond rating) and administrator
turnover. Previous studies exploring how fiscal policies such as borrowing and debt
levels influence tenure of top public executives in municipalities, have revealed only
modest effects (Feioek & Stream, 2002). It is also thought that administrators in more
stable counties with low long-term debt levels (as reflected in higher bond ratings)
experience decreased levels of turnover.
The interview responses from Interviewees # I , #2 and #3 presented multiple
viewpoints on the effect of long-term financial stability and appointed administrator
turnover. For example, Interviewee #1 questioned:
Whether long-term stability (bond ratings) might be better suited as a barometer for 
measuring the overall economics o f  the community.
On the other hand. Interviewee #2 suggested:
A county’s long-term fiscal performance could have an impact on a commission’s 
decision to dismiss an administrator, but this goes back to the relationship the 
administrator has with commission members.
Interviewee #3 said:
With regards to bond ratings, I think this measurement is only important if it goes 
down. Although a county’s bond rating is, for the most part, outside the control of 
most administrators, they may still have to shoulder the responsibility.
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Table 4-2 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related 
hypotheses contained in the General Model regarding the relationship between 
government fiscal performance measurements and administrator turnover.
Table 4-2
General Model - Government Fiscal Performance Research Questions and Related 
Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q5: What is the relationship between a county’s 
cost burden and administrator turnover?
Q6: What is the relationship between a county’s 
incom e growth and administrator turnover?
Q7: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
revenue dependency and administrator turnover?
Q8: What is the relationship between a county’s 
financial outlay (expenditures) and administrator 
turnover?
Q9: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
short-term (financial) stability and administrator 
turnover?
QIO: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
long-term (financial) stability and administrator 
turnover?
H5a: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between a 
county’s cost burden and administrator turnover.
H6a; (-) A  negative correlation exists between a 
county’s incom e growth and administrator 
turnover.
H7a: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between a 
county’s revenue dependency and administrator 
turnover
H8a; (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s level o f  expenditures and administrator 
turnover.
H9a: (-) A  negative relationship exists betw een a 
county’s short-term (financial) stability and 
administrator turnover.
HlOa: (-) A negative relationship exists between a 
county’s long-term (financial) stability and 
administrator turnover.
Community Instability Domain 
Researchers have long thought that instability factors inherent in the demographic 
composition of a municipality play an important role in top-executive turnover (Boynton 
& DeSantis, 1990; Feioek et al., 2001; McCabe et al., 2006; Newell et al., 1989; Stillman, 
1974; Watson & Hassett, 2003). Due to the similarities o f top executives in 
municipalities and county administrators, it is thought that community instability factors 
would also play an important role in county administrator turnover.
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Stillman (1974) was one o f the first to determine that population size was a dominant 
factor in top public executive turnover. Similar results were found in later studies which 
suggested that the level o f affluence or ethnic diversity within a community could cause 
divisions, or cleavages, in that community, ultimately impacting the decisions of top 
executives to remain in office or seek alternative employment (see also Boynton & 
DeSantis, 1990; Feioek et al., 2001; and Newell et al., 1989). Watson and Hassett (2003) 
found that top municipality executives with long tenures came from relatively 
homogenous cities.
The interview responses from past and present county administrators provided
multiple viewpoints as to the importance of community instability and appointed county
administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #3 suggested community instability
was an important factor when they said:
1 definitely agree that community instability factors play a role in an administrator’s 
success for failure. A good administrator must pay attention to the voice o f  the 
community. If  they don’t, they leave themselves open for attack.
Interviewee #2 was not sure as to the impact of community instability on county
administrator turnover as refleeted in their interview response:
I’m not sure whether community instability has any impact on administrator turnover 
In order to examine the influenee that community instability factors have on county.
Interviewee #3, on the other hand stated:
1 don’t see community instability as a major factor in county administrator turnover. 
For the most part, it’s an administrator’s performance that matters, and the 
relationship they have with commission members.
In order to examine the influenee that community instability factors have on county 
administrator turnover, the General Model presented in this study contains six attributes 
thought to aceurately measure the domain of community instability: (a) county
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population growth, (b) county scope of jurisdietion, (c) ethnic diversity, (d) economic 
conditions, (e) affluence, and (f) poverty.
Both Interviewee #1 and #3 agreed with the aforementioned attributes when they 
said, respeetively:
I generally agree with the measurements you have chosen; and
I agree with your choice of measurements with regards to community instability.
They would seem to accurately capture this domain.
The speeifie research questions and related hypotheses in the domain of eommunity 
instability are as follows.
Population Growth
Researeh Question 11 What is the relationship between a county’s population growth 
and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1 la: The smaller the county’spopulation growth rate, the more likely an 
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is posited that a negative correlation exists between expanding counties (measured 
as a one-year ehange total population) and administrator turnover. Feioek et al. (2001) 
found that municipalities with growing populations had lower turnover rates of top 
exeeutives. Conversely, Feioek et al. suggested that population deelines eould ereate 
instability in the commission. Based on the researehers’ findings, it is proposed that a 
similar relationship exists with county population increases and decreases, and county 
administrator turnover.
Interviewee #1 agreed with the positive effeet o f eounty growth and appointed county 
administrator turnover when they said:
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It would seem that high growth communities would tend to have a greater degree of 
administrator turnover when compared to low growth communities. This would have 
to do with the upward mobility factor of career administrators. It would also seem 
that communities with sustained or no growth would retain their administrators for 
longer periods o f  time.
County Scope o f Jurisdiction
Researeh Question 12: What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f
jurisdiction and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 12a: The larger the county’s scope o f  jurisdiction, the more likely an
administrator will depart his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between eounties with a large seope of
jurisdiction (measured as a ratio between a county’s total population and the number of
residents residing in unineorporated jurisdictions) and administrator turnover. Wiseman
(2004) theorized that “citizens generally have a very real perception o f their relationship
with demoeratic government” (p. 88), and that when demands are made, responses
(positive or negative) are expected. Qualified electors of a jurisdiction feel that their best
opportunity to obtain a response from government is at the level associated with the
delivery of services. It is posited that the larger the county’s scope of jurisdietion, the
greater the potential for negative elector response, precipitating community instability.
Interviewee #4 agreed with the aforementioned hypotheses when they said:
Your measurement of total eounty population to the population not residing in 
incorporated jurisdictions is an excellent variable, only beeause it directly measures 
the amount of services the county is responsible for.
Ethnic Diversity
Research Question 13: What is the relationship between a county’s ethnic diversity 
and administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 13a: The larger the county’s ethnic diversity, the more likely an 
administrator will leave his or her position.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between a county’s ethnic diversity 
(measured as the non-white percentage o f the eounty’s total population) and 
administrators departing their positions. MeCabe et al. (2006) suggested that in 
heterogeneous communities, eleavages based on race or other soeial conditions could be 
linked to top public executive turnover. Similarly, Simons and Simons (2002) suggested 
that certain conditions contributing to community instability, such as population 
heterogeneity or cultural diversity, may produce political demands for a change in the 
local government’s administration.
The posit o f cleavages based on race is echoed in Interviewee #4’s response when 
they suggested:
1 agree that minority diversity (within the community) could cause tensions fo r  a 
county manager and commission members, however I  have not experienced this in my 
short tenure. This eould be due to the fact that the minority population does not have 
a lot o f  influence in our county because they are so dispersed.
Similarly, Interviewee #3 stated:
1 place a lot of importance on maintaining good relations with all ethnic sub-groups 
within the eommunity. Open and honest communication has a way of preventing 
many misunderstandings. Also, the hiring pattern of the county to include individuals 
from an ethnic cross-section o f the community helps in many ways.
Economic Conditions
Research Question 14: What is the relationship between a county’s economic
condition and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 14a: The unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the more likely an
administrator will leave his or her position.
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It is hypothesized that a positive corrélation exists between poor county economic
conditions (measured as the percentage o f the available workforce that is unemployed)
and administrator turnover. Feioek et al. (2001) found that communities experiencing
economic growth have less administrative turnover. Further researeh suggested that
economic growth trends over time might signal an administrator’s departure (MeCabe et
ah, 2006). Simmons and Simmons (2002) supported this notion by postulating that higher
rates of unemployment eould ehange a community’s “politico cultural base” producing
demands for top-administrative change within the government entity.
Interviewee #1 agreed with that a community’s economic condition may effect
appointed eounty administrator turnover however, suggested:
The number o f  building permits, or percentage change (up or down) in building 
permits might be a good indicator o f a community’s economic condition. Also, the 
percentage change in assessed property value may be an additional indicator of a 
community’s economic condition.
Additionally, Interviewee #3 interestingly pointed out:
With regards to your measurements on a community’s economic prosperity, 1 think 
that a good economy drowns out a lot o f  these issues. In other words, in good times, 
the effects o f community instability on administrator turnover in significantly 
diminished.
Affluence
Research Question 15: What is the relationship between a county’s affluence and 
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 15a; The less affluent the county, the more likely an administrator will 
leave his or her position.
It is postulated that a negative correlation exists between a county’s affluence 
(measured as the rate of per capita income of the population in the community) and
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administrator turnover. Past studies of top-executive turnover in municipalities have 
consistently shown that growth in terms of per capita income is predictive of a eity 
retaining its top executives (Feioek et al., 2001; MeCabe et al., 2006). Based on these 
studies, it is thought that similar relationships exist within American eounties. As Feioek 
et al. suggested, income growth “may influenee not only the performance of managers 
but also the desirability o f the eity to the manager, and the affordability o f the manager to 
the city” (p. 106). Furthermore, a largely affluent population provides a larger revenue 
base for services, and may lead to a more positive commission-administrator relationship, 
thereby reducing internal conflict (Berman, 1997).
Poverty
Research Question 16: What is the relationship between a county’s poverty rate and 
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 16a: The larger a county’s poverty rate, the more likely an administrator 
will leave his or her position.
It is proposed that a positive correlation exists between increasing county poverty 
rates (measured as the percentage o f the households below the federal poverty level) and 
administrator turnover. The inclusion of this measurement was deemed important 
because it allowed a “cross-check” o f hypotheses 15a. While increased affluence within a 
community was thought to decrease administrator turnover, increased poverty was 
thought to hasten an administrator’s departure. As Berman (1997) proposed, increased 
poverty levels reduce the revenue base and tend to have a negative impact on public 
safety and the welfare and economic growth concerns of the eommunity. This in turn
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could cause disharmony amongst the commission members and thus on the 
administrative arm of the loeal government.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses contained in the General 
Model regarding the relationship between community instability measurements and 
appointed administrator turnover are contained in Table 4-3.
Table 4-3
General Model - Community Instability Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q 1 1 : What is the relationship between a county’s 
population growth and administrator turnover?
Q12: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
scope o f  jurisdiction and administrator turnover?
Q13: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
ethnic diversity and administrator turnover?
Q I4: What is the relationship between a county’s 
econom ic condition and administrator turnover?
Q I5; What is the relationship between a county’s 
affluence and administrator turnover?
Q16; What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
poverty rate and administrator turnover?
HI la: (-) A  negative relationship exists betw een a 
county’s population growth rate, and administrator 
turnover.
H I2a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s scope o f  jurisdiction and administrator 
turnover.
H I3a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s ethnic diversity and administrator 
turnover.
H I4a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s econom ic condition and administrator 
turnover.
H I5a: (-) A  negative relationship exists betw een a 
county’s level o f  affluence and administrator 
turnover.
H I6a . (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s poverty rate and administrator turnover.
Administrator Profile Domain 
A number o f studies have linked administrator profile characteristics to extended 
administrator tenures (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feioek & 
Stream, 1998; Renner, 2001 ; Watson & Hassett, 2002, 2004; Whitaker & DeHoog,
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1991).’  ^ For example, Watson and Hassett (2002) found that a vast majority o f long-
serving top municipality executives had graduate degrees. This notion was echoed by a
similar study by Renner (2001). DeSantis and Newell (1996), on the other hand, found
that a large percentage (80%) of top municipality exeeutives did not come from within
the community, indicating mobility in an executive’s career track. Mobley et al. (1979)
suggested that as an individual’s tenure increased, the probability of the individual
leaving his or her position decreased, an observation also confirmed by Cotton and Tuttle
(1986) in their analysis of top municipality executives.
While many researehers have put forth the theory that most top public executives
ehange positions numerous times during their careers for more lucrative and politically
stable positions (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1994; Feioek &
Stream, 1998; Kaatz et ah, 1999; Renner & DeSantis, 1994), some researehers have
found evidence that a small group o f top executives experience lengthy tenures in a single
municipality (Watson & Hassett, 2003, 2004).
Responses from two of the interviewees provided further insight into the effect of
administrator profiles (characteristics) on appointed county administrator turnover. First,
Interviewee #3 generally agreed that:
Certain administrator profiles eould be used to explain eounty administrator turnover, 
especially in the sense that they reflect the performance o f  the individual. Tenure, for 
example, is probably a good indicator o f an individual’s performance such as 
interpersonal relationship with the commission.
Interviewee #1, however, was not convinced o f the importance of select administrator 
profiles on appointed county administrator turnover when they said:
A lthough m ost studies focused  on top executives in local m unicipalities, it is thought that the same 
relationships exist with regards to Am erican counties and county administrators.
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I’m not sure whether you eould really tie leadership profile measures to administrator 
turnover. I think you could find a relationship between administrator hiring practices 
and education, gender and ethnicity. I guess if you consider turnover as the flip  side 
to hiring, you eould make the argument.
To further investigate the relationship of administrator characteristics and
administrator turnover, the General Model presented in this study contain five important
attributes thought to measure an administrator’s profile: (a) knowledge, (b) experience,
(e) gender, (d) ethnicity, and (e) origin o f recruitment. Developing these attributes
facilitated the advancement of specific research questions and related hypotheses.
Although Interviewee #1 was not convinced of the importance of select administrator
profiles on appointed county administrator turnover, they did say:
I do agree that the measures you have mentioned are probably good measures for 
your researeh study.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses for the aforementioned 
profiles are as follows.
Knowledge (Education)
Researeh Question 17: What is the relationship between an administrator’s formal 
education and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 17a: The lower an administrator’s level o f  education, the more likely he 
or she will leave their position.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between an administrator’s success in 
academia (measured as the administrator’s level o f formal education) and administrator 
turnover. While many researehers have concluded that a large majority of contemporary 
long-serving top public executives have graduate degrees (Renner, 2001; Watson & 
Hassett, 2002, 2004), there have been no studies that have examined the relationship 
between the level o f formal education and county administrator turnover. It is thought.
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however, that administrators who have acquired an advanced degree are more apt to be 
retained than their counterparts who have not acquired an advanced degree.
Experience
Researeh Question 18: What is the relationship between an administrator’s job
experience and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 18a: The shorter an administrator’s job  tenure, the more likely he or she
will leave their position.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between longer administrator job
tenure (measured as the number o f years in the position) and administrator turnover.
Although researchers have found evidence that increased tenure strengthens the tendency
for individuals to remain at their place o f employment in the private sector (Cotton &
Tuttle, 1986; Kirschenbaum & Weisberg, 1990; Lucas et ah, 1987; Mobley et al., 1979;
Porter & Steers, 1973), there has been no research as to the effect of lengthy tenure on
top public executive turnover. Devoid of this researeh, it is posited that increased tenure
strengthens the propensity that administrators will remain in office, since lengthened
tenures are indicative o f harmonious relations between the administrator and commission.
Interviewee #2 moderately agreed with the above hypotheses when they said:
Administrators with longer tenures would seem to indicate that these individuals are 
satisfied with where they’re at, resulting in less turnover and job search.
Interviewee #4 had a uniquely different way of explaining the effect o f appointed
administrator tenure and turnover in that:
County managers with longer tenures would have a lower chance o f  leaving their 
jobs, voluntarily or otherwise. This is due to the fact that yow are a known 
commodity. In some ways you are the devil they know, but at least they know you.
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Gender Diversity
Research Question 19: What is the relationship between an administrator's gender
and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 19a: Female administrators are more likely to leave their positions when 
compared to male administrators.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between female administrators 
(measured as the gender of the administrator) and administrator turnover. A review of the 
literature found no studies that examined the relationship of a top public executive’s 
gender and turnover, whether in the public or private sector. Due to an abyss of studies on 
this association, researehers have suggested that loeal governments are beginning to take 
a proactive approach to hire disproportionately higher levels of females in top executive 
positions (Fox & Schuhmann, 2001; Reid, Kerr, & Miller, 2001). While females are still 
far underrepresented in top-level administrative positions (see Watson & Hassett, 2002, 
2004), it is theorized that ongoing efforts in local governments to equalize opportunities 
for females has created sizable opportunities for experienced female administrators. 
Ethnic Diversity
Research Question 20: What is the relationship between an administrator’s ethnicity 
and administrator turnover?
Flypothesis 20a: Administrators who are non-white are more likely to leave their 
positions when compared to administrators o f  Caucasian decent.
As with hypotheses 19a, it is theorized that a positive correlation exists between non­
white administrators (measured as the ethnicity o f the administrator) and administrator 
turnover. Again, a review of the literature found no studies that examined the relationship
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of top public executive ethnicity and turnover. While non-whites are notably 
underrepresented in top-level administrative positions (see Watson & Hassett, 2002, 
2004), it is theorized that ongoing efforts in local governments to equalize opportunities 
for non-whites has created opportunities for experienced non-white administrators. 
Recruitment Origin
Research Question 21 : What is the relationship between an administrator’s origin o f  
recruitment and administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 21a: Administrator’s who are recruited from  outside the organization are 
more likely to leave their positions when compared to administrators who are promoted 
from  within the organization.
It is argued that administrators who are recruited from outside the organization are 
more likely to leave their positions (measured as an internal or external recruitment) as 
compared to administrators who are promoted from within the organization. Researchers 
have long thought that mobility was a principal strategy in an administrator’s career 
advancement plans (Barber, 1988; Paul, 1981) and that top public executives seek and 
accept management positions with increasingly larger organizations. DeSantis and 
Newell (1996) for example, found that nearly 80% of top public executives in large 
municipalities do not come from within the organization; a similar pattern thought to 
exist for county administrators. Watson and Hassett (2004), however, alluded to the fact 
that local professionals who are homegrown may not exercise a “mobility” strategy in 
their career advancement plans, instead electing to remain in the eommunity in which 
they reside.
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Table 4-4 provides a summary of the specific research questions and related 
hypotheses proposed in the General Model regarding the relationship between 
administrator profiles and appointed administrator turnover.
Table 4-4
General Model - Administrator Profile Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q17: What is the relationship betw een an H I7a: (-) A  negative relationship exists between
administrator’s formal education and administrator an administrator’s form al education and
turnover? administrator turnover.
Q 18: What is the relationship betw een an H I8a: (-) A  negative relationship exists between
administrator’s job  experience and administrator an administrator’s job  tenure and administrator
turnover? turnover.
Q19: What is the relationship betw een an H I9a: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between
administrator’s gender and administrator turnover? fem ale administrators and administrator turnover.
Q20: What is the relationship betw een an H20a: (+ ) A positive relationship exists between
administrator’s ethnicity and administrator non-w hite administrators and administrator
turnover? turnover.
Q21 : What is the relationship betw een an H21a: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between
administrator’s origin o f  recruitment and administrators who are recruited from outside the
administrator turnover? organization and administrator turnover.
General Model o f  County Administrator Turnover 
As previously diseussed, one of the principal purposes of this researeh study was to 
examine factors thought to contribute to general appointed eounty administrator turnover 
in large American counties. Figure 4-1 provides a depiction of the General Model. The 
top row denotes general turnover/non-tumover of county administrators. The second row 
indicates the four domains within the General Model thought to influence general 
administrator turnover. Below each domain (listed vertically) are the corresponding 
covariates within each of the four domains. It should be noted that no temporal order or
1 1 1
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rank of importance is implied in Figure 4-1 with regards to the position o f individual 
domains and their respective covariates within the model.
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Uncertainty
T umover/Non-Turnover 
o f County Administrators
i I
Domains
Fiscal
Performance
Community
Instability
Adm inistrator
Profiles
Covariates within each Domain
Short-Term
Commission
Turnover
M id-Term
Commission
Turnover
Commission 
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Figure 4-1. General Model of county administrator turnover.
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Push/Pull Model - Research Questions and Hypotheses 
As previously noted, the second model developed in this research study, the Push/Pull 
Model, incorporated 15 o f the 21 covariates contained in the General Model. The selected 
covariates were thought to measure key dimensions influencing push and pull-effected 
appointed county administrator turnover. The specific research questions and hypotheses 
contained in the Push/Pull Model of appointed county administrator turnover follows.
Political Uncertainty Domain 
As discussed in the previous section, political uncertainty as a determining factor of 
top public executive turnover has been a topic o f research for nearly 50 years. Many 
earlier researchers theorized that political conflict and political uncertainty were principal 
reasons why top public executives left their office.
One notable study suggested that internal political struggles for control within the 
commission played a major role in whether a top executive chose to remain in office or 
seek alternative employment elsewhere (Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991). As Whitaker and 
DeHoog pointed out, inherent discords between members of the commission and the top 
executives have a significant push effect on leadership turnover. The researchers also 
found that uncertainty within the commission led to involuntary or forced turnover when 
the top executive became entangled or aligned with the commission members.
Other researchers have posited similar theories by suggesting that internal conflict 
within the commission represented a push effect on top public executive turnover because 
of its ability to create high levels of frustration on the part of the executive (Box, 1993; 
DeSantis & Newell, 1996; Kaatz et al., 1999; Kaatz & Gabris, 1996; Loveridge, 1971; 
Renner & DeSantis, 1993, 1994; Svara, 1991).
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To further explore the role o f political uncertainty and its push or pull effect on 
county administrator turnover, the Push/Pull Model incorporated the same four attributes 
as contained in the General Model: (a) short-term commission member turnover, (b) mid­
term commission member turnover, (c) commission leadership turnover, and (d) 
partisanship/non-partisanship in commission member elections - change is commission 
party control.
Short-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 1 : What is the relationship between short-term commission 
member turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis lb: The greater the short-term commission member turnover, the greater 
the push effect on administrator turnover.
It is theorized that the greater the percentage change of commission members in any 
one-year time frame, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As previously 
mentioned, when new members are elected to a commission, a shift o f the commission 
majority from one faction to another could occur, followed closely by the replacement of 
the administrator (Svara, 1990).
Both Interviewee #3 and #4 strongly agreed with the push effect o f short-term 
commissioner turnover on appointed administrator turnover. For example. Interviewee #3 
said:
1 would agree that building a good relationship with commission members is 
important. When new members (winners) come on board (the commission) it’s 
imperative that the county administrator nurture a strong working relationship with 
them. This is something that my predecessor was unable to do and, in many ways, it 
led to his departure; and
1 would have to strongly agree that turnover of commission members has a major 
impact on a county administrator’s longevity.
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Interviewee #4’s thoughts were similar when they suggested;
An important component o f commission turnover is the fact that new individuals to 
the commission who have limited or no experience in the public sector must be 
educated or re-educated to the inter-workings of county government. This re­
education process in many ways creates levels of frustration within the 
administration.
Mid-term Commission Member Turnover
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member
turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 2b: The greater the mid-term commission member turnover, the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover.
It is further theorized that the greater the cumulative percentage change of
commission members in a rolling two-year time frame, the greater the push effect on
administrator turnover. As discussed in the previous section, inclusion of this
measurement was deemed prudent because it is thought that adversarial relationships
between commission members and administrators build over time.
Leadership Turnover
Research Question 3 : What is the relationship between commission leadership
turnover and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 3b: Commissions that experience leadership changes have a push effect
on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that a commission leadership change (measured as the percentage
change of commissiori leadership in any one-year time frame) has a push effect while no
commission leadership change has a pull effect on administrator turnover. As previously
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noted, the commission chairperson could influence a commission’s overall decision to
retain or dismiss an appointed administrator.
Interviewee #1 agreed with the push effect of commission leadership turnover and
appointed administrator turnover when they said:
I would strongly agree that turnover o f commission leadership has a major impact on 
a county administrator’s longevity.
Commission Partisanship -  Commission Party Control
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between partisan and non-partisan
commissions, and changes in commission party control and push or pull-effected
administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 4b,: Partisan commissions are a push effect on administrator turnover
when compared to non-partisan commissions.
Hypothesis 4b2: Partisan commissions that experience a change in party control are
a push effect on administrator turnover when compared to partisan commissions that do
not experience a change.
As previously discussed, it is thought that political cross-pressures arise within
commissions when partisan election processes exist within the county (as compared to
counties with non-partisan election processes). It is also thought that cross-pressures
created along party lines due to disagreement among commission members leads to
political instability ultimately resulting in political uncertainty. Also, changes in
commission party control may contribute to push-induced administrator turnover.
Interviewee #4 echoed the aforementioned theory when they explained:
The push effect can be brutal on a county manager when a partisan board is divided 
on critical issues such as pro-development versus anti-development. Additionally, the 
commission members ’ decision making process is very different than that o f  a county
116
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
manager. Labor relations are one good example. Typically, a county manager’s 
responsibility is to contain costs while commission members attempt to maintain 
relationships.
A summarization of the related research questions and hypotheses contained in the 
Push/Pull Model with regards to the domain of political uncertainty are provided in Table 
4-5.
Table 4-5
Push/Pull Model - Political Uncertainty Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q L  What is the relationship between short-term  
com m ission  m em ber turnover and push or pull- 
effected  administrator turnover?
Q2: What is the relationship between mid-term  
com m ission m em ber turnover and push or pull- 
effected  administrator turnover?
Q3: What is the relationship between com m ission  
leadership turnover and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
Q4: What is the relationship betw een partisan and 
non-partisan com m issions and changes in 
com m ission  party control and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
H lb ; (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a 
one-year percentage change in com m ission  
m em ber turnover and push-effected administrator 
turnover.
H2b: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a 
rolling tw o-year percentage change in com m ission  
m em ber turnover and push-effected administrator 
turnover.
H3b: (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een  
com m ission  leadership changes and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
H 4b|: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een  
partisan com m issions and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
Hdb;: (+ ) A positive relationship exists between  
changes in the party control o f  partisan 
com m issions and push-effected administrator 
turnover.
Government Fiscal Performance Domain 
As discussed in the previous section, government fiscal performance as an 
explanatory factor o f top public executive turnover has only recently become a topic of 
research in local municipalities with somewhat inconclusive results. The review of
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literature, however, found no such research relating to the push or pull effects of 
government fiscal performance on appointed county administrator turnover.
In an attempt to understand the role o f government fiscal performance on push and 
pull-induced county administrator turnover, four attributes of fiseal performance were 
proposed and included in the Push/Pull Model. These were a county’s (a) cost burden, (b) 
financial outlay, (c) short-term stability, and (d) long-term stability. The specific research 
questions and related hypotheses in the domain of government fiscal performance follow. 
Cost Burden
Research Question 5: What is the relationship between a county's cost burden and 
push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 5b: The larger a county’s cost burden, the greater the push effect on 
administrator turnover.
It is theorized that the larger the ratio of total property tax revenue to a county’s total 
population, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As discussed in the 
previous section, it was thought that inclusion of this measurement would be prudent 
simply because property tax issues are considered highly charged and visible. Further, it 
was thought that high levels o f property tax revenue burdens could lead to higher levels 
of push-induced county administrator turnover.
Financial Outlay
Research Question 6: What is the relationship between a county’s financial outlays, 
or expenditures and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 6b: The larger a county’s level o f  expenditures, the greater the push effect 
on administrator turnover.
118
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
It is argued that the greater a county’s ratio between total expenditures and total 
population, the larger the push effect on administrator turnover. Interviewee #3 agreed 
with the push effect o f larger county expenditures on appointed administrator turnover 
when they said:
The most important factor that many citizens don’t understand is that we (the county) 
have demands for services (that are) beyond our capabilities. Many forms o f services 
are competing for the same funds. Examples would include parks and recreation, and 
public hospitals. Larger county expenditures as a function of per eapita without a 
corresponding increase in revenue places the administrator “at risk” o f being label as 
fiscally irresponsible and subject to dismissal.
Short-term Stability
Research Question 7: What is the relationship between a county’s short-term
(financial) stability and push or pull-ejfected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 7b: The lesser a county’s short-term (financial) stability, the greater the
push effect on administrator turnover.
It is thought that the higher a county’s one-year change in total expenditures, the
greater the push effect on administrator turnover. As in hypotheses 5b and 6b, increasing
expenditures is indicative of increasing service costs and declining productivity. It is
thought that these pressures can precipitate push-induced administrator turnover.
Long-term Stability
Research Question 8: What is the relationship between a county’s long-term
(financial) stability and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 8b: The healthier a county’s long-term (financial) stability, the greater
the pull effect on administrator turnover.
It is put forth that the unhealthier a county’s long-term financial stability, the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover. Conversely, the healthier a county’s long-term
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financial stability, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover. Simply stated, 
administrators in more stable counties with low long-term debt levels (as reflected in 
higher bond ratings) experience decreased levels of push-induced turnover, while 
administrators in less stable counties with high long-term debt levels (as reflected in 
lower bond ratings) experience increased levels of push-induced turnover.
Table 4-6 provides a summary o f the specific research questions and related 
hypotheses contained in the Push/Pull Model regarding the relationship between 
government fiscal performance measurements and administrator turnover.
Table 4-6
Push/Pull Model - Government Fiscal Performance Research Questions and Related 
Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q5: What is the relationship between a county’s H5b: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a
cost burden and push or pull-effected administrator county’s cost burden and push-effected
turnover? administrator turnover.
Q6: What is the relationship betw een a county’s H6b: : (+ ) A positive relationship exists betw een a
financial outlay (expenditures) and push or pull- county’s level o f  expenditures and push-effected
effected administrator turnover? administrator turnover.
Q7; What is the relationship betw een a county’s H7b; (-) A  negative relationship exists betw een a
short-term (financial) stability and push or pull- county’s short-term (financial) stability and push-
effected administrator turnover? effected  administrator turnover.
Q8; What is the relationship betw een a county’s H8b: (-) A negative relationship exists betw een a
long-term (financial) stability and push or pull- county’s long-term (financial) stability and push-
effected administrator turnover? effected  administrator turnover.
Community Instability Domain 
As previously discussed, researchers have long thought that instability factors 
inherent in the demographic composition o f a municipality play an important role in top- 
executive turnover. Due to the similarities o f top executives in municipalities and county
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administrators, it is thought that community instability factors would also play an 
important role in push and pull-effected county administrator turnover. To further 
understand the role o f community instability on push and pull-induced county 
administrator turnover, four attributes o f community instability were included in the 
Push/Pull Model. These were a county’s (a) population growth, (b) scope o f jurisdiction, 
(c) economic condition, and (d) level of poverty. The specific research questions and 
related hypotheses in the domain o f community instability follow.
Population Growth
Research Question 9 What is the relationship between a county’s population growth 
and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 9b: The smaller the county’s population growth rate, the greater the push 
effect on administrator turnover.
It is posited that the smaller the one-year change in a county’s total population, the 
greater the push effect oh administrator turnover. As previously discussed, researchers 
have suggested that municipalities with growing populations had lower turnover rates of 
top executives. Conversely, researchers have suggested that municipalities with 
population declines may create instability in the commission and induce a push effect on 
top-executive turnover. Therefore, it is proposed that a similar relationship exists with 
county population decreases and push-induced county administrator turnover.
County Scope o f  Jurisdiction
Research Question 10: What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f  
jurisdiction and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 10b: The larger the county’s scope ofjurisdiction, the greater the push 
effect on administrator turnover.
It is theorized that a positive correlation exists between counties with a large scope of 
jurisdiction (measured as a ratio between a county’s total population and the number of 
residents residing in unincorporated jurisdictions) and push-induced administrator 
turnover. As discussed earlier, the larger the county’s scope o f jurisdiction, the greater the 
potential for negative elector response, therefore precipitating community instability and 
push-induced administrator turnover.
Economic Conditions
Research Question 11 : What is the relationship between a county’s economic 
condition and push or pull-ejfected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 1 lb: The unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the greater the push 
effect on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that the unhealthier a county’s economic condition (measured as 
the percentage of the available workforce that is unemployed), the greater the push effect 
on administrator turnover. Researcher have suggested that economic growth trends over 
time signal a key pull effect (McCabe et ah, 2006). Simmons and Simmons (2002) 
supported this notion by postulating that higher rates of unemployment could change a 
community’s “politico cultural base” producing demands for push-induced top- 
administrative change within the government entity.
Poverty
Research Question 12: What is the relationship between a county’s poverty rate and 
push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
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Hypothesis 12b: The larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the push effect on 
administrator turnover.
It is proposed that the larger a county’s poverty rate (measured as the percentage of 
the households below the federal poverty level) the higher the frequency of push-induced 
administrator turnover. As with the General Model, the inclusion of this measurement 
was deemed important because it allowed a “cross-check” of hypotheses 1 lb.
The specific research questions and related hypotheses contained in the Push/Pull 
Model and proposed in this research study regarding the relationship between community 
instability measurements and administrator turnover are contained in Table 4-7.
Table 4-7
Push/Pull Model - Community Instability Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific research question Related hypothesis
Q9: What is the relationship betw een a county’s 
population growth and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
QIO: What is the relationship between a county’s 
scope o f  jurisdiction and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
Q] 1 : What is the relationship between a county’s 
econom ic condition and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
Q12: What is the relationship betw een a eounty’s 
poverty rate and push or pull-effected  
administrator turnover?
H9b: (-) A  negative relationship exists betw een a 
county’s population growth and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
HI Ob: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s scope o f  jurisdiction and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
HI lb: (-) A negative relationship exists betw een a 
county’s econom ic condition and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
H I2b: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists betw een a 
county’s poverty rate and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
Administrator Profde Domain 
A  number of studies have linked administrator profile characteristics to extended 
administrator tenures (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock & 
Stream, 1998; Renner, 2001; Watson & Hassett, 2002, 2004; Whitaker & DeHoog,
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1991). The review of literature, however, found no studies linking administrator profile
characteristics and push or pull-effected administrator turnover.
To further investigate the relationship o f administrator profile characteristics, and
push and pull-effected administrator turnover, the Push/Pull Model presented in this
study contained three important attributes thought to measure an administrator’s profile:
(a) knowledge, (b) experience, and (c) origin of recruitment. The specific research
questions and related hypotheses in the domain of community instability follow.
Knowledge (Education)
Research Question 13 : What is the relationship between an administrator’s formal
education and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 13b: The lower an administrator’s form al education, the greater the push
effect on administrator turnover.
It is thought that a negative correlation exists between higher levels of an
administrator’s formal education (measured as the administrator’s level o f formal
education) and push-induced administrator turnover. As previously diseussed, there have
been no studies that have examined the relationship between the level of formal
education, and push or pull-effected county administrator turnover. It is thought,
however, that administrators who have acquired an advanced degree are more apt to be
pulled from office than their counterparts who have not acquired an advanced degree.
Interviewee #2 agreed with the aforementioned hypotheses when they said:
1 would agree that there is probably a relationship between education and 
administrator turnover; especially when you compare this measurement to what you 
described as push and pull departures; and
1 would think that the higher an administrator’s level of education, the more likely 
they would be pulled out o f office. I only say this because of the upward mobility
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factor. Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people.
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well
(always looking for a better opportunity).
Interviewee #3, however, offered a different viewpoint when he stated:
I’m not so sure that education matters after you get the job, but I ’d be interested to
see what your study reveals.
Experience
Research Question 14: What is the relationship between an administrator’s job  
experience and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 14b: The shorter an administrators job  tenure, the greater the push effect 
on administrator turnover.
It is hypothesized that a negative correlation exists between longer administrator’ 
tenures (measured as the number o f years in the position) and push-induced administrator 
turnover. As previously mentioned, although researchers have found evidence that 
increased tenure strengthens the tendency for individuals to remain at their place of 
employment, there has been no research as to the effect of tenure on push or pull-induced 
administrator turnover. Devoid o f this research, it is posited that shorter administrator 
tenures leads to push-induced departure. Conversely, longer administrator tenures are 
indicative of harmonious relations between the administrator and commission and may 
result in pull-induced departures.
Recruitment Origin
Researeh Question 15: What is the relationship between an administrator’s origin o f  
recruitment and push or pull-effected administrator turnover?
Hypothesis 15b: The push effect is greater fo r  administrators who are recruited from  
outside the organization when compared to those who are promoted from within.
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It is argued that administrators who are recruited from outside the organization are 
more likely to experience a push-induced departure (measured as an internal or external 
recruitment) as compared to administrators who are promoted from within the 
organization.
Interestingly, Interviewee #3 strongly agreed with hypothesis 15b when they said:
1 think the origin of recruitment is important, only because individuals who are 
promoted from within generally have an established working relationship with 
commission members and department heads.
Table 4-8 provides a summary o f the spécifié research questions and related 
hypotheses proposed in the Push/Pull Model regarding the relationship between select 
administrator profiles and push or pull-effected administrator turnover.
Table 4-8
Push/Pull Model - Administrator Profile Research Questions and Related Hypotheses
Specific  research question Related hypothesis
Q13: WTiat is the relationship betw een an 
administrator’s form al education and push or pull- 
effected administrator turnover?
Q14: What is the relationship betw een an 
administrator’s job  experience and push or pull- 
effected administrator turnover?
Q15: What is the relationship betw een an 
administrator’s origin o f  recruitment and push or 
pull-effected administrator turnover?
H I3b; (-) A negative relationship exists between  
an administrator’s formal education and push- 
effected administrator turnover.
H14b: (-) A  negative relationship exists between  
an administrator’s job tenure and push-effected  
administrator turnover.
H I5b: (+ ) A  positive relationship exists between  
an administrator who was recruited from outside 
the organization and push-effected administrator 
turnover.
Push/Pull Model o f  County Administrator Turnover 
Figure 4-2 provides a depiction o f the Push/Pull Model. The top row denotes push 
and pull-effected turnover o f county administrators. The second row indicates the four 
domains in the Push/Pull Model. Below each domain (listed vertically) are the
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corresponding covariates within each of the four domains. As with the General Model in 
Figure 4-1, it should be noted that no temporal order or rank of importance is implied in 
Figure 4-2 with regards to the position o f individual domains and their respective 
covariates within the Push/Pull model.
Push and Pull-Effected Turnover 
of County Administrators
Domains
Covariates within each Domain
Figure 4-2. General Model of county administrator turnover.
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CHAPTER 5
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SYSTEM FOR ANALYSIS 
First, this chapter discusses general research designs and the mixed methods research 
design used in this study. Second, issues relating to validity, the unit o f analysis, the 
target population and study sample are addressed. Third, relational measures (dependent 
and covariates), data collection and data sources, and coding procedures are discussed. 
Fourth, an overview of the quantitative analysis techniques employed in the study to 
answer the research questions and subsequently test the researeh hypotheses are 
presented, e.g., statistical software selection, treatment of missing data and 
multicollinearity. Finally, this chapter discusses the quantitative procedures important to 
the Cox proportional regression procedure and the qualitative research methodology used 
in the supplemental cross-sectional interviews of present and past-appointed county 
administrators.
Research Design
A research design or plan can best be described as a set of logical steps that occur in 
sequence for the purpose of linking data to a study’s research questions so as to draw 
reasonable and sound conclusions. A properly constructed research design is further
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intended to provide a researcher with a set o f rules, or “blueprint,” to facilitate the linkage 
of a researcher’s theoretical paradigm to the collection and analysis of empirical data.
As previously summarized in Chapter 1, this research study followed a holistic 
approach o f inquiry by using a mixed-methods design typology incorporating both 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches.'^ Priority was given to the quantitative 
approach for the overall study design, data collection, and analysis, because of the study’s 
cross-sectional time series method of inquiry. A succinct discourse of both approaches 
and a summary of the seleeted design used in this research study follow.
Quantitative Designs 
There exist two basic research designs, the first being the quantitative approach and 
the second being the qualitative approach. Differentiation between the two designs, or 
approaches, lies in the way data is collected and analyzed. Although many researchers 
portray the two approaches as a dichotomy, they do share a common bond (Decrop,
1999). Some researchers, for example, have suggested that if both methods are utilized 
correctly, they contain the same logic of inference (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994).
Quantitative research designs primarily reflect the “scientific method” and adopt a 
more deductive approach to designing the research study, testing the research hypotheses, 
and interpreting the results. Quantitative research designs principally test preconceived 
theories and do not attempt to develop new theories.'^
Creswell (2003) and Creswell, Clark, Guttman and H anson (2003) described m ixed-m ethods research as 
a process o f  collecting and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single research study.
In a quantitative approach the entire framework o f  a research study is constructed around a theory, and 
the theory acts as a system atizing m odel for the developm ent o f  the research questions, hypotheses, data 
collection  procedure and analyses (B lanche & Durrheim, 1999; W elm an & Kruger, 2001).
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Babbie (1995) put forth the view that the quantitative approach has strength in its 
inherent precision and control. As Babbie suggested, control is attained through the 
sampling and research design, and reliable methods o f measurement. Similarly, other 
researchers have proposed that the quantitative approach has further powers because of 
its use of quantitative data. In other words, researchers are afforded the opportunity to 
experiment with empirical data by systematically manipulating one variable to determine 
its effect on another (Blanche & Durrheim, 1999; Welman & Kruger, 2001).
Some researchers have also suggested that the quantitative approach has inherent 
limitations. Gilbert (1993) and Massey (2003), for example, presented the idea that 
quantitative research fails to take into account an individual’s ability to interpret his or 
her own experiences and assemble his or her own meanings to situational events. In short, 
qualitative researchers present the argument that the quantitative approach, and the 
subsequent use o f the scientific method, diminishes the richness, individuality, and 
subjective nature o f an individual’s perspective.
Qualitative Designs
Qualitative research traces its origin to the social sciences, particularly sociology and 
anthropology. While quantitative research typically adopts a deductive approach to 
research study design, qualitative methods are more closely associated with an inductive 
approach.
As Corbin and Strauss (1990) suggested, qualitative research methods generate 
findings without the use of statistical procedures or quantification. In its simplest state, 
qualitative research places little reliance on numbers, but instead concentrates on rich 
descriptions of an individual’s personal viewpoints. As a result, qualitative research does
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not test preconceived theories, but attempts to develop new theories.'® Creswell (2003) 
asserted that issues o f validity are common criticisms of qualitative research methods. 
Creswell’s assertions are primarily based on the inherent subjectivity of qualitative data 
and the inability to replicate conditions or interrelationships. Creswell further pointed out 
that the subjective character o f an individual’s perspective and views are not in accord 
with the criteria of the scientific method.
Summary of the Selected Mixed Methods Research Design
As noted earlier, this research study employed a mixed methods design typology. The 
process for selecting an integrated design that combined the elements of both the 
qualitative and quantitative approach involved weighing the benefits and deficiencies of 
the available methodologies. It was decided that combining the two approaches would 
minimize the shortfalls of using only one methodology. A summary of the important 
features of the mixed methods cross-sectional time series design incorporated in this 
research study is best described as follows.
• Mixed Method Dual-Model Approach: The research design incorporated both 
quantitative and qualitative research approaches to develop and analyze two 
distinct models, the General Model and the Push/Pull Model of county 
administrator turnover.
• Model Based: The research design included a causal model that made 
assumptions about the cause-and-effect relationships between the study variables.
'* B ecause o f  its fundamental paradigm , qualitative research is considered subjective in context, due in part 
to the reliance on the texts and d iscourses o f  the study participants (Gilbert, 1993).
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• Theory Driven: Push and pull motivation theory influenced the selection of 
variables and methods of analyses.
• Descriptive: The research study described and documented the phenomena of 
interest regarding courity administrator turnover in large American counties with a 
Commission-Administrator form of government.
• Explanatory: The research study attempted to explain county administrator 
turnover, both from a departure/non-departure perspective, and from a push and 
pull viewpoint using the variables in the study model.
Time Series or Retrospect: The research study consisted of collecting information 
for both the dependent and covariates over a period of 14 years, beginning in 
2005 and moving backward to 1992.
• Cross-Sectional: The research study observed changes in both the dependent 
variable and covariates from the 32 largest American counties based on 1990 U.S. 
Bureau o f the Census data across 12 states.
Issues of Validity
Validity has commonly been referred to as the extent that a research study’s results 
accurately represent real phenomena. Quantitative and qualitative researchers constantly 
strive for validity, both internally and externally, so as to provide a true representation of 
the underlying theories under investigation (Bowen, 2003). Internal validity addresses 
whether a study measures what it claims to measure, while external validity refers to 
whether a study’s results are generalizable to a population (Hernon, 1994; Krathwohl, 
1993). By using both primary and secondary sources o f information in conjunction with a
132
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
mixed-methods research design (a primarily quantitative approach supported by “first 
hand” interviews from a cross-sectional sampling of present and past county 
administrators), it was thought that issues of validity were properly addressed.'^ Table 5- 
1 provides a listing of both the primary and secondary sources of information contained 
in this research study.
Table 5-1
Primary and Secondary Sources o f  Information
Primary sources Secondary sources
Governm ent docum ents containing census 
data, dem ographic statistics, annual financial 
results, and research reports.
G overnm ent, business, fraternal, and 
professional organization/association  
new sletters and releases, and m eeting  
minutes.
Peer review ed journal articles and surveys.
A cadem ic yearbooks.
Personal correspondence with county 
officia ls including telephone conversations, 
electronic em ail, and letters.
Firsthand interviews with present and past 
county administrators.
Annually published reference directories.
Print media including m agazine and 
newspaper articles.
N on-peer reviewed articles and review s 
containing interpretive accounts and 
histories, evaluative and critical 
studies/reports, and comm entaries.
Governmental and non-governm ental 
handbooks and manuals.
Textbooks, almanacs, and personal 
biographies.
Ph.D. dissertations.
Professional papers presented at annual 
m eetings and conventions.
It is important to note that the firsthand interviews conducted with present and past 
county administrators allowed for the use of triangulation techniques. Qualitative 
researchers have described triangulation as a method that provides overlapping 
information, allowing the researcher to check the study’s results from more than one
Primary sources o f  information are com m only considered “first-hand” information, or original 
docum ents or records used in the preparation o f  a published or unpublished work. Secondary sources o f  
information are published or unpublished work that analyzes, interprets, and/or evaluates primary sources.
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viewpoint (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1991). Researchers have posited that 
triangulation the effect of reducing the likelihood o f misinterpreting a study’s results, 
thereby increasing a researeh study’s overall validity (Baker, 1999; Deerop, 1999; Jones,
1996).
Unit of Analysis, Target Population and Samples 
Unit o f  Analysis
Appointed county administrators are the focus for this research study nested within 
large American counties (populations 100,000 or greater) with a functioning 
Commission-Administrator form of government, as defined by the National Association 
of Counties in 2006. The unit o f  analysis was appointed county administrators within 
large American counties. The unit of analysis was thought to be appropriate for 
examining the specific research questions and related hypotheses contained within this 
research study.
Targeted Counties
The review o f literature found that 48 of the 50 states within the United States have 
operational county governments, the exceptions being the Connecticut and Rhode Island. 
The literature further pointed out that of the 3,033 American counties that existed in 
2006, nearly 20% had populations of 100,000 or greater (National Association of 
Counties, 2006). This became the basis for defining the parameter o f large American 
counties, and subsequently the targeted counties.
Other counties were considered but not seleeted. They included American counties 
with Commission or Commission-Executive forms of government. The rationale for
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excluding these counties from this research study was based on the fact that these forms 
of government were either void o f a professional administrator position, or the 
administrator was elected through popular vote in lieu of being appointed by the 
commission.
Using the 1990 U.S. Bureau o f the Census, 429 counties with populations o f 100,000 
or greater were identified.^® Each county was then codified as to its respective form of 
government using the National Association of Counties (2006) definitions. A summary of 
the results is contained in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2
Summary o f  Large American County Governance (1990)
Form o f  county governm ent Num ber Percentage
Sole C om m ission 119 27.7
Com m ission-Adm inistrator/M anager 137 31.9
C om m ission-E xecutive 154 35.9
Other (Parish, Borough, no form o f  governm ent, etc.) 19 4.5
Total 429 100.0
The data contained in Table 5-2 indicate that nearly one-third, or 32%, of all large 
counties in 1990 had a functioning Commission-Administrator form of government. The 
review of literature also uncovered no known changes in the forms of governments 
within large American counties since 1990. Based on this knowledge, the following 
equation was applied to estimate the 2006 targeted county population for this researeh 
study:
The use o f  1990 U .S. bureau o f  the Census data w as considered a foundational starting point o f  this 
tim e-series research studv.
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2006 Targeted county population = Number o f  counties (2006) x Percentage o f  large
counties X  Percentage o f  counties (1990) with a Commission-Administrator form  o f
government.
The resulting 2006 targeted county population was estimated to be 194 large 
American counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government.
Quantitative Sample
The quantitative research observations (or samplings) for this research study were 
limited to data for the 32 largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator 
form of government (based on 1990 U.S. Bureau o f the Census population estimates). 
The time period for this study was bounded to data collected from 1992 through 2005.
As discussed in Chapter 1, these limitations arose due to the fact that accurate data on 
counties with mid-sized and smaller populations were sparse and not easily attainable 
within the time limitations of performing this research study. Furthermore, data on 
counties prior to 1992 were inadequate and, in most cases, unavailable. Because of these 
facts it was thought that using inaccurate data that represented mid-sized and smaller 
counties would negatively skew the overall validity o f this study. Table 5-3 provides a 
listing of the American counties used in this researeh study.
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Table 5-3
32 Largest U.S. Counties with Commissioner-Administrator Form o f  Government
Rank County State
April 1, 1990  
Population estim ate
1 L os A ngeles California 8,863 ,164
2 San D iego California 2 ,498 ,016
3 Orange California 2 ,410 ,556
4 M aricopa Arizona 2,122,101
5 Santa Clara California 1,497,577
6 San Bernardino California 1,418,380
7 A lam eda California 1,279,182
8 Broward Florida 1,255,488
9 R iverside California 1,170,413
10 Tarrant Texas 1,170,103
11 Sacramento California 1,041,219
12 Hennepin M innesota 1,032,431
13 Ham ilton Ohio 866,228
14 Palm Beach Florida 863,518
15 Pinellas Florida 851,659
16 Hillsborough Florida 834,054
17 Fairfax Virginia 818,584
18 Contra Costa California 803,732
19 Clark N evada 741 ,459
20 Orange Florida 677,491
21 Ventura California 669 ,016
22 Fresno California 667 ,490
23 Pima Arizona 666,880
24 San M ateo California 64%,623
25 Fulton Georgia 648,951
26 M ontgom ery Ohio 573,809
27 Delaw are Pennsylvania 547,651
28 K em California 543,477
29 Bucks Pennsylvania 541,174
30 M ecklenburg North Carolina 511,433
31 Union N ew  Jersey 493 ,819
32 R am sey M innesota 485 ,765
Source: United States Bureau o f  the C ensus, 1990
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Qualitative Sample
A  total o f four county administrators selected from the sample counties participated in 
this study: two currently in offiee (one with a long tenure, one with a short tenure), one 
deemed pushed from office, and one considered pulled from office. Table 5-4 provides 
descriptive statistics for the four participants (length in office, level o f education, race, 
gender and source o f recruitment). Additionally, Table 5-5 provides a career path 
chronology o f each participant.
Table 5-4
Descriptive Statistics o f  Cross-Sectional Interviews
Administrator
profile
characteristics Interviewee #1 Interview ee #2 Interviewee #3 Interviewee #4
Reason for Pushed departure - Pulled departure - N /A  -  Currently in N /A  -  Currently
departure Political Upward m obility office in office
disagreem ent with to larger county
com m ission
Tenure 4 Years 13 Years 14 Years I Year
Education Bachelor degree Master degree B achelor degree Master degree
Race White W hite W hite W hite
Gender Male M ale M ale Fem ale
Source o f External Internal Internal Internal
recruitment
Ethical Considerations
Several safeguards were used for protecting the individuals participating in the 
qualitative component of this research study. First, the objectives of this research study
M iller and M iller (1991) suggested that selecting  individuals w ho have firsthand know ledge o f  the 
theoretical paradigm effectively  evades the eco log ica l fallacy o f  asking the incorrect person the correct 
question.
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were clearly articulated to the participants prior to beginning the telephone interview. 
Second, verbal consent was received from the
participants prior to administering the research questions. Third, using pseudonyms in 
lieu of actual names, it was further thought that the confidentiality o f the partieipants 
could be maintained, i.e.. Interviewee No. 1, Interviewee No. 2, Interviewee No. 3, and 
Interviewee No. 4. Fourth, the participant’s present or past place o f employment (county 
name and state) was presented in such a way that lessened personal identification. 
Specifically, an individual’s present or past place of employment was eategorized into 
geographical regions within the United States.
Table 5-5
Career Path Chronology o f  Interviewees
Years Position
2001 -  Present
Interview ee # 1
Consultant (Private Sector)
1 9 9 7 -2 0 0 1 County M anager (Large County)
1995 E xecutive (Private Sector)
1 9 8 3 -  1995 Controller (Large C ounty)
1 9 8 0 -  1983 Fiscal (State Governm ent)
1999 -  Present
Interview ee #2
County Executive (Large County)
1 9 8 6 - 1 9 9 9 County E xecutive (M edium  County)
1 9 7 8 -  1986 County Administrator (Sm all County)
1 9 9 1 -  Present
Interviewee #3
County Administrator (Large County)
1 9 8 8 -  1991 A ssistant County Administrator
1 9 8 5 - 1 9 8 8 Department Director (Public Sector)
1 9 8 0 -  1985 Engineer (Public Sector)
2 0 0 6  -  Present
Interviewee #4
County M anager (Large C oim ty)
2002  -  2006 A ssistant County M anager
1 9 9 8 - 2 0 0 2 City M anager (Large C ity)
1 9 8 9 - 1 9 9 8 Senior V ice President (Private Sector)
1 9 8 6 -  1989 General M anager (Public Sector)
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Research Model
This research study attempted to assess the cause-and-effect relationships between 
political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, community instability, and select 
administrator profile attributes as covariates, and both general turnover and push/pull 
factor-induced turnover.
The dependent variable in the General Model is a dichotomous variable indicating 
whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position or remained in office.
The dependent variable In the Push/Pull Model is also a dichotomous variable reflecting 
whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position as a result of push factors 
or pull factors. Personal reasons not associated to push and pull factors, or retirement, 
such as personal or family illness, or deaths, were excluded from the analyses. The 
measures included political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, community 
instability, and select administrator profile variables that are theorized to accurately 
measure the domain attributes.
Relational Measures, Data Collection and Sources, 
and Coding Procedures
The research study models provided the necessary direetion on the types of data, the 
collection processes and sources, and coding procedures contained in this study. As a 
result, each o f the attributes within the four domains suggested specific relational 
measures or variables.
The data for each variable were collected from both primary and secondary sources 
over a 10-month time period beginning in April, 2006, and ending in January, 2007. Data
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collection principally focused on the trends and relationships between the dependent and 
variables. A summary o f the primary and secondary data sources accessed during the data 
collection process for each of the variables is contained in Exhibit I.
Quantitative data were coded and assigned numeric values, and entered into a 
Microsoft Excel database. A comprehensive matrix of the dependent and covariates, 
including levels of measurements and codification, is contained in Exhibit II.
Qualitative data on the other hand, were structured into journals and Microsoft Excel 
tables. The following is a detailed account of each data variable (both dependent and 
independent) and their associated collection processes and codifications.
Dependent Variables
Two dependent variables were contained in this research study, one associated with 
the General Model and one with the Push/Pull Model.
General Model
The term county administrator turnover was operationally defined as whether an 
individual departed his or her position o f county administrator or remained in office.
County administrator turnover data in the General Model were principally obtained 
through secondary sources, such as annually published government reference directories 
including:
• The Municipal Yearbook, Vol. 59-66 (1992-1999);
• The Municipal Yellow Book: Who’s Who in the Leading City and County 
Governments and Local Authorities, Vol. 7-76 (Winter 1991-Winter 2006);
• Carroll’s County Directory (November 1995/April 1996, November 1996/April
1997);
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• Carroll’s Annual Municipal/County Directory (2001-2002); and
• W ho’s Who in Local Government Management, (1991/1992-1998/1999).
When conflicting information was uncovered during the data collection process,
validation as to the true value o f the data was obtained from primary sources such as 
personal correspondence with county officials, i.e., telephone conversations, electronic 
emails and letters.
The dependent variable Y a d m i n i s t r a t o r  t u m o v e r ( a )  was a eategorical (dichotomous) variable 
comprised of two values indicating whether an administrator departed or remained in 
office, coded as follows:
• 1 = departed office; or
• 0 = remained in office.
Push/Pull Model
The term county administrator turnover was operationally defined as whether an 
individual departed their position o f county administrator due to push factors such as 
actions resulting in involuntary, coereed, or pressured removal, and pull faetors sueh as 
actions resulting in voluntary exits.
County administrator turnover data in the Push/Pull Model were obtained through 
both primary and secondary sources. Primary sourees included personal correspondence 
with county officials; and governmental, business, fraternal and professional 
organization/assoeiation newsletters or releases; and meeting minutes. Secondary sources 
included print media (magazine and newspaper articles), non-peer reviewed reviews 
(interpretive aeeounts and histories), and biographies.
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In all cases, multiple data sources were used for purposes of triangulation and to 
enhance the validity or true value of the data. The primary and secondary sources 
(excluding personal eorrespondenee) used during the data eolleetion process (and not 
specifieally refereneed in the body of this research study or included in the Bibliography) 
are eontained in Appendix I.
Departure events were ordered and codified based on established principles of past 
researchers in the arena of leadership departures or succession (Gorden & Rosen, 1981). 
The dependent variable Y a d m i n i s t r a t o r  t u m o v e r ( b )  was a categorical (dichotomous) variable 
comprised of two values indicating whether an administrator departed due to push factors 
or pull factors coded as follows:
• 0 = pushed from office; or
• 1 = pulled from office.
Covariates
Twenty-one covariates existed in this researeh study: four assoeiated with the 
political uncertainty domain, six with the government fiscal performance domain, six 
with the community uncertainty domain, and five within the administrator profile 
domain.
Political Uncertainty Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship 
between measurements o f  political uncertainty and county administrator turnover? The 
four attributes deemed as accurate measurements o f politieal uncertainty included (a) 
short-term commission turnover, (b) mid-term eommission turnover, (e) commission 
leadership turnover, and (d) commission partisanship -  commission party control.
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Political uncertainty data were prineipally obtained through the same seeondary 
sources as those listed previously in the General Model section.
When conflicting information was uncovered during the data-collection process, 
validation as to the true value of the data was obtained from primary sources such as 
personal correspondence with county officials, i.e., telephone conversations, electronic 
email, and letters.
Short-term commission turnover. The following speeific research question was 
addressed: What is the relationship between short-term commission member turnover as 
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression short-term commission turnover was operationally defined as a one- 
year percentage change in commission board members.
The independent variable measuring a county’s short-term commission turnover 
variable was interval and coded as X s h o r t t e r m c o m m i s s i o n t u m o v e r  = Ratio of eommission 
members replaced in a given year to the total number o f commission members on the 
commission.
Mid-term commission turnover. The following specific research question was 
addressed: What is the relationship between mid-term commission member turnover as 
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression mid-term commission turnover was operationally defined as a 
consecutive two-year rolling average, or percentage change in eommission members on 
the commission.
The independent variable measuring a county’s mid-term commission turnover was 
interval and coded as Xmid-tenncommisaontumover = Rolling average, or ratio of eommission
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members replaced in a consecutive two-year time period to the total number of 
commission members on the commission.
Commission leadership turnover. The following specific research question was 
addressed: What is the relationship between commission leadership turnover as the 
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term commission leadership turnover was operationally defined as a change in 
commission leadership (or chairperson) for a given year.
The independent variable measuring eommission leadership turnover, 
X c o m m i s s i o n i e a d e r s h i p t u r n o v e r ,  was nominal denoting whether a commission chairperson was 
replaced by another commission member in a given year and coded as follows:
• 1 = commission leadership turnover, or
• 0 = no commission leadership turnover.
Commission partisanship -  commission party control. The following specific 
research question was addressed: What is the relationship between non-partisan 
commissions, partisan commissions with no change in party control, and partisan 
commissions with changes in party control as the independent variable and administrator 
turnover as the dependent variable?
The term commission partisanship -  commission party control was operationally 
defined as whether commission electoral structures incorporated partisan election 
processes, and whether commission electoral structures that incorporated partisan 
election processes experienced a change in party control.
The independent variable measuring a county’s commission partisanship -  
commission party control, Xpartisan-panyctri, was ordinal designating whether commission
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elections incorporated a partisan process, and whether those commissions that 
incorporated partisan elections experienced a change in party control or not coded as 
follows:
• 1 = partisan commissions election processes with a change in party control;
• 0 = partisan commission with no change in party control; or
• -1 = no partisan commission election process.
Government Fiscal Performance Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship 
between measurements o f  government fiscal performance variables and county 
administrator turnover? The six attributes deemed as accurate measurements of 
government fiscal performance included a county’s (a) cost burden, (b) income growth, 
(c) revenue dependency, (d) financial outlay, (e) short-term stability, and (f) long-term 
stability.
Government fiscal performance and county population data were obtained through 
primary sources, such as the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the individual counties’ 
Consolidated Annual Financial Reports (1991-2006). County bond ratings were obtained 
through both primary and secondary sources, e.g., personal correspondence with county 
officials and annually published government reference directories published by Moody’s 
Investor Service.
Cost burden. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s cost burden, or tax revenue equity, as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term cost burden, or tax revenue equity, was operationally defined as the ratio of 
total property tax revenue to total population in a given year.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s cost burden was interval and coded as 
Xcostburden = Ratio of total property tax revenue to the total population in a given year.
Income growth. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s income growth as the independent variable and 
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term income growth was operationally defined as the one-year percentage change 
in tax revenue.
The independent variable measuring a county’s income growth was interval and 
coded as Xjncomegrowth ~ Ratio o f total tax revenue in a given year to the total tax revenue 
in the preceding year.
Revenue dependency. The following specific research question was addressed: What 
is the relationship between a county’s revenue dependency (level o f  intergovernmental 
transfers) as the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent 
variable?
The term revenue dependency was operationally defined as the percentage of 
intergovernmental transfers to total revenue in any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s revenue dependency was interval and 
coded as Xrevenuedependency = Ratio o f intergovernmental transfers to the total revenue.
Financial outlay. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s financial outlay or expenditures as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term financial outlay was operationally defined as the ratio of total expenditures 
to total population in a given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s financial outlay was interval and 
coded as Xfmanciaioutiay = Ratio of total expenditures to total population in a given year.
Short-term stability. The following specific research question was addressed: What is 
the relationship between a county’s short-term stability (change in total expenditures) as 
the independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression short-term stability was operationally defined as the one-year 
percentage change in total expenditures.
The independent variable measuring a county’s short-term stability was interval and 
coded as Xshomermstabiiity = Ratio of total expenditures in a given year to the total 
expenditures in the preceding year.
Long-term stability. The following specific research question was addressed: What is 
the relationship between a county's long-term stability (county bond rating) as the 
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The expression long-term stability was operationally defined as the equivalent of a 
county’s uninsured general obligation bond issuance rating backed by the county’s ability 
to increase taxes if necessary to make payments on the long-term bonds as rated by 
Moody’s Investor Services. In cases where uninsured general obligation bonds were not 
issued, bond ratings were obtained from lease revenue, certificate of partieipation, 
tourism development tax, and insured general obligation bond issues, and adjusted to 
reflect a county’s uninsured general obligation bond issuance rating (lease revenue and 
certificate o f participation bond issues were adjusted one credit rating higher, while
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tourism development tax and insured general obligation bond issues were adjusted one 
credit rating lower). Exhibit III provides a summary of bond issuanees (other than 
uninsured general obligation bond issues) used in this research study for both the General 
and Push/Pull models.
The independent variable measuring a county’s long-term stability, Xiongteimstabiiity, was 
ordinal with 17 values indicating the pereeived safety of a county’s long-term debt 
financing and coded as follows:
1 = prime with maximum safety, or Aaa;
2 to 4 = high grade, high quality or, A al, Aa2, Aa3;
5 to 7 = upper medium grade, or A l, A2, A3;
8 to 10 = lower medium grade, or Baal, Baa2, Baa3;
11 = non-investment grade, or Ba;
12 to 13 = speculative, or Ba2, Ba3;
14 to 16 = highly speculative, or B 1, B2, B3 ; or 
17 = substantial risk, or C aa l.
Community Instability Variables
The following general researeh question was addressed: What is the relationship 
between measurements o f  community instability variables and county administrator 
turnover? The six attributes deemed as accurate measurements o f community instability 
included a county’s (a) population growth, (b) county scope o f jurisdiction, (c) ethnic 
diversity, (d) economic conditions, (e) affluence, and (f) poverty level.
Community instability data were obtained solely through primary sources such as the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, and the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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Population growth. The following specific research question was addressed: What is 
the relationship between a county’s population growth as the independent variable and 
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term population growth was operationally defined as the one-year percentage 
change in total population.
The independent variable measuring a county’s population growth was interval and 
coded as Xpopuiationgrowth = Ratio o f total population in a given year to the total population 
in the preceding year.
County scope o f  jurisdiction. The following specific research question was addressed: 
What is the relationship between a county’s scope o f  jurisdiction as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term county scope o f  jurisdiction was operationally defined as the ratio between a 
county’s total population and the population residing in unincorporated jurisdictions. The 
population in unincorporated jurisdictions was determined by subtracting the population 
in incorporated areas (jurisdictions with populations o f 10,000 or more based on 2000 
U.S. Bureau o f the Census statistics) from the total population of the county for any given 
year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s scope of jurisdiction was interval and 
coded as Xscopeoijurisdiction = Ratio of total population in a county in a given year to the total 
population residing in unincorporated areas.
Ethnic diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s ethnic diversity (non-white population) as the 
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term ethnic diversity was operationally defined as the annualized pereentage of 
the non-white population to the total population.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s ethnie diversity was interval and 
coded as Xethnicdiversiiy = Annualized ratio o f the non-white population to total population 
in a given year.
Economic conditions. The following specific research question was addressed: What 
is the relationship between a county’s economic condition (unemployment rate) as the 
independent variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term economic condition was operationally defined as the unemployment rate in 
the month of July within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s economic condition was interval and 
coded as Xeconomicconditions = Ratio o f the unemployed workforce to the total population of 
the workforce in the month o f July.
Affluence. The following spécifié research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s affluence level (per capita income) as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term affluence was operationally defined as the annualized average per capita 
income level of the total population within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a eounty’s affluence level was interval and 
coded as Xamuence = Annualized ratio o f total income to total population.
Poverty. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between a county’s poverty level (percentage o f  the households living below
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the federal poverty level) as the independent variable and administrator turnover as the 
dependent variable?
The term poverty was operationally defined as the annualized total households living 
below the federal poverty level within a county for any given year.
The independent variable measuring a county’s poverty level was interval and coded 
as Xpoverty “  Annualized ratio of the total households living below the federal poverty 
level to total population.
Administrator Profile Variables
The following general research question was addressed: What is the relationship 
between administrator profile variables and county administrator turnover? The five 
attributes deemed relevant measurements o f administrators included an administrator’s 
level of (a) formal education, (b) job experience (tenure), (c) gender, (d) ethnicity, and (e) 
origin of recruitment.
Administrator profile data were obtained through both primary and secondary 
sources. Primary sources included personal correspondence with county officials; and 
governmental, business, fraternal and professional organization/association newsletters 
and releases, and meeting minutes. Secondary sources included the same annually 
published government reference directories as listed previously in the General Model 
section. Additional secondary sources included print media (magazine and newspaper 
articles), non-peer reviewed reviews (interpretive accounts and histories), and 
biographies.
In all cases, multiple data sources were used for purposes of triangulation and to 
enhance the validity, or true value, o f the data. The primary and secondary sources
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(excluding personal eorrespondenee) used during the data eolleetion process (and not 
specifieally referenced in the body of this researeh study or ineluded in the Bibliography) 
are contained in Appendix I.
Formal education. The following spécifié research question was addressed; What is 
the relationship between an administrator’s level o f  form al education as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term form al education was operationally defined as an administrator’s level of 
formal education expressed as the number o f years the individual attended an accredited 
institution of higher education.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s formal education, 
Xformaieducation, was Ordinal with four values indicating the administrator’s level o f formal 
education and coded as follows:
• 20 = Doctorate degree;
• 18 = Master’s degree;
• 16 = Bachelor’s degree; or
• 12 = High School degree.
Job experience. The following spécifié researeh question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between an administrator’s job  experience (tenure) as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term job  experience was operationally defined as an administrator’s length of 
time in office, or tenure, expressed as the number of years (rounded to the nearest whole 
year).
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The independent variable measuring an administrator’s job experience was interval 
and coded as Xjobexperience == Administrator job tenure expressed in number o f years.
Gender diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between an administrator’s gender as the independent variable and 
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term gender diversity was operationally defined as an administrator’s gender, 
whether male or female.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s gender, Xgenderdiversity, was 
nominal and coded as follows:
• 0 = male; or
• 1 = female.
Ethnic diversity. The following specific research question was addressed: What is the 
relationship between an administrator’s ethnicity as the independent variable and 
administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
The term ethnicity was operationally defined as whether an administrator was of non­
white decent.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s ethnicity Xethnicdiversiiy was 
nominal and coded as follows:
• 0 = non-white; or
• 1 = white.
Origin o f  recruitment. The following specific research question was addressed: What 
is the relationship between an administrator’s origin o f  recruitment as the independent 
variable and administrator turnover as the dependent variable?
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The term origin o f  recruitment was operationally defined as whether an individual 
was promoted to the position o f administrator from within the organization or from 
outside the organization.
The independent variable measuring an administrator’s source o f recruitment, 
X s o u r c e o f r e c r u i t m e n t ,  was nominal and coded as follows:
• 0 = reeruited from within the organization; or
• 1 = recruited from outside the organization.
Cross-Sectional Interviews
The qualitative eomponent o f this study was intended to solicit firsthand knowledge 
relating to the factors that may explain county administrator turnover. Also, the solicited 
responses were intended to indicate support (or non-support) of the design and 
methodology used in this research study.
Data were gathered using a semi-structured telephone interview method. By using 
this method, issues to be addressed in the interview were attended to, yet flexibility was 
maintained so that the interviewee was able to develop ideas and speak more widely on 
the issue o f county administrator turnover.
Question selection incorporated both open-ended and closed-ended questions. Open- 
ended questions were intended to solicit alternative domains, attributes and variables that 
may exhibit a cause-and-effect relationship on eounty administrator turnover (other than 
those described in the quantitative eomponent o f this research study).
Closed-end questions were designed to solicit the level of agreement or disagreement 
regarding the choice of relational measures used in the research study. Closed-ended 
questions were ordinal and based on a Likert scale with five values indieating the
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interviewees’ level of agreement or disagreement to the question. They were eoded as 
follows: 1 = Disagree strongly; 2 = Disagree; 3 = Unsure; 4 = Agree; or 5 = Agree 
strongly.
The questions posed to interviewees during the telephone interview data collection 
process are contained in Appendix II.
Table 5-6 provides a breakdown of the qualitative research questions as to their type,
i.e., open-ended versus elosed-ended.
Table 5-6
Summary o f  Qualitative Research Questions and Types
Researcti questions Type
la , Ic , 2a, 2c, 3a, 3c, 4a, 4c Closed-ended
lb , 2b, 3b, 4b, 5 Open-ended
System for Analysis 
The quantitative component of this researeh study eontained both categorical and 
continuous variables, while the qualitative component contained categorieal variables and 
firsthand testimonials. The following are the primary analytical considerations, 
quantitative procedures, and qualitative procedures deemed appropriate to analyze the 
data in this study.
Analytical Considerations 
Key analytical considerations for properly testing the hypotheses in both the General 
and Push/Pull Models of county administrator turnover contained in this study include the
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selection of appropriate statistical software, treatment o f missing data, i.e., appropriate 
methods of imputation, and testing for multicollinearity. A discussion of each key issue 
follows.
Statistical Software Selection 
The choice of an appropriate statistieal software package for use in this research study 
was principally dependent on its ability to perform panel data analysis that incorporates 
both a spatial and temporal dimension within the realm of panel data and duration 
analysis. As Yafee (2003) suggested, the statistical packages that perform well in panel 
data analysis are Stata and SAS. Further, “Stata appears to have a particularly rich variety 
of duration analysis procedures” (p. 7) capable of performing complex analysis modeling. 
SPSS, on the other hand, “is reasonably strong on ANOVA-related procedures,” however 
it is “the weakest of the three packages in the scope of statistical procedures it offers” 
(Acock, 2005, p. 1094).
Based on a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the three statistical 
software packages, Stata was ehosen in lieu of SAS and SPSS to test the effects of the 
covariates on the dependent variables in both models.
Treatment o f  Missing Data 
During the data collection process, a number o f values related to variables in the 
fiscal performance domain were unobtainable for four counties. Those values included 
total tax revenues, total intergovernmental transfers, total revenue, and total expenditures 
for three years of the study. Table 5-7 provides a breakdown of the missing data by 
county and study year. For purposes of obtaining aecurate and reliable results of tests 
assoeiated with the Cox proportional regression procedure, it was important to address
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the missing data. Further, Murdaugh (2005) pointed out, “Assuring the sample size 
remains the same allows for the computation of statistical tests on more than one model 
and ensures any changes in the estimates will not be due to the use o f different samples 
from the dataset” (p. 86).
Table 5-7
Missing Data by County and Year
County Years
M aricopa C ounty, AZ 1 9 9 2 -  1993
Palm Beach C ounty, FL 2005
Pima County, AZ 2005
Pinellas County, FL 2005
Fogarty (2006) suggested that four non-mutually exclusive categories exist for 
treatment o f missing data. The first category is based on complete-case procedures, or 
methods, that result in the discarding of incomplete variables. This strategy, however, 
facilitates bias and is usually not very efficient.
Fogarty’s (2006) second category, available-case procedure, deletes data “only from 
those statistics that need the information” (p. 6). Available-case procedures, such as pair 
wise deletion, have a disadvantage over other procedures because the sample base may 
vary from variable to variable depending on the pattern o f missing information.
The third category proposed by Fogarty (2006), weighting procedures, are based on 
“design weights” and operate by modifying variable weights to adjust for missing data. 
Weighting procedures, however, are principally used in sample survey applications.
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Finally, the fourth category suggested by Fogarty (2006) for the treatment o f missing 
data, imputation-based procedures, adopts a strategy to “fill-in,” or impute the missing 
data.
The fourth approach, or imputation, was deemed the most appropriate for treating 
missing data in this research study for two reasons. As Roth (1994) suggested, imputing 
missing data tends to generate less biased estimators than simple missing data techniques. 
Second, Roth posited that imputing missing data allows the researcher to use methods of 
data analysis on the complete dataset
While there are many methods of imputation, such as mean imputation, hot deck 
imputation, and historical imputation, the procedure best suited for handling missing data 
in this research study was thought to be regression imputation. Regression imputation 
simply uses other variables to predict the value of the variable with missing data, and 
then the fitted value is imputed.
For missing data o f non-consecutive years (Palm Beach County, Pima County, and 
Pinellas County), a simple regression imputation procedure was used, oxY\ = a + bx,, 
where Y\ was the missing value, and a and b are the least squares estimates obtained from 
a regression of known values o f the given variable and study year.
For missing data of consecutive years (Maricopa County), a sequential regression 
imputation procedure was used. In sequential regression imputation, a regression model 
for a given variable is developed using all the original data. Next, for each missing data 
point a value is imputed. Then, the process is repeated for the next missing data point 
(Raghunathan, Lepkowski, van Hoewyk, & Solenberger, 2001). Following the 
Raghunathan et al. procedure, missing values for study year 1993 were first imputed
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using a simple regression imputation proeedure. The process was then repeated for 
missing data in study year 1992, ineorporating the imputed values for study year 1993 in 
the simple regression imputation procedure.
Multicollinearity
Multicollinearity is an important analytical consideration in any regression analysis. 
Multicollinearity becomes a problem when the effects of multiple covariates on the 
dependent variable cannot be separated. When two variables are significantly correlated, 
it becomes problematic when determining which of the two variables accounts for the 
variance in the dependent variable.
Considering the models contained in this study, it is expected that some degree of 
collinearity may exist between certain covariates, e.g., one-year commission turnover and 
two-year commission turnover; a community’s poverty rate and per capita income.
To assess the degree of multicollinearity among the 21 covariates in both the General 
and Push/Pull Models, bivariate correlation analyses were performed. Exhibit IV 
presents the results of the bivariate correlation analysis for the General Model, while 
Exhibit V provides the results for the Push/Pull Model.
As suspected, a relatively high degree of correlation exists in both models regarding 
one-year commission turnover and two-year commission turnover, or .62 and .59 
respectively. Further, an elevated correlation exists between a community’s poverty rate 
and per capita income, or -.65 and -.71. Also, it is not surprising to see a relatively high 
correlation between a community’s poverty rate and unemployment rate, or .62 and .66.
Lewis-Beck (1980) suggested that in social science research, a correlation of .80 is 
considered an acceptable “cutoff’ value. Although some bivariate correlations were
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considered relatively high, none exceeded .80. Based on this knowledge, the collinearity 
between the 21 covariates was deemed acceptable and all variables were retained for 
purposes of this research study.
Quantitative Procedures 
The quantitative data were first organized for analysis by means o f the guiding data 
collection framework, or research study models. Subsequently, descriptive statistics were 
generated to analyze both the dependent variable and covariates, i.e., measurements of 
central tendency, distribution, and dispersion.
Next, an appropriate approach for analyzing cause-and-effect of the eovariates on the 
dependent variables had to be selected. Because of the characteristics of the data 
contained in this research study and subsequent hypotheses, a form o f duration analysis, 
the Cox proportional regression model, was chosen.
Different from parametric models, the Cox proportional regression model does not 
necessitate “a priori specification of the hazard function” (Demore, 2005, p. 78). 
Additionally, unlike parametric models that incorporate temporal attributes on the right 
hand side of the equation, duration models encompass time dynamics into the dependent 
variable through “hazard rates.”
In the General Model, the hazard rate represents the risk that an appointed county 
administrator will depart his or her position in any given year. In the Push/Pull Model, 
the hazard rate represents the risk that an appointed county administrator will depart their 
position in any given year due to push or pull-induced factors. For purposes of clarity, 
hazard rates can simply be interpreted as the increase or decrease in risk that a departure 
will occur, with the covariates either increasing or decreasing those occurrences.
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Next, to operationalize the data in the research study models, the models’ “risk set” 
had to be defined. A risk set is a composite o f possible outcomes that could occur in the 
analysis of appointed county administrator turnover. In the General Model, the risk set 
was departure or non-departure. In the Push/Pull Model, the risk set was pushed 
departure and pulled departure.
Because this research study incorporated time-varying data (covariates that change 
their values over time), special data organization was required. First, to maintain the same 
risk sets across different counties and appointed administrators, the structure o f the data 
required a single observation for every county, for every appointed administrator, for 
every year of the study. Second, time duration variables were needed to account for the 
interevent-time variant characteristics o f the research study’s data set, i.e., counters that 
measure the length of time in office (duration), i.e., start times (ISTART) and finish times 
(IFINISH). A hypothetical example of how the data was organized in this study is 
presented in Table 5-8.
Table 5-8
Research Study Data Organization
County Year Administrator Departure Duration ISTART IFINISH
A 1992 Smith 0 1 0 1
A 1993 Smith 0 2 1 2
A 1994 Smith 0 3 2 3
A 1995 Smith 1 4 3 4
A 1996 Jones 0 1 0 1
B 1992 Franks 0 1 0 1
B 1993 Franks 1 2 1 2
B 1994 H olm es 0 1 0 1
C 1992 White 0 1 0 1
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Finally, the factors that motivate an appointed county administrator to depart or 
remain in his or her position had to be defined. Important to note is that these motivating 
factors may or may not be interdependent. In the both the models, the motivating factors 
were the covariates.
Qualitative Procedures
In qualitative research, data collection and analysis proceed simultaneously so as to 
bring to light substantive theories supported by empirical data (Merriam, 1988). For this 
reason, the qualitative analyses started early on in this research study when responses to 
open-ended questions were transcribed and organized around the issues being 
investigated.
Marshall and Rossman (1995) suggested there were five steps in analyzing qualitative 
data, each involving data analysis and interpretation. These five steps consisted of (a) 
organizing the data, (b) generating response categories, (c) assessing emerging themes 
and/or patterns, (d) seeking out alternative explanations, and (e) writing the report. 
Merriam (1988) suggested that the use of both textual and graphic depictions, such as 
tables organized by categories, was a preferred method of illustrating and reporting 
qualitative data.
The qualitative data analyses o f interviewee responses to open-ended questions 
therefore consisted of organizing and summarizing responses into a textual format. 
Similarly, descriptive statistics o f the participants were summarized in table format.
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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS OF STUDY - GENERAL MODEL 
County Administrator Turnover -  General Model
This chapter presents the analyses and findings of the General Model, and includes 
the testing of the hypotheses. As stated in Chapter 1, there were three purposes of this 
research study; briefly:
1. To explain turnover in appointed county administrators in large American 
counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government using push and 
pull motivation theory.
2. To examine whether previous methods used to explain top municipality executive 
turnover could also be applied to explain county administrator turnover.
3. To provide a starting point for development and specification of a single plausible 
model that could explain appointed county government administrator turnover in 
American counties of varying populations.
Development of the General Model first began by incorporating similar 
measurements o f political uncertainty and community characteristics previously used in 
the study of top municipality executive turnover. Next, government fiscal performance 
and county administrator profile measurements were added. By including these 
measurements, it was thought the overall explanatory powers o f the General Model could
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be enhanced. As previously discussed, the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable 
indicating whether an appointed administrator departed his or her position or remained in 
office. The independent variable set includes all 21 covariates identified and discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5.
Important to note is that the original data set consisted of 90 administrators and 448 
observed events (32 counties over 14 years). The following analyses incorporates only 
88 administrators and 438 events. As mentioned in Chapter 4, a decision was made to 
exclude administrator departures such as personal or family illness, or deaths, from the 
research study’s analyses because these events were deemed irrelevant to the study 
results. The data excluded from the forthcoming analyses included 2 administrators 
encompassing 10 events (years).
Descriptive Data Analysis
Descriptive data analysis is important in any research study because it provides a 
“ground level” framework in which to examine the static characteristics of the dependent 
variable and covariates,, i.e., measurements of central tendency, distribution, and 
dispersion.
Table 6-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for “all” cases of the dependent 
variable. In general, county administrators are highly educated with college degrees 
(97.7%), have less than ten years in the position (81.8%), and are predominantly white 
males (90.9% and 87.5% respectively). County administrators were equally dispersed 
(50%) between external recruitment and internal promotion.
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Table 6-1
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Dependent Variable “A ll” Cases
Administrator tum over(a)
A ll cases (C ode 0 =  no change; 1 =  change) Frequency Percentage
R eason for turnover: Currently in office 27 30.7
Pushed induced 17 19.3
Pulled induced 26 2 9 5
Retirem ent 18 20.5
Total 88 100.0
Education (highest level completed): H igh school 0 0.0
A ssociate degree 2 2.3
B achelor degree 26 2 9 j
M aster degree 46 5 2 3
D octorate degree 14 15.9
Total 88 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 48 54.5
6 - 1 0  Years 24 2T 3
1 1 - 1 5  Years 9 10.2
1 6 - 2 0  Years 6 6.8
21 +  Years 1 1.2
Total 88 100.0
Gender: M ale 77 8T 5
Fem ale 11 12.5
Total 88 100.0
Race: W hite 80 9& 9
N on-w hite 8 9.1
Total 88 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 44 50.0
External 44 5& 0
Total 88 100.0
Num ber o f  administrators =  88 subjects representing 27 in office  at the end o f  the study period (2005 ), and 
17 push-induced, 26  pull-induced and 18 voluntary retirement departures
Descriptive statistics for those cases o f the dependent variable that represented “no 
change,” or county administrators currently in office, are presented in Table 6-2. 
Interestingly, all county administrators currently in office had bachelor’s degrees or 
higher, while the majority had less than 10 years in the position (74.1%). Additionally,
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county administrators currently in office are predominantly white males (85.2% and 
81.5% respectively). Internal promotions were more prevalent with current county 
administrators (55.6%) versus external recruitments (44.4%).
Table 6-2
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Dependent Variable “No Change ”
Adm inistrator tum over(a) 
(C ode 0 =  no change)) Frequency Percentage
Education (highest level completed): H igh school 0 0.0
A ssociate degree 0 0 .0
B achelor degree 11 40 .7
M aster degree 11 40 .7
Doctorate degree 5 18.6
Total 27 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 13 4& 2
6 - 1 0  Years 7 2 5 4
1 1 - 1 5  Years 6 2 Z 2
1 6 - 2 0  Years 1 3.7
21 + Years 0 0.0
Total 27 100.0
Gender: M ale 22 81.5
Fem ale 5 1 8 j
Total 27 100.0
Race: W hite 23 8 ^ 2
N on-w hite 4 14.8
Total 27 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 15 55.6
External 12 44 .4
Total 27 100.0
Num ber o f  administrators =  27 subjects in office  at the end o f  the study period (2005) w ith m inim um  
tenures o f  one year
Descriptive statistics for those cases o f the dependent variable that represented 
“change,” or county administrators that departed, are presented in Table 6-3. While 
county administrators that departed their positions were also highly educated, with 96.7%
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having bachelor’s degrees or higher, a larger percentage had tenures o f ten years or less 
(85.3%) when compared to county administrators currently in office (74.1%). 
Furthermore, the percentage o f white males (90.2% and 93.4% respectively) was also 
notably higher when compared to county administrators who are currently in office 
(85.2% and 81.5%).
Table 6-3
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Dependent Variable “Change ”
Administrator tum over(a) 
(C ode 1 =  change) Frequency Percentage
R eason for turnover: Pushed induced 17 274
Pulled induced 26 42^
Retirement 18 2 9 j
Total 61 100.0
Education (highest level com pleted): H igh school 0 0 .0
A ssociate degree 2 3.3
Bachelor degree 15 2A6
Master degree 35 57.4
D octorate degree 9 14.7
Total 61 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 35 57.4
6 -  10 Years 17 274
1 1 - 1 5  Years 3 864
1 6 - 2 0  Y  ears 5 8.2
21 +  Years 1 1.6
Total 61 100.0
Gender: M ale 55 9&2
Fem ale 6 9.8
Total 61 100.0
Race: W hite 57 93.4
N on-w hite 4 6.6
Total 61 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 29 47.5
External 32 525
Total 61 100.0
Num ber o f  administrators = 61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26 pull-induced and 18 voluntary  
retirement departures
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Tables 6-4 through 6-7 summarize the descriptive statistics for the covariates (by 
domain) that are contained in the General Model.
Table 6-4
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Political Uncertainty Variables
Variable name M ean Std. dev. M in. M ax. Description
Short-term
com m ission
turnover
.11 .16 0 1 Ratio o f  com m ission  m em bers 
replaced in a given  year to the total 
number o f  com m ission  m em bers
M id-term
com m ission
turnover
.11 .10 0 .40 Ratio o f  com m ission  m em bers 
replaced in a consecutive tw o year 
time period to the total number o f  
com m ission  members
C om m ission
leadership
turnover
.56 .50 0 1 Change in com m ission  leadership for 
a given  year: 1 =  leadership change;
0 =  no leadership turnover
C om m ission
partisanship
.48 .50 0 1 C om m ission elections incorporated a 
partisan process; 1 =  partisan election  
process; 0 =  no partisan election  
processes
C ounty party 
control
.02 .13 0 1 Change in com m ission  party 
majority: 0 =  non-partisan  
com m ission  or no change in party 
control w ithin partisan com m issions; 
1 =  change in party control
Total number o f  observations =  438 events'
^  A s previously m entioned, the original data set consisted  o f  90 administrators and 448 observed  
events (32 counties over 14 years). The analyses contained in Table 6 -4  through Table 6-10 incorporates 
on ly  88 administrators and 438  events. A  decision  w as m ade to exclude administrator departures such as 
personal or fam ily illness, or deaths, from the research study’s analyses because these events w ere deem ed  
irrelevant to the study results. The data excluded from Table 6-4 through Table 6 -10  includes 2 
administrators encom passing 10 events.
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Table 6-5
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Fiscal Performance Variables
V ariable nam e M ean Std. dev. Min. Max. D escription
C ost burden .30 .30 .04 228 Ratio o f  total property tax revenue to 
total population in a g iven  year
Incom e growth .06 .12 -.35 1.21 One-year percentage change in tax 
revenue
R evenue
dependency
.42 .22 .02 .90 Ratio o f  intergovernm ental transfers 
to total revenue in a g iven  year
Financial
outlay
.97 .55 .14 4 .02 Ratio o f  total expenditures to total 
population in a g iven  year
Short-term
stability
.05 .08 - j3 .51 One-year percentage change in total 
expenditures
Long-term
stability
3J4 2J^ 1 17 Uninsured general obligation  long­
term bond rating: 1 =  A a l through 17 
=  Caal
Total number observations =  438 events (see Table 6-4 footnote for details)
Table 6-6
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model -  Community Instability Variables
V ariable nam e M ean Std. dev. Min. M ax. D escription
Population
growth
.02 .02 -.01 .14 One-year percentage change in 
total population
C ounty scope  
o f  jurisdiction
.34 .24 .02 .99 Ratio betw een total population o f  
county to the total population  
residing in incorporated areas 
within the county
Ethnic
diversity
.22 .10 .07 .61 A nnualized percentage o f  non­
w hite population to the total 
population
E conom ic
conditions
5.77 2 .45 1.60 15.00 U nem ploym ent rate in the month 
o f  July in any g iven  year
A ffluence 31013.21 8775.63 16847.00 61029.00 A nnualized average per capita 
incom e level o f  the total 
population in any g iven  year
Poverty 12.24 4 .24 4 .10 28.10 A nnualized total households liv ing  
b elow  the federal poverty  leve l in 
any g iven  year
Total number observations =  438 events (see Table 6-4 footnote for details)
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Table 6-7
Descriptive Statistics fo r  General Model  -  Administrator Profile Variables
Variable name M ean Std. dev. Min. M ax. Description
Formal
education
17.64 1.44 14 20 Level o f  formal education; 12 =  H igh  
school through 20 =  Doctorate degree
Job experience . 6.35 4.59 1 22 Length o f  tim e in office , or tenure 
expressed as the number o f  years
Gender
diversity
.13 .33 0 1 Gender diversity: 0  =  male; 1 =  
fem ale
Ethnic diversity .91 .29 0 1 Ethnic diversity: 0 =  non-w hite; 1 = 
white
O rigin o f  
recruitment
.50 .50 0 1 Promoted to the position  o f  
administrator from w ithin the 
organization, or recruited from  
outside the organization: 0 =  internal 
recruitment; 1 =  external recruitment
Total number observations =  438 events (S ee  Table 6-4 footnote for details)
Cox Proportional Regression Analysis -  
General Departure
The hypotheses contained in this research study pertain to the conditional duration o f 
county administrator tenure and their subsequent departure given a set o f 21 covariates. 
Using the Cox proportional hazards regression model, the effects o f the covariates on 
general administrator turnover were further analyzed. Following are the results o f the 
analysis from three separate and distinct standpoints; the Kaplan-Meir method o f survival 
estimate analysis, the “full model” proportional hazard analysis, and the “restricted 
model” proportional hazard analysis.
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis 
The principal purpose o f using the Kaplan-Meir analysis in this research study is to 
estimate a population survival curve for appointed county administrators from the study’s
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sample. The use of the Kaplan-Meir analysis was deemed the proper way of estimating 
the survival curve because it allows for estimation over time, even though events drop out 
and administrator lengths in office are different. Also called the Product Limit Estimator, 
the Kaplan-Meir estimator (see Survivor function in Table 6-8) provides a nonparametric 
estimate of the survivor function s{t), or the probability o f survival past time t. Simply 
stated, the Kaplan-Meir estimator provides an estimation o f the probability that an 
administrator remains in office, over time.
Summarized in Table 6-8 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir (1958) 
survival method for county administrator departures over time. Column one represents 
administrator tenure (minimum number of years in office). Column two represents the 
total number o f administrators with the corresponding minimum tenures in column one. 
Column three represents the number of administrators during each o f the tenure periods 
that departed their positions (turnover). Column four represents the number of 
administrators during each of the tenure periods that were still in office after the 
conclusion o f the study period (year 2005). Columns five and six present the survivor 
function and standard error for each of the tenure periods, or time (/).
The Kaplan-Meir survival estimate can also be plotted. The plot consists of a series of 
data points (estimates of the survival function) producing a line with a series of horizontal 
steps declining in magnitude. Provided in Figure 6-1 is a graphical depiction of county 
administrator departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the data 
set contained in Table 6-8.
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Table 6-8
Analysis o f  Cumulative Departures Over Time
M inimum  
Tenure in 
Years
N um ber o f  
Administrators
Num ber o f  Num ber o f  N on- 
Departures Departures Survivor function Std. error
1 88 10 2 0 ^ 9 0.03
2 76 7 3 0.80 0.04
3 66 15 1 0.62 0.05
4 50 8 5 & 52 0.05
5 37 4 2 0.47 0 .06
6 31 5 2 0.39 0 .06
7 24 2 3 0 36 0 .06
8 19 4 1 0 ^ 8 0 .06
9 14 3 0 0 ^ 2 0 4 5
10 11 2 1 0.18 0.05
11 8 0 3 0.18 0.05
13 5 0 1 0.18 0.05
14 4 1 3 0 .14 0.05
Total number o f  observations =  438  events (see Table 6-4 footnote for details) 
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 27 non-departures 
Earliest observed entry t =  0 
Last observed exit t =  14
Kaplan-M eier Survival Estimate
o  
o  -
o
o
V )  -
o
o  
o  -
o
150 5 10
T enure in Y ears
Figure 6-1. County administrator general departures over time.
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Proportional Hazard Analysis -  Full Model
The full model proportional hazard analysis incorporates all 21 covariates in this 
research study using the Cox proportional hazard regression model. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the model was stratified by year and incorporated robust standard 
errors.
Table 6-9 summarizes the Cox proportional hazard regression estimation results. The 
first column identifies each of the 21 covariates. The second column presents the main 
effects o f each covariate on the dependent variable (general county administrator 
turnover). The third column provides the corresponding robust standard error. The fourth 
column presents the probability that the covariate was statistically significant. The fifth 
column represents the change in hazard rate.
Important to note is that a positive coefficient estimate increases the duration of a 
county administrator’s time in office, while a negative coefficient estimate decreases the 
time in office. Similarly, a positive hazard rate indicates that a covariate reduces the odds 
of an administrator leaving office, while a negative hazard rate increases the odds of an 
administrator leaving office. A more in-depth interpretation of the change in hazard rates 
follows.
In reviewing the estimation results contained in Table 6-9, the coefficient estimates 
for the covariates measuring commission partisanship -  commission party control, long­
term stability or a county’s bond rating, the county’s scope of jurisdiction, an 
administrator’s length of time in office or tenure, and an administrator’s origin of 
recruitment all were found to have statistically significant effects (p-values <0.10) on 
county administrator general turnover.
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Table 6-9
Proportional H azards- Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  General Departures
V ariable C oefficient
Robust 
standard error P > z Change in hazard rate
O ne-year com m ission  turnover 1.33 0.95 0.17 272 .00
R olling  tw o-year com m ission  turnover -0.99 1.62 0.54 -63 .00
Leadership change -0 .08 0.25 0.74 -8 .00
Partisan/nonpartisan com m ission  -  
change in party control -0.93" 0.45 0.04 -60 .00
C ost burden 1.22 0.79 0.12 238.00
Incom e growth -0.03 0.97 0.98 -2.00
R evenue dependency 0.29 1.17 0.80 35 .00
Financial outlay -0.60 0.46 0.19 -45 .00
Short-term stability 1.02 1.94 0 .60 177.00
Long-term  stability 0.07* 0.04 0 .10 7 .00
Population change -1 .06 8.09 0 .90 -65 .00
Scope o f  jurisdiction 1.33* 0.79 0.09 280 .00
Ethnic diversity -2.96 2.09 0 .16 -95 .00
E conom ic -0.06 0.08 0.42 -6 .00
A ffluence 0 .00 0.00 0.95 0 .00
Poverty 0.06 0.05 0.26 6.00
L evel o f  education -0 .08 0.11 0.49 -8 .00
Tenure 0.07** 0.04 0.05 8.00
Gender -0 .05 0.55 0.92 -5.00
R ace -0.34 0.62 0.59 -29 .00
Internal/external recruitment 0.57* 0.31 0.06 77 .00
Total number o f  observations =  438  events (see Table 6-4 footnote for details)
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 27 non-departures
L og pseudo likelihood =  -222 .40 , W ald chi2 (21) =  28 .90 , Prob >x^ =  0 .1164
" f < . 0 1 , " f < . 0 5 , f < . l
The existence o f statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s 
hypotheses 4a, 10a, 12a, 18a and 21a. All other covariate eoefficient estimates were 
found to have no statistieally signifieant effeets (p-values > 0.10), therefore nullifying 
hypotheses la  through 3a, 5a through 9a, 13a through 17a, and 19a and 20a.
The signifieanee o f the Wald test, which is a measurement o f the overall fit o f the full 
model containing all 21 covariates, was eonsidered weak (Prob > x  ^= 0.1164). Generally,
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researchers strive for values o f less than 0.05. Due to the weakness o f the tull model, 
further refinement and development o f a restrieted model o f county administrator 
turnover was considered necessary.
Proportional Hazard Analysis -  Restricted Model 
The restrieted model proportional hazard analysis incorporates only the five 
covariates shown to have statistically significant effects (p-values < 0.10) on county 
administrator turnover in the full model.. Those eovariates included eommission 
partisanship -  commission party control, long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, 
scope o f jurisdiction, length o f time in office or tenure, and origin o f recruitment. Table 
6-10 summarizes the estimation results of the restricted model.
Table 6-10
Proportional Hazards -  Restricted Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  General Departures
Variable C oefficient
R obust 
standard error f  > z Change in hazard rate
Partisan/nonpartisan com m ission  -  
change in party control -0.64** 0.31 0.04 -47 .00
Long-term  stability 0.07* 0 .04 0.07 0 .08
Scope o f  jurisdiction 1.06* 0 .62 0.09 188.00
Tenure 0.07** 0.03 0.04 7.00
Internal/external recruitment 0.48* 0 .24 0.08 62 .00
Total number o f  observations =  438  events (see Table 6-4 footnote for details) 
88 subjects representing 61 departures and 27 non-departures 
L og pseudo likelihood =  -226 .53 , W ald chi2 (5) =  18.45, Prob >  =  0.0024
< .0 1 ." ; ,< .0 5 ,  f  < . l
In reviewing the estimation results o f the restrieted model, it was found that the 
coefficient estimates for all five covariates had statistically significant effects (p-values < 
0.10) on county administrator general turnover. Further, the significance o f the Wald test
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(p-value > = 0.0024) suggests that the overall fit of the restricted model was strong (p-
value > less than 0.05).
Turning first to the effects o f commission partisanship -  commission party control, 
the coefficient estimate of -0.64 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.04. The 
negative correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-47.00) suggested that the 
covariate increased the risk of an administrator leaving office. In other words, the model 
indicated that the probability of an administrator departure increased by 47% as the 
commission structure progressed from non-partisan to partisan no change in party control 
to partisan with a change in party control, when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were consistent with hypothesis 4a, which theorized that administrators 
in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are more likely to 
depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no change in party 
control. Similarly, administrators in counties with partisan commissions are more likely 
to depart when compared to counties with non-partisan commissions.
Turning next to the effects of long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, the 
coefficient estimate of 0.07 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.07. The positive 
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (0.08) suggested that the covariate 
decreased the risk of administrator departure. Simply stated, the probability of an 
administrator remaining in office an additional year increased by 8% for every one-unit a 
county’s uninsured general obligation equivalency bond rating decreased, all other 
covariates held constant. These results were contrary with hypothesis 10a, which 
theorized that administrators were more likely to depart their position when a county’s 
bond rating decreased.
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Third, the effects o f the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the coefficient estimate o f 1.06 
was statistically significant at p-value = 0.09. The positive correlation and change in 
hazard rate (188.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard of an administrator 
leaving office. Specifically, administrator departures in any given year decreased by 
188% for every one percent increase in the covariate (percentage of total population to 
population in unincorporated jurisdictions), when all other covariates were held constant. 
These results were contrary to hypothesis 12a, which theorized that administrators in 
counties with larger scopes of jurisdictions are more likely to depart their office when 
compared to administrators in counties with smaller scopes of jurisdictions.
The coefficient estimate (0.07) for the length of time an administrator is in office or 
tenure was also statistically significant at p-value = 0.04. The positive correlation and 
change in hazard rate (7.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard of an 
administrator leaving office. Simply stated, the probability of an administrator departure 
in any given year decreased by 7% for every addition year in office, when all other 
covariates were held constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis 18a, which 
theorized that administrators with longer tenures are less likely to depart their office 
when compared to administrators with shorter tenures.
Finally, the coefficient estimate of 0.48 that measured the effects of an 
administrator’s origin o f recruitment was statistically significant at p-value = 0.08. The 
positive correlation and change in hazard rate (62.00) suggested that the independent 
variable decreased the hazard o f an administrator leaving office. In other words, the rate 
o f administrator departure decreased by 62% for administrators who were recruited from 
outside the organization compared to those recruited from inside the organization, when
178
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
all other covariates were held constant. These results were contrary to hypothesis 21a, 
which theorized that administrators hired from outside the organization are more likely to 
depart their office when compared to those promoted from within the organization.
Post Estimation Test o f  the Proportional Hazard Assumption 
A key assumption when modeling a Cox proportional hazard model is proportional 
hazards. The proportional hazards assumption in the Cox regression analysis “refers to 
the effect o f any covariate having a proportional and constant effect that is invariant to 
when in the process the values of the covariate changes” (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
1997, p. 1433). For purposes of this study, the proportional hazards assumption is simply 
the assumption that the covariates in the models effect administrator departure rates 
proportionally over time, i.e., if the effect of a covariate reduces the departure rate at time 
1 by 25 %, it will also reduce the depareture rate at time 2 by 25%, and so on.
To determine whether the restricted model violates the proportional hazard 
assumption relating to each of the covariates over time, a post-estimation test was 
required. Post-estimation testing of the time dependent covariates in the restricted model 
on functions o f time (t) is similar to testing for a non-zero slope in a generalized linear 
regression using scaled Schoenfeld residuals on functions o f time. Table 6-11 provides 
the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, both globally and 
to each covariate in the restricted model.
In reviewing the post-estimation test results of the proportional hazard assumption, no 
evidence was found that the covariates in the restricted model violate the proportional 
hazard assumption (all p-values > exceed 0.05). In other words, none of the five 
covariates (when measured against the function of time (t)) had confidence levels of 95%
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or greater. The results o f the post-estimation test verifies that the interactions between the 
covariates and the function of time (t) are insignificant, therefore, suggesting the 
restricted model in this study is properly constructed.
Table 6-11
Test o f  Proportional Hazard Assumption -  Restricted Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f
Variable P T' d f
C onfidence level 
(prob >  x^)
Partisan/nonpartisan com m ission  -  
change in party control 0.15 1.54 1 0.22
Long-term stability 0.03 0.02 1 0.88
Scope o f  jurisdiction 0.03 0.08 1 0.78
Tenure 0.07 0.22 1 0.64
Internal/external recruitment 0.04 0.07 1 0.79
G lobal test 3.18 5 0.67
Note: Robust variance-covariance matrix used
Summary comments and conclusions regarding the results of the General Model 
analyses are provided in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 7
FINDINGS OF STUDY -  PUSH/PULL MODEL 
County Administrator Turnover -  Push/Pull Model 
The second theoretical model developed and tested in this research study was the 
Push/Pull Model of county administrator turnover. The Push/Pull Model differed from 
the General Model such that it further examined the push and the pull effects of 15 of the 
21 covariates on the dependent variable (county administrator turnover).
As explained in Chapter 6, the original data set consisted o f 90 administrators and 
448 observed events (32 counties over 14 years). The following analyses incorporate 
only 61 administrators and 258 events because administrator departures such as personal 
or family illness, deaths, and administrators currently in office at the end of the study 
were excluded from the forthcoming analyses.
Descriptive Data Analysis 
As in the General Model, the descriptive data analysis in the Push/Pull Model 
provides a basis in which to examine the characteristics of the dependent variable and 
covariates,, i.e., measurements of central tendency, distribution, and dispersion. It should 
be noted that the descriptive statistics contained in this chapter are not limited to the 15 
covariates used in the forthcoming Cox proportional regression analyses. The descriptive
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statistics contained in this chapter incorporate all 21 covariates used in the General 
Model. By using all 21 covariates in the descriptive statistic summaries o f the Push/Pull 
Model it was thought that comparisons could be made to the descriptive statistie 
summaries contained in the General Model.
Table 7-1 summarizes the descriptive statistics for push-induced departures o f the 
dependent variable.
Table 7-1
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Dependent Variable Push-Induced 
Departure
Administrator tum over(b) 
Push-induced departure (code =  1)
Frequency Percentage
Education (highest level com pleted): H igh school 0 0.0
A ssociate degree 0 0.0
B achelor degree 5 29 .4
Master degree 11 64.7
D octorate degree 1 5.9
Total 17 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 12 70.6
6 - 1 0  Years 3 17.6
1 1 - 1 5  Years 2 11.8
16 -  20  Years 0 0.0
21 +  Years 0 0.0
Total 17 100.0
Gender: M ale 15 88.2
Fem ale 2 11.8
Total 17 100.0
Race: W hite 15 88.2
N on-w hite 2 11.8
Total 17 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 7 41. 2
External 10 58.8
Total 17 100.0
N um ber o f  administrators =  17 push-induced departures
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The descriptive statistics in Table 7-1 pointed out that county administrators pushed 
out o f office were highly educated, with 100% having bachelor degrees or higher. 
Further, a high percentage (88.2%) had less than ten years in the position, while 88.2% 
were males and 88.2% were white. Also important to note was that over half (58.8%) 
were recruited to the position from external sources.
Descriptive statistics summarizing the reasons for those cases o f the dependent 
variable that represented push-induced departures are presented in Table 7-2.
Table 7-2
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Dependent Variable Reason fo r  Push- 
Induced Departure
R eason for departure Frequency Percentage
F iscal perform ance 6 35.3
P olitical conflict 10 58.8
Criminal investigation 1 5.9
Total 17 100.0
N um ber o f  administrators =  17 push-induced departures
Table 7-3 summarizes the descriptive statistics for pull-induced departures o f the 
dependent variable. An analysis of the results in Table 7-3 suggested similar results to 
push-induced departures with the exception o f the origin o f recruitment. Specifically, 
county administrators were highly educated, with 100% having associate degrees or 
higher; a high percentage (88.5%) had less than 10 years in the position; and 88.5% were 
males and 92.32% were white. Unlike administrators who experienced pull-induced 
departures (over half being recruited from external sources), administrators who 
experienced push-induced departures were predominantly promoted from within (53.8%).
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Table 7-3
Administrator tum over(b) 
Pull-induced departure (code =  2) Frequency Percentage
Education (highest level com pleted): H igh school 0 0 .0
A ssociate degree 1 3.8
Bachelor degree 9 34 .6
M aster degree 11 42.3
Doctorate degree 5 19.3
Total 26 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 15 57.7
6 - 1 0  Years 8 30.8
1 1 - 1 5  Years 2 7.7
16 -  20 Years 1 3.8
21 +  Years 0 0 .0
Total 26 100.0
Gender: M ale 23 88.5
Fem ale 3 11.5
Total 26 100.0
Race: W hite 24 92.3
N on-w hite 2 7.7
Total 26 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 14 53.8
External 12 46.2
Total 26 100.0
Num ber o f  administrators =  26  pull-induced departures
Descriptive statistics summarizing pull-induced departures are presented in Table 7-4. 
Interestingly, o f  the 26 administrators who departed office due to pull factors, 42.3% 
accepted positions in the public sector, 42.3% accepted positions in the private sector,
11.5% accepted positions with a non-profit organization, and one (3.9%) ran for political 
office.
Table 7-5 summarizes the descriptive statistics for county administrators who 
departed office for purposes o f retirement, while Tables 7-6 through 7-9 summarize the 
descriptive statistics for all 21 covariates identified and described in Chapters 4 and 5.
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Table 7-4
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Dependent Variable Reason fo r  Pull- 
Induced Departure
R eason for departure Frequency Percentage
A ccept position in the public sector 11 42.3
A ccept position in the private sector 11 42.3
A ccept position  in  the non-profit sector 3 11.5
Run for political office 1 3.9
Total 26 100.0
N um ber o f  administrators =  26 pull-induced departures
Table 7-5
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Dependent Variable "Retirement ” Induced 
Departure
Administrator tum over(b)
“Retired” (code =  3) Frequency Percentage
Education (highest level completed); H igh school 0 0.0
A ssociate degree 1 5.6
B achelor degree 1 5.6
M aster degree 13 72.1
Doctorate degree 3 16.7
Total 18 100.0
Job tenure: 0 - 5  Years 8 44.4
6 - 1 0  Years 6 33.3
1 1 - 1 5  Years 1 5.6
1 6 - 2 0  Years 2 11.1
21 +  Y ears 1 5.6
Total 18 100.0
Gender: M ale 17 94.4
Fem ale 1 5.6
Total 18 100.0
Race: W hite 18 100.0
N on-w hite 0 0.0
Total 18 100.0
Source o f  recruitment: Internal 8 44 .4
External 10 55.6
Total 18 100.0
N um ber o f  administrators =  18 voluntary retirements
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Interestingly, the descriptive statistics contained in Table 7-5 suggested that county 
administrators who chose to retire were also highly educated with 94.4% having bachelor 
degrees or higher. Interestingly, the percentage of county administrators with ten years o f 
service or fewer (77.7%) was less than their counterparts who departed due to push and 
pull factors. Further, 94% of the administrators who retired were males, while 100% were 
white.
Table 7-6
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Political Uncertainty Variables
V ariable name M ean Std. dev. Min. M ax. D escription
Short-term
com m ission
turnover
.13 .17 0.00 1.00 Ratio o f  com m ission  m em bers
replaced in a g iven  year to the total 
number o f  com m ission  m em bers
M id-term
com m ission
turnover
.13 .10 0.00 0 .40 Ratio o f  com m ission  m em bers
replaced in a consecutive tw o year 
time period to the total num ber o f  
com m ission  m em bers
C om m ission
leadership
change
.54 .50 0 1 Change in com m ission  leadership for 
a given  year: 1 =  com m ission  
leadership turnover; 0 =  no 
com m ission  leadership turnover
C om m ission
partisanship
.45 .50 0 1 C om m ission election  partisan 
process: 1 =  partisan com m ission  
election  process; 0 = no partisan 
com m ission  election  p rocesses
C ounty party 
control
.02 .12 0 1 Change in com m ission  party 
majority: 0 =  non-partisan 
com m ission  or no change in party 
control w ithin partisan com m issions; 
1 =  change in party control
Total number o f  observations =  258  events 23
23
A s explained in Chapter 6, the original data set consisted o f  90 administrators and 448  observed  
events (32  counties over 14 years). W hile the General M odel analyses contained in  the previous chapter 
incorporated 88 administrators this chapter also  excludes administrators currently in office  at the end o f  the 
study period (an additional 27  administrators and 180 events).
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Table 7-7
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Fiscal Performance Variables
V ariable name M ean Std. dev. Min. M ax. D escription
Cost burden .29 .28 .04 1.73 Ratio o f  total property tax revenue to 
total population in a g iven  year
Incom e growth .04 .13 -.35 1.21 One-year percentage change in tax 
revenue
R evenue
dependency
.427 .22 .02 .90 Ratio o f  intergovernmental transfers 
to total revenue in  a g iven  year
Financial
outlay
.92 .48 .24 Ratio o f  total expenditures to total 
population in a g iven  year
Short-term
stability
.054 .07 .33 One-year percentage change in total 
expenditures
Long-term
stability
2.53 1 17 Uninsured general obligation long­
term bond rating: 1 =  A a l through 17 
=  Caal
Total number o f  observations =  258 events (see Table 7 -6  footnote for details)
Table 7-8
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Community Instability Variables
Variable
N am e
M ean Std. dev. Min. Max. D escription
Population
growth
.02 .02 -.01 .14 One-year percentage change in 
total population
County scope  
o f
jurisdiction
.35 .25 .04 .98 Ratio betw een total population  
o f  county to the total population  
residing in incorporated areas 
within the county
Ethnic
diversity
.21 .09 .07 .61 A nnualized percentage o f  non­
w hite population to the total 
population
E conom ic
conditions
5.94 2.74 1.60 15.00 U nem ploym ent rate in the 
month o f  July in any g iven  year
A ffluence 28839.55 7622 .47 16847.00 54195.00 Annualized average per capita 
incom e level o f  the total 
population in any g iven  year
Poverty 12.609 4 .7 6 0 4 .10 28.10 A nnualized total households 
living b elow  the federal poverty  
level in any g iven  year
Total number o f  observations =  258 events (see Table 7-6  footnote for details)
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Table 7-9
Descriptive Statistics fo r  Push/Pull Model -  Administrator Profile Variables
Variable
N am e
M ean Std. dev. M in. M ax. Description
Formal
education
17.67 1.42 14.00 20.00 L evel o f  formal education; 12 =  H igh  
School through 20 =  D octorate 
degree
Job experience 6.15 4.65 1.00 22.00 Length o f  tim e in  o ffice , or tenure 
expressed as the number o f  years
Gender
diversity
.10 .30 0 .00 1.00 Gender diversity: 0  =  male; 1 =  
fem ale
Ethnic diversity .93 .25 0 .00 1.00 Ethnic diversity: 0  =  non-w hite; 1 =  
w hite
Origin o f  
recruitment
.52 .50 0 .00 1.00 Promoted to the position o f  
administrator from w ithin the 
organization, or recruited from  
outside the organization: 0  =  internal 
recmitment; 1 =  external recruitment
T otal number o f  observations =  258 events (see Table 7-6 footnote for details)
Cox Proportional Regression Analysis -  Push Departure 
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis 
As in the General Model, the Kaplan-Meir analysis in the Push/Pull Model estimates 
a population survival eurve for appointed county administrators from the study’s sample. 
Summarized in Table 7-10 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir (1958) 
survival method for push-indueed departures over time. Column one represents 
administrator tenure (minimum number o f years in office). Column two represents the 
total number o f administrators with the corresponding minimum tenures in Column one. 
Column three represents the number o f administrators during each o f the tenure periods 
that expeneneed push-effected departures. Column four represents the number o f 
administrators during each of the tenure periods that experienced pull-induced departures 
or retired after the conclusion o f the study period (year 2005). Columns five and six
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present the survivor function and standard error for each o f the tenure periods , or time 
it).
Table 7-10
Analysis o f  Cumulative Push Departures Over Time
M inimum  
Tenure in 
Years
N um ber o f  
Administrators
Num ber o f  Num ber o f  Pull- 
Push- Induced and 
Induced Retirement 
Departures Departures Survivor Function Std. Error
1 61 4 6 0 4 3 0.03
2 51 ■ 2 5 0.90 0.04
3 44 4 11 0 ^ 2 0.05
4 29 3 5 0.73 0.07
5 21 1 3 0 4 0 0.07
6 17 1 4 0 ^ 6 0 4 8
7 12 0 2 0 ^ 6 0.08
8 10 0 4 O ja 0.08
9 6 1 2 0.55 0.12
10 3 0 2 0.55 0.12
14 1 1 0 0 -
T otal number o f  observations =  258  events (see Table 7-6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
Earliest observed entry t =  0 
Last observed exit / =  14
Provided in Figure 7-1 is a graphical depiction o f county administrator push-induced 
departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the raw data contained 
in Table 7-10. As discussed in Chapter 6, the Kaplan and Meier estimator provides a 
nonparametric estimate o f the survivor function s(t), or the probability o f survival past 
time t. The plot consists o f a series o f data points representing estimates o f the survival
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function therefore, producing a line with a series of horizontal steps declining in 
magnitude.
K aplan-M eier Survival Estim ate
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Figure 7-1. County administrator push departures over time.
Proportional Hazard Analysis -  Full Model 
As previously stated, the full model proportional hazard analysis encompasses only 
the 15 covariates deemed appropriate in the Push/Pull Model. Table 7-11 summarizes the 
estimation results for all 15 covariates using the Cox proportional hazard regression 
method. The full model again incorporated robust standard errors and was stratified by 
year. The first column identifies each of the 15 covariates. The second column presents 
the main effects of each covariate on the dependent variable (push-induced departures). 
The third column provides the corresponding robust standard errors. The fourth column
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presents the probability that the eovariate is statistically significant. The fifth eolumn 
represents the change in hazard rate.
Again, a positive coeffieient estimate increases the duration o f a county 
administrator’s time in office while a negative coefficient estimate deereases the time in 
office. Similarly, the duration o f a county administrator’s tenure is inversely correlated to 
the hazard o f an administrator leaving office: a positive correlation represents that an 
independent variable reduces the hazard o f an administrator leaving office while a 
negative correlation increases the hazard o f leaving office.
Table 7-11
Proportional Hazards -  Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Push Departures
V ariable C oefficient
R obust standard 
error Change in hazard rate
O ne year com m ission  turnover 249 1.91 0.15 1525.00
R ollin g  tw o-year com m ission  turnover -3.42 247 0.25 -97 .00
Leadership change -0.94' Ojg 0.10 -67 .00
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission  -  
change in party control 0.98* 060 0.10 167.00
C ost burden -6.53'' 240 0.02 -100 .00
Financial outlay 1.79" 043 0.03 4 9 9 .00
Short-term stability 2.57 349 0.44 1207.00
L ong-term  stability 0.22'" 0.09 0.01 25 .00
Population change 14.09 11.58 042 4 .32e+ 09
Scope o f  jurisdiction -4.04" 1.75 0.02 -98 .00
E conom ic -0.54'" 0.17 0.00 -42 .00
Poverty 0.36'" 0.14 0.01 44 .00
L evel o f  education 0.10 0.30 0.73 11.00
Tenure -0.07 0.13 0.59 7 .00
Recruit 0.50 0.70 0.48 66 .00
T otal number o f  observations =  258  events (see Table 7 -6  footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
L og pseudo likelihood =  -42 .86 , W ald ch i2(21) =  61 .81 , Prob >  E  =  0 .0000  
< . 0 5 , / , < . l
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In reviewing the estimation results contained in Table 7-11, the coefficient estimates 
for 8 of the covariates measuring commission leadership change, partisan commission 
elections and change in party control, a county’s cost burden or tax revenue equity, 
financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, 
scope of jurisdiction or the total population outside incorporated areas of the county, the 
economic conditions of the county or unemployment rate, and the eounty’s level of 
poverty, all reflected statistically significant effects (p-values <0.10) on push-induced 
county administrator turnover.
The existence o f statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s 
hypotheses 3b through 6b, 8b, and 10b through 12b. All other covariate coefficient 
estimates were found to have no statistically significant effects (p-values >0.10) on 
administrator turnover, therefore nullifying hypotheses lb  and 2b, 7b, 9b, and 13b 
through 15b.
The significance o f the Wald test o f the full model containing the 15 covariates was 
p-value > = 0.0000. This was considered strong (less than 0.05) indicating that further
refinement and development of a restricted model o f county administrator pushed 
turnover was unnecessary.
Turning first to the effects o f commission leadership change, the coefficient estimate 
o f -0.94 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The negative correlation and 
corresponding change in hazard rate (-67.00) suggested that the covariate increased the 
risk of a pushed departure. Simply stated, the probability of an administrator experiencing 
a pushed departure in any given year increased by 67% when there was a change in 
commission leadership, all other covariates held constant. These results were consistent
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with hypothesis 3b, which theorized that administrators were more likely to be pushed 
from office when a leadership change in the commission occurs.
Turning next to the effects o f commission partisanship -  commission party control, 
the coefficient estimate o f 0.98 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The 
positive correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (167.00) suggested that the 
covariate decreased the risk of an administrator experiencing a pushed departure. In other 
words, the model indicated that the probability o f an administrator departure decreased 
by 167% when the status of a commission moves from non-partisan to partisan with no 
change in party control and further to partisan with a change in party control (non­
partisan commissions = -1, partisan commissions, no change in party control = 0, partisan 
commission, change in party control = 1), when all other covariates were held constant.
These results were inconsistent with hypothesis 4b, which theorized that 
administrators in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are 
more likely to depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no 
change in party control. Similarly, administrators in counties with partisan commissions 
are more likely to depart when compared to counties with non-partisan commissions.
The coefficient estimate (-6.53) for a county’s cost burden, or tax revenue equity was 
also statistically significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative correlation and change in 
hazard rate (-100.00) suggested that the covariate increased the hazard o f an 
administrator leaving office. Simply stated, the probability of an administrator 
experiencing a pushed departure in any given year increased 100% for every one-unit 
increase in the ratio of total property tax revenue to total population, when all other 
covariates were held constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis 5b, which
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theorized that the larger a county’s cost burden, the greater the push effect on 
administrator turnover.
Turning next to the effects of a county’s financial outlay or expenditures, the 
coefficient estimate of 1.79 is statistically significant at p-value = 0.03 The positive 
correlation and change in hazard rate (499.00) suggests that the eovariate deereases the 
hazard of a push-induced departure. Specifically, the rate of a pushed departure decreased 
by 499% for every one-unit increase in the eovariate, or one percent increase in the ratio 
of total expenditures to total population, when all other covariates were held constant. 
These results are inconsistent with hypothesis 6b, which theorized that administrators in 
counties with larger levels of expenditures experience a push-effected departure.
Fifth, the effects of long-term stability or a county’s bond rating, the coefficient 
estimate of 0.22 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.01. The positive correlation 
and corresponding change in hazard rate (25.00) suggested that the eovariate decreased 
the risk of a pushed administrator departure. Simply stated, the probability of an 
administrator remaining in office an additional year increased by 25% for every one-unit 
a county’s uninsured general obligation equivalency bond rating decreased, all other 
covariates held constant. These results were also inconsistent with hypothesis 8b, which 
theorized that administrators were more likely to experience a pushed departure when a 
county’s bond rating decreased.
Sixth, the effects of the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the coefficient estimate of -  
4.04 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative correlation and 
corresponding change in hazard rate (-98.00) suggested that the covariate increased the 
hazard of an administrator experiencing a pushed departure in any given year.
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Specifically, administrator pushed departures increased by 98% for every one-unit 
increase (one percentage point) in the covariate (percentage of total population to 
population in unincorporated jurisdictions), when all other covariates were held constant. 
These results were consistent with hypothesis 1 Ob, which theorized the larger the 
eounty’s scope of jurisdiction, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover.
The coefficient estimate (-0.54) for the economic conditions of the county or 
unemployment rate was also statistically significant at p-value = 0.00. The negative 
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-42.00) suggested that the covariate 
increased the hazard o f a pushed departure. Simply stated, the probability o f an 
administrator experiencing a pushed departure in any given year increased by 42% for 
every add one percent increase in the unemployment rate., all other covariates held 
constant. These results were consistent with hypothesis l ib ,  which theorized the 
unhealthier a county’s economic condition, the greater the push effect on administrator 
turnover.
Finally, the coefficient estimate of 0.36 that measured the county’s level of poverty 
was statistically significant at p-value = 0.01. The positive correlation and change in 
hazard rate (44.00) suggested that the covariate decreased the hazard o f an administrator 
being pushed from office. In other words, the rate o f pushed departures decreased by 44% 
for every one percent increase in the number of households below the federal poverty 
level, when all other covariates were held constant. These results were contrary to 
hypothesis 12b, which theorized that the larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the 
push effect on administrator turnover.
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Post Estimation Test o f  the Proportional Hazard Assumption 
As discussed earlier, the proportional hazards assumption is simply the assumption 
that the covariates in the models effect administrator departure rates proportionally over 
time, i.e., if the effect of a covariate reduces the departure rate at time 1 by 25 %, it will 
also reduce the depareture rate at time 2 by 25%, and so on.
To determine whether the full model violates the proportional hazard assumption 
relating to each of the covariates over time, a post-estimation test was required. Table 7- 
12 provides the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, both 
globally and to each covariate in the restricted model.
In reviewing the post-estimation test results o f the proportional hazard assumption, no 
evidence was found that the covariates in the full model violate the proportional hazard 
assumption (all p-values > exceed 0.05). In other words, none of the 15 covariates 
(when measured against the function of time (t)) had confidence levels of 95% or greater. 
The results o f the post-estimation test verifies that the interactions between the covariates 
and the function of time (t) are insignificant, therefore, suggesting the full model is 
properly constructed.
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Table 7-12
Test o f  Proportional Hazard Assumption -  Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Push 
Departures
Variable P d f prob> f
One year com m ission  turnover 0.19 1.47 1 0.23
R olling tw o-year com m ission turnover -0 .19 1.22 1 0.27
Leadership change -0.07 0 .19 1 0.66
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission -  change in 
party control 0.07 0.15 1 0.70
Cost burden -0.25 2 .38 1 0.12
Financial outlay -0.18 0.92 1 0.56
Short-term stability 0.18 1.73 1 0.19
Long-term stability -0.11 0 .60 1 0.44
Population change 0.02 0.01 1 0.94
Scope o f  jurisdiction 0.06 0.22 1 0.64
E conom ic 0.00 0 .00 1 0.99
Poverty -0.06 0.24 1 0.63
Level o f  education -0.07 0.24 1 0.62
Tenure -0.14 1.35 1 0.25
Recruit -0 .10 0.43 1 0.51
G lobal test - 4 .69 15 1.00
N ote: Robust variance-covariance matrix used
Cox Proportional Regression Analysis -  Pull Departure 
Kaplan-Meir Survival Estimate Analysis 
Summarized in Table 7-13 are the estimation results using the Kaplan-Meir method 
for pull-indueed departures over time. Column one represents administrator tenure 
(years). Column two represents the total number o f administrators with the corresponding 
minimum tenures in column one. Column three represents the number o f administrators 
during eaeh o f the tenure periods that experienced pull-effected departures (turnover). 
Column four represents the number of administrators during each of the tenure periods
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that experienced push-indueed departures or retired after conclusion o f the study period 
(year 2005). Columns five and six present the survivor function and standard error for 
eaeh o f the tenure periods , or time (t).
Table 7-13
M inim um  
Tenure in 
Years
N um ber o f  
Administrators
N um ber o f  
Pull- 
Induced  
Departures
Num ber o f  Push- 
Induced and 
Retirement 
Departures Survivor Function Std. Error
1 61 3 7 0.95 0.03
2 51 3 4 0 .89 0 .04
3 44 10 5 0 .69 0 .06
4 29 2 6 0 .64 0.07
5 21 2 2 0.58 0.07
6 17 2 3 0.51 0.08
7 12 1 1 0.47 0 .08
8 10 3 1 0 .33 0 .09
9 6 0 3 0 .33 0 .09
10 3 0 2 0.33 0.09
14 1 0 1 0.33 0.09
Total number o f  observations =  258  events (see Table 7-6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26  pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
Earliest observed entry / =  0 
Last observed exit / =  14
Provided in Figure 7-2 is a graphical depiction of county administrator pull-induced 
departures over time using the Kaplan-Meier survival method and the raw data contained 
in Table 7-13. Again, the Kaplan and Meier estimator provides a nonparametric estimate 
o f the survivor function s{t), or the probability of survival past time t.
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Figure 7-2. County administrator pull departures over time.
Proportional Hazard Analysis -  Full Model 
Table 7-14 summarizes the estimation results for the 15 covariates in the Push/Pull 
Model using the Cox proportional hazard regression model. The full model again 
incorporated robust standard errors and was stratified by year. The first column identifies 
each of the 15 covariates. The second column presents the main effects of each covariate 
on the dependent variable (pull-induced departures). The third column provides the 
corresponding robust standard error. The fourth column presents the probability that the 
covariate is statistically significant. The fifth column represents the change in hazard rate.
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Table 7-14
Proportional Hazards -  Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Pull Departures
V ariable C oefficient
Robust standard 
error f  >z Change in hazard rate
One year com m ission  turnover -0 .67 0.79 0.67 -49 .00
R olling tw o-year com m ission  
turnover -0.54 1.32 0.82 -42 .00
Leadership change 0.23 0.51 0.56 26 .00
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission  -  
change in party control -0.78 0.31 0.25 -54 .00
C ost burden 2.31 16.23 0.15 907 .00
Financial outlay -1 .36 0.23 0.13 -74 .00
Short-term stability -2.72 0.28 0.52 -93 .00
Long-term  stability -0 .04 0.09 0 .67 -4 .00
Population change -2.63 0.98 0.85 -93 .00
Scope o f  jurisdiction 1.79 7.28 0.14 4 9 6 .00
E conom ic 0.08 0.09 0.29 9 .00
Poverty -0.01 0.06 0.91 -1 .00
L evel o f  education -0.07 0.16 0.66 -7 .00
Tenure 0.04 0.05 0.38 4 .00
Recruit -0 .04 0.11 0.91 4 .00
Total number o f  observations =  258 events (see Table 7 -6  footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26  pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
L og pseudo likelihood =  -85 .31 , W ald ch i2 (2 1 ) =  18.01, Prob >x^ =  0.2623  
' " p < . 0 1 , " f < . 0 5 , f < . l
In reviewing the estimation results eontained in Table 7-14, none o f the eoeffieient 
estimates for the 15 covariates were found to have statistically significant effects (p- 
values <0.10) on pull-indueed county administrator turnover. This may be due to model 
misspecifieation, or violations o f the proportional hazard assumption as reflected in the 
Wald test (p-value > x  = 0.2623) which is greater than 0.05. To test whether the pull- 
induced county administrator departure full model violated the proportional hazard 
assumption o f eaeh eovariate, a post-estimation test was performed.
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Post Estimation Test o f  the Proportional Hazard Assumption 
As previously mentioned, one disadvantage o f the Cox proportional regression model 
is that it assumes all the covariates effect the hazard rate consistently over time. Further, 
as the time o f the study increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain the 
proportional hazard assumption. Violations o f the proportional hazard assumption can be 
interpreted as an interaction between one or more o f the covariates and the function of 
time (t). Table 7-15 provides the results o f the post estimation test o f the proportional 
hazard assumption, both globally and to each covariate in the full model.
Table 7-15
Test o f  Proportional Hazard Assumption -  Eull Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Pull 
Departures
Variable P d f prob> f
One year com m ission  turnover -0 .22 3.05 1 0 .08
R olling tw o-year com m ission  turnover -0 .28 3 .52 1 0 .06
Leadership change 0 .06 0.23 1 0.63
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission  -  change in party 
control 0 .19 3.66 1 0 .06
C ost burden 0.41 32.12 1 0 .00
Financial outlay -0 .44 35.63 1 0 .00
Short-term stability -0 .39 35 .70 1 0 .00
Long-term  stability 0 .26 7 .22 1 0 .00
Population change -0 .30 10.38 1 0 .00
Scope o f  jurisdiction -0 .23 5.45 1 0.02
E conom ic 0 .39 7.58 1 0.01
Poverty -0 .18 1.65 1 0 .20
L evel o f  education 0.13 1.16 1 0 .28
Tenure -0 .13 0.48 1 0 .49
Recruit -0 .36 12.30 1 0 .00
G lobal test - 47 .19 15 0 .00
N ote; Robust variance-covariance matrix used
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As suspected, eight of the 15 covariates were found to violate the proportional hazard 
assumption (p-values > with 95% confidence levels or greater). In other words, the 
results of the post estimation test suggests that interactions between eight covariates and 
the function o f time (t) are significant, and that the model may require certain interaction 
variables (or dummy variables) be included to control for and eliminate possible time 
variations. The covariates are the county’s cost burden, financial outlay, short-term 
financial stability, long-term financial stability, population growth, scope of jurisdiction, 
and economic conditions, and the origin of recruitment of the appoint administrator.
In order to determine the correct interaction variables for inclusion into the model, 
each of the eight covariates were interacted with time, or (t) effectively creating an 
additional eight dummy variables. Next, the eight time-interacted dummy variables were 
included in the full model and the Cox proportional regression procedure run again. The 
results are presented in Table 7-16.
The results in Tables 7-16 indicate that only two of the eight covariates (cost burden 
and financial outlay) had statistical significance with regards to violations o f the 
proportional hazard assumption as reflected in the time-interacted dummy variables 
{lfmish*Costburden and Ifinish*Finoutlay) p-values < 0.05. To control for and eliminate 
the time variations caused by these two covariates, the time-interacted dummy variables 
lfmish*Costburden and Ifmish*Finoutlay were retained in the model and the six time- 
interacted dummy variables that did not have statistical significance (p-values > 0.05) 
were removed. The model was then run again. The results of the Cox proportional 
regression analysis on the modified model are presented in Table 7-17. The addition of
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the time-interaeted eovariates deemed statistieally significant (Ifinsih *Costburden and 
lfinish*Finoutlay) had an interesting effect on the original model.
Table 7-16
Proportional Hazards -  Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Pull Departures Including 
Interaction Covariates
Variable C oefficient
Robust standard 
error f  > z Change in hazard rate
O ne year com m ission  turnover -0 .46 1.96 1.81 -37 .00
R olling tw o-year com m ission  turnover -1.62 3.06 0 .60 -80 .00
Leadership change 0.40 0.55 0.47 50 .00
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission  -  
change in party control -0 .80 0.66 0.23 -65 .00
C ost burden -7 .12 ' 3.03 0 .10 -100 .00
Financial outlay 4 .5 7 " 1.87 0.02 -3 .00
Short-term stability 2 .45 7.22 0.73 1068.00
Long-term  stability 0.13 0 .26 0.61 14.00
Population change 10.61 31.79 0.74 40453 .00
Scop e o f  jurisdiction 1.48 2 .05 0 .47 343 .00
E conom ic -0 .17 0.19 .038 -15 .00
Poverty 0.02 0.08 0 .82 2 .00
L evel o f  education -0 .06 0 .20 0.78 -6 .00
Tenure 0 .10 0.07 0.15 11.00
Recruit -0 .18 1.15 0.88 -16 .00
Time-interacted dummy variables 
Ifm ish*Costburden 3.40 1.11 0.00 Significant effect
Ifinish*F inoutlay -2.15 0.69 0 .00 Significant effect
Ifinish*Ststability -2.61 2 .42 0.28 N on-significant effect
Ifinish*Ltstability -0 .06 0.10 0.59 N on-sign ificant effect
Ifinish*Popchg -6.19 10.55 0.56 N on-significant effect
Ifinish*U nincorpcnty 0 .20 0 .49 0 .69 N on-significant effect
Ifm ish*E conom ic 0.08 0.04 0.08 N on-sign ificant effect
lfinish*R ecruit 0.11 0.33 0 .74 N on-sign ificant effect
T otal number o f  observations =  258  events (see Table 7-6 footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
L og  pseudo likelihood =  -74 .94 , L og ch i2(23) =  29 .82 , Prob >x^ =  0.1545  
' " p < . 0 I , " p < . 0 5 , p < . l
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In reviewing the estimation results eontained in Table 7-17, the eoeffieient estimates 
for the covariates measuring a county’s cost burden or tax revenue equity, financial 
outlay or a eounty’s expenditures, scope of jurisdiction measured as the total population 
outside incorporated areas, and an administrator’s job experience (tenure) all reflected 
statistically significant effects (p-values <0.10) on pull-induced county administrator 
turnover.
The existence of statistically significant effects was consistent with the study’s 
hypotheses 5b, 6b, 10b, and 14b. All other covariate coefficient estimates were found to 
have no statistieally significant effects (p-values >0.10) on pull-indueed administrator 
turnover, therefore nullifying hypotheses lb  through 4b, 7b through 9b, and 15b.
The significance of the Wald test of the modified full model containing the 15 
covariates and  2 statistically significant time-interacted dummy variables was p-value >
= 0.0000. This was considered strong (less than 0.05) indicating that further refinement 
and development of the modified full model incorporating time-interacted dummy 
variables was the proper approach. Further, the results o f the Wald test indicated that a 
restricted model of county administrator pulled turnover was unnecessary.
Turning first to the effects of a eounty’s cost burden or tax revenue equity, the 
eoeffieient estimate of -4.79 was statistieally significant at p-value = 0.02. The negative 
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (-100.00) suggested that the 
covariate increased the hazard of a pull-induced county administrator departure. In other 
words, the model indicated that pull-induced departures increased by 100.00% for every 
one percent increase in the covariate (ratio of total property tax revenue to total 
population), when all other covariates were held constant. The results are inconsistent
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with hypothesis 5b, which theorized that administrators in counties with lower cost 
burdens are more likely to experience a pull-induced departure.
Table 7-17
Proportional Hazards -  Full Model: Predictors o f  Rate o f  Pull Departures Including 
Interaction Covariates with Statistical Significance (p-values <0.05)
Variable C oefficient
Robust 
standard error f  > z Change in hazard rate
O ne year com m ission  turnover -0 .83 1.60 0.61 -66 .00
R olling tw o-year com m ission  
turnover -0.65 2.01 0.75 -47 .00
Leadership change 0.41 0.50 0.41 51 .00
Partisan/non-partisan com m ission  -  
change in party control -0.94 0 .62 0.13 -61 .00
C ost burden -4 .79" 1.99 0.02 -100 .00
Financial outlay 3.4T" 1.34 0.01 2942 .00
Short-term stability -4.30 2 .87 0.13 -99 .00
Long-term  stability -0.07 0.11 0 .52 -7 .00
Population change -5.21 13.47 0 .70 -101 .00
Scope o f  jurisdiction 2 .3 7 " 1.20 0.05 971 .00
E conom ic 0.10 0.11 0 .36 10.00
Poverty -0 .00 0.07 1.00 0 .00
L evel o f  education -.012 0.18 0.51 -11 .00
Tenure 0 .08 ' 0.05 0.10 8 .00
Recruit 0.24 0.38 0.53 27 .00
Time-interacted dummy variables 
Ifinish*Costburden 2.26 0 .59
Ifrnish*Finoutlay -1.53 0.41
Total number o f  observations =  258 events (see Table 7-6  footnote for details)
61 subjects representing 17 push-induced, 26 pull-induced, and 18 voluntary retirement departures 
L og pseudo likelihood =  -78 .10 , W ald eh i2(17) =  63 .31 , Prob >  E  =  0.0000  
" ';)< .01 ," ;,< .05 , f  < . l
Turning next to the effects of a county’s financial outlay or expenditures, the 
eoeffieient estimate o f 3.41 is statistically significant at p-value = 0.01 The positive
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correlation and change in hazard rate (2942.00) suggests that the covariate decreased the 
hazard of a pull-induced county administrator departure. Specifically, the rate of 
departure decreased by 2,942% for every one percent increase in the covariate, or ratio of 
total expenditures to total population, when all other covariates were held constant. These 
results are inconsistent with hypothesis 6b, which theorized that administrators in 
counties with smaller levels of expenditures experience a pull-effected departure.
Third, the coefficient estimate of 2.37 measuring the county’s scope o f jurisdiction or 
total population outside incorporated areas, was also statistically significant at p-value =
0.05. The positive correlation and change in hazard rate (971.00) suggested the covariate 
decreased the hazard of a pull-induced county administrator departure. Simply stated, the 
rate of departure decreased by 971% for one percent increase in the covariate (percentage 
of the total population to population in unincorporated jurisdictions), all other variables 
held constant. These results were consistent to hypothesis 10b, which theorized that the 
smaller the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the greater the pull effect on administrator 
turnover.
Lastly, with regards to the effects of an administrator’s job experience (tenure), the 
coefficient estimate of 0.08 was statistically significant at p-value = 0.10. The positive 
correlation and corresponding change in hazard rate (8.00) suggested that the covariate 
decreased the hazard of a pull-induced county administrator departure. In other words, 
the model indicated that the rate o f departure decreased by 8% for every one-unit increase 
in the covariate (number of years as an appointed administrator), all other variables held 
constant. These results were inconsistent with hypothesis 14b, which theorized that the 
longer an administrator’s tenure, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover.
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Summary comments and conclusions regarding the results of the Push/Pull Model 
analyses are provided in Chapter 8.
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CHAPTER 8
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion of Results 
This research study sought to add to the body of knowledge pertaining to appointed 
county administrator turnover in large American counties with a Commission- 
Administrator form of government. To accomplish this endeavor, two theoretical models 
were developed: the General Model that examined general county administrator turnover, 
and the Push/Pull Model that explored the ways in which push and pull factors affected 
administrator turnover. Four general research questions were posed in both models:
What is the relationship between political uncertainty and administrator turnover? 
What is the relationship between government fiscal performance and administrator 
turnover?
What is the relationship between community instability and administrator turnover?
• What is the relationship between administrator profiles and administrator turnover?
Additionally, an assessment was made regarding the joint relationship between key 
factors deemed representative o f political uncertainty, government fiscal performance, 
community instability, select administrator profiles, and appointed county administrator 
turnover.
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A summary of the important findings from this research study for both the General 
Model and the Push/Pull Model follows.
General Model
Unlike previous empirical studies that have explored appointed municipality 
executive turnover (DeHoog & Whitaker, 1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Feiock et al., 
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006; Renner, 
1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991), no empirical research studies have been undertaken to 
explore appointed county administrator turnover.
Hence, the principal contribution to the body of knowledge relating to analysis of 
general county administrator turnover was to fill a “void ... in our knowledge base about 
the American county” (Benton, 2003, p. 471). Second, this study contributes to the body 
of empirical literature on appointed county administrators in large American counties. 
Although many studies have descriptively characterized appointed county administrators, 
i.e., length of tenure, gender, race, and education, no such research has attempted to 
explore cause-effect relationships between multiple covariates and county administrator 
turnover.
While the General Model of county administrator turnover contained in this study 
proposed 21 hypotheses (one for each of the covariates) within the four domains of 
interest, statistical significance was found in only five of the covariates (p-values < 0.10),
i.e., non-partisan/partisan commission with or without a change in party control, a 
county’s long-term stability measured as the uninsured general obligation equivalency 
bond rating, a county’s scope of jurisdiction measured as the percentage of a county’s 
total population to the population in unincorporated jurisdictions, a county
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administrator’s job experience measured as the number o f years in the position, and a 
county administrator’s origin o f recruitment (internal promotion or external hire).
Further, the results o f the Cox proportional regression procedure for the restricted model 
provided “directional” support for only two of the five hypotheses. No statistically 
significant evidence with regard to cause-effect on county administrator turnover was 
found for the remaining 16 covariates.
Unlike previous research that explored the interrelationships between similar 
covariates and municipality top-executive turnover, the findings of this study on county 
administrator turnover suggest stark differences.
First, DeFloog and Whitaker (1990), found that political conflict was a primary reason 
for municipality appointed executive turnover, a relationship that was not strongly 
supported in this research study o f appointed county administrator turnover. For example, 
this study found that short-term and mid-term changes in the composition of the 
commission had no effect on appointed county administrator turnover. Similar non­
results were found with leadership changes in the governing body.
One possible explanation of the non-effect in counties versus municipalities is that 
political conflict and uncertainty is more visible in municipalities when compared to that 
of counties. The factors contributing to elevated levels of political conflict in 
municipalities may be due to the more complex dynamics o f local political systems.
Directional support w as consistent with hypothesis 4a, and 4a2 (partisan councils and changes in party 
control result in higher administrator turnover) and hypothesis 18a (the longer an administrator’s job  
tenure, the less likely an administrator w ill leave his or her position). D irectional support was inconsistent 
or contrary to hypothesis 10a (administrators were more likely to depart their position when a county’s 
bond rating decreased), 12a (the larger the county’s scope o f  jurisdiction, the more likely an administrator 
w ill leave his or her position) and hypothesis 21 a (administrators w ho are recruited from outside the 
organization are m ore likely to leave their positions when compared to administrators w ho are promoted 
from within the organization).
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Second, Feiock et al. (2001), found evidenee “linking community and economic 
growth to (municipality) administrative turnover” (p. 106). Similarly, MeCabe et al. 
(2006) discovered cause-effect relationships between a municipality’s income level and 
eeonomie change, and top-executive turnover.
Cause-effect relationships between community instability and fiscal performance 
faetors, and appointed eounty administrator turnover however were not generally 
supported in this general turnover eomponent of this researeh study. For example, of the 
12 covariates deemed representative of these two domains, only two were found to be 
statistieally significant on appointed county administrator turnover; a county’s long-term 
stability and seope of jurisdiction.
The non-effects o f the ten remaining eovariates may once again, be attributed to the 
increased eomplexity and dynamics of local political systems. In one sense, top- 
exeeutives in municipalities may be held more accountable for the suceesses and failures 
o f their respeetive jurisdictions when eompared to appointed eounty administrators.
Lastly, this researeh study suggested the majority of factors measuring a eounty 
administrator’s profile had no statistical significance on general turnover, e.g., level of 
education, gender and raee. Interestingly, these results are contrary to the beliefs of some 
participants interviewed during the eourse o f this study. For example. Interviewee #1 
suggested:
I think you could find a relationship between administrator hiring practices and 
education, gender and ethnicity. I guess if  you eonsider turnover as the flip  side to 
hiring, you could make the argument.
Interviewee #2 was more adamant about the relationships between edueation, gender 
and ethnicity when they said:
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I would think that the higher an administrator’s level of education, the more likely 
they would depart their office. I only say this because of the upward mobility factor. 
Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people. 
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well 
(always looking for a better opportunity); and
Gender and ethnicity (female and non-white) go hand in hand. By this I mean that 
female, or non-white administrators have a higher propensity to be recruited to other 
jurisdictions. I don’t think they have a higher probability o f being asked to leave.
These stark differences among the factors that contribute to municipality top-
executive turnover as compared to appointed county administrators only beckons a closer
examination of the similarities and dissimilarities o f the institutional characteristics of
local and county governments.
Push/Pull Model
Although several empirical studies have explored the push and pull factors that 
account for the length o f top municipality executive tenures (Feiock & Stream, 1998; 
Feiock et al., 2003; Feiock et al., 2001; McCabe et al., 2006), no empirical research 
studies have been undertaken to date to explore the push and pull factors that account for 
turnover o f appointed county administrators. Thus, the primary contribution to the body 
of knowledge pertaining to the analysis o f the push and pull factors that account for the 
length of county administrators was to fill one such void.
Unlike the General Model that characterized administrator turnover as a dichotomous 
event that was either departure or non-departure, this component of the research study 
added another dimension or second stage, furthering the body of knowledge o f county 
administrator turnover: push-induced departure and pull-induced departure. While the 
General Model of county administrator turnover proposed 21 hypotheses (one for each of
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the 21 covariates), the Push/Pull Model of county administrator turnover proposed only 
15 hypotheses (one for each of the 15 covariates contained in the Push/Pull Model). 
Push-Induced Departures
To summarize the analyses o f push-induced departures, statistical significance was 
discovered in over half, or eight of the 15 covariates (p-values < 0.10), i.e., commission 
leadership change, partisan commission elections and change in party control, a county’s 
cost burden or tax revenue equity, financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, long-term 
stability or a county’s bond rating, scope of jurisdiction or the total population outside 
incorporated areas o f the county, the economic conditions of the county or 
unemployment rate, and the county’s level of poverty. Directional support, however, was 
only evident in four o f the eight hypotheses. No statistically significant evidence as to 
cause-effect on push-induced county administrator turnover was found for the remaining 
seven covariates in the Push/Pull Model.
As previously discussed, researchers have suggested that political conflict is a 
primary reason for municipality appointed executive turnover. Similar to the results 
contained in the General Model, this relationship was not strongly supported in the 
Push/Pull Model of push-induced appointed administrator turnover. In other words, this 
study found that short-term and mid-term changes in the composition of the commission
Directional support was consistent with hypothesis 3b (changes in commission leadership result in push- 
induced administrator departures), 5b (the greater the county’s cost burden, the more likely a push-induced 
administrator departure), 10b (the larger the county’s scope of jurisdiction, the greater the push effect on 
administrator turnover), and 1 lb (the less healthy a county’s economic condition, the greater the push effect 
on administrator turnover). Directional support was contrary or inconsistent with hypothesis 4b] 
(administrators in counties with partisan commissions and a change in party control are more likely to 
depart when compared to counties with partisan commissions with no change in party control), 6b 
(administrators in counties with larger levels of expenditures experience a push-effected departure), and 8b 
(administrators are more likely to experience a pushed departure when a county’s bond rating decreased), 
and 12b (the larger a county’s poverty rate, the greater the push effect on administrator turnover).
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had no effect on push-indueed appointed county administrator turnover. Again, the more
complex dynamics of local political systems may partially explain this phenomenon.
Interviewee #4 summed up the effects of political uncertainty on push-indueed
appointed county administrator turnover by saying;
When all is said and done, you have to believe that you are doing the right thing, and 
that you make every attempt to build good relations with council members through 
trust and respect. If you have a good relationship with council members, you are in a 
position to say no if needed and still avoid being pushed from office.
Second, the eause-effect relationships between community instability and fiscal
performance factors and push-induced appointed county administrator turnover were only
marginally supported, i.e., the greater the county’s cost burden the more likely a push-
induced administrator departure, the larger the county’s scope of jurisdiction the greater
the push effect on administrator turnover, and the less healthy a county’s economic
condition the greater the push effect on administrator turnover.
Interestingly, these results suggest that while community instability and fiscal
performance factors may not necessarily effect general turnover, they do contribute to
push-induced turnovers. One reason for this finding may be that when a governing body
or commission does eventually decide to remove an administrator from office, the
reason(s) for removal are because of constituent pressures on commissioners for the
economic woes o f the community or the administration’s poor fiscal performance.
Lastly, an analysis of the covariates measuring a county administrator’s educational
level, years in office, and source o f recruitment suggested no cause-effect relationship
with push-induced appointed county administrator departures. Interestingly, these
findings are contrary to the interview response of Interviewee #2 who said;
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I would agree that there are probably relationships between education, tenure, gender 
and ethnicity, and administrator turnover, especially when you compare these 
measurements to what you described as push and pull departures.
Interviewee #1 did, however, accurately assess the effects o f administrator profiles
and push-induced departures in this research study when they said:
I’m not sure whether you could really tie leadership profile measures to administrator 
pushed-induced turnover.
Pulled-Induced Departures
To summarize the analyses of pull-induced departures, statistical significance was
discovered in only four o f the 15 covariates (p-values < O.IO), i.e., a county’s cost burden
or tax revenue equity, financial outlay or a county’s expenditures, a county’s scope of
jurisdiction or the total population outside incorporated areas of the county, and a county
administrator’s job experience measured as the number of years in the position.
Directional support, however, was inconsistent with three of the four hypotheses.
Further, no statistically significant evidence as to cause-effect on pull-induced county
administrator turnover was found for the remaining 11 covariates in the Push/Pull Model.
Feiock et al. (2006) suggested that pull factors refer to “opportunities for professional,
financial, or personal advancement in other positions,” and that “pull factors are often
outside the direct control or influence of an administrator’s current employer” (p. 101).
The results of the pull-induced analyses appear to support these conclusions.
Turning first to the factors that measure political uncertainty, none o f the four
eovariates were found to influence pull-induced appointed county administrator
^  Directional support was consistent with hypothesis 10b (the smaller the county’s scope of jurisdiction, 
the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover). Directional support was inconsistent with hypothesis 
5b (the lesser the county’s cost burden, the more likely a pull-induced administrator departure), 6b 
(administrators in counties with lesser levels of expenditures experience a pull-effected departure), and 14b 
(the longer an administrator’s tenure, the greater the pull effect on administrator turnover).
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departures. While these results were inconsistent with the study’s hypotheses in the 
political uncertainty domain, they are similar to the results of studies performed on top- 
executives in municipalities.
Second, the cause-effect relationships between all four community instability and 
fiscal performance factors found to be statistically significant on pull-induced appointed 
county administrator turnover were inconsistent with the proposed hypotheses is this 
research study. Interestingly, while these results suggest that faetures measuring 
community instability and fiscal performance do appear to influence pull-induced 
administrator departures, the direction o f the influence was opposite of what was 
proposed in this study. Again, as Feiock et al. (2006) suggested, pull departures “are 
often outside the direct control or influence of an administrator’s current employer” and 
therefore, difficult to measure (p. 101).
Lastly, two of the three factors in the Push/Pull Model associated with a county 
administrator’s profile (education and source of recruitment) suggested no cause-effect 
relationship with pull-induced appointed county administrator departures. With regards to 
the level of education, these results are contrary to the interview responses given by 
Interviewee #2 when he said:
1 would think that the higher an administrator’s level of education, the more likely 
they would be pulled out o f office. I only say this because o f the upward mobility 
factor. Individuals with advanced educations are generally highly motivated people. 
Therefore, one could expect that these individuals would be career driven as well 
(always looking for a better opportunity).
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Implications for Theory and Practice 
The research contained in this dissertation had both theoretical and practical 
implications pertaining to the field of study o f appointed county administrator turnover. 
By underscoring both the theoretical and practical implications of integrating the 
substantive findings of this research study with past studies of appointed municipality 
executives, construction of a single plausible theoretical model that could be used to 
explain appointed public administrator turnover in American counties of varying 
populations might be accomplished.
Theoretical Implications 
The theoretical relevance of the study findings is threefold. First, the study results 
illustrated the robustness of commission partisanship, a county’s scope of jurisdiction 
measured as the percentage of a county’s total population to the population in 
unincorporated jurisdictions, a county administrator’s job experience measured as the 
number of years in the position, and a county administrator’s origin of recruitment, as 
explanatory variables of county administrator general turnover. The study results also 
illustrated the robustness o f a county’s long-term stability measured as the change in 
uninsured general obligation equivalency bond ratings, economic conditions measured as 
the county’s unemployment rate, and poverty rate measured as the percentage of 
households below the federal poverty level, as explanatory variables of county 
administrator push-induced turnover.
Second, this research extended current models of appointed public executive 
turnover. Specifically, this study expanded the models of turnover developed by Feiock et 
ah, (2001) and McCabe et al. (2006) by taking into account the influence of alternative
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variables o f political uncertainty, fiscal performance, community instabilities and 
administrator profiles. Creating new measurements for constructs and providing support 
for the application of existing constructs fostered the potential future development o f a 
single explanatory model o f appointed administrator turnover in counties of varying 
sizes.
Third, this study contributed to the literature on push and pull motivation theory and 
appointed public executive turnover by regarding county administrator turnover as a 
dichotomous occurrence with regards to push-indueed and pull-indueed departures. By 
viewing administrator turnover from a push and pull standpoint, top public executive 
departures are more precisely explained.
Practical Implications
As previously discussed, top municipality executive turnover is known to have 
profound effects on city policy, programs and fiscal commitments (DeHoog & Whitaker, 
1990; DeSantis & Renner, 1993; Renner, 1990; Whitaker & DeHoog, 1991; Feiock et al., 
2003; Feiock et al., 2001; Feiock & Stream, 1998, 2002; McCabe et al., 2006). It was 
therefore theorized that county administrator turnover would have similar effects on 
county policy, programs, and fiscal commitments as well. The practical implications of 
this research study were primarily the identification of factors that contributed to county 
administrator turnover so that repeated turnover in American county government might 
be minimized.
The expanded roles and responsibilities o f top public executives have in many ways 
increased their scope and position o f assisting in the provision of critical public services. 
These expanded roles and responsibilities highlight the potential adverse effect that top-
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executive turnover may have on American counties. Previous researchers have suggested 
that repeated top-executive turnover often precedes periods of organizational under­
performance. In extreme cases, otherwise functional governmental entities with sound 
policies, programs, and fiscal commitments, may become non-functional, leaving the 
community with broken commitments and sub-par delivery of services.
Because appointed county administrators play an ever-increasing role in policy 
formulation and implementation, economic development, and community building, 
repeated turnover of county administrators in American counties can have a far-reaching 
negative effect on the organization’s success (Banovetz, 1995; Martin, 1990; Morgan & 
Watson, 1992; Nalbandian, 1999; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Renner, 2001; Wright, 
1969). By addressing the factors identified in this research study that affect administrator 
turnover, top-exeeutive retention rates might be increased.
Contributions of the Research Study 
There is growing recognition of the importance of top-executive turnover on the 
performance o f organizations in the public sector (Feiock et ah, 2001; McCabe et ah, 
2006). Previous studies have explored the interrelationships among the factors that are 
linked to top municipality executive turnover but, as previously mentioned, they have not 
systematically applied similar constructs to county administrator turnover.
The contribution of this research study was to first fill this gaping hole in the study of 
county government. By contributing to the body o f knowledge and providing a better 
understanding of both the general turnover o f appointed county administrators and the 
push and pull factors that affect turnover, it is thought that both practitioners and scholars
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may benefit. In many ways, the success o f this research study’s contribution to literature 
within the study of county government will be ultimately judged by the extent to which it 
can be used to explain county administrator turnover in counties o f varying sizes.
Second, to accomplish this research study, a particularly large amount o f data was 
compiled. The longitudinal nature of the data used in this study meant that the total 
accumulation of information contained in the database was substantial and most likely 
unique among other academic studies of county governments. Based on this fact, the data 
that were collected for this research study could serve as the basis for other explorations 
o f American counties.
Limitations of the Research Study 
There were several limitations to this research study. First, because this study’s 
theoretical framework and research approach was limited to the 32 largest American 
counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government, the explanatory qualities 
o f the models may not be applicable to American counties with relatively smaller 
populations. It is acknowledged that it would have been particularly useful to include a 
more diverse dataset consisting of American counties with greater population dispersions, 
however because of the void and questionable accuracy of such data, it was deemed 
unusable in this research study.
Second, some explanatory measurements may not accurately reflect the desired cause. 
For example, the use of a county’s bond rating to measure government fiscal performance 
may only provide a summary of the overall long-term financial condition of the county.
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As such, bond ratings may not reflect a county’s level o f fiscal performance in the short­
term and mid-term time frames.
Third, this study represented an effort to broadly apply previous study models of 
turnover among top municipality executives to large American counties with a 
Commissioner-Administrator form of government. The limited success of this endeavor, 
particularly in capturing the underlying sources that influence county administrator 
turnover, is indicative of the challenges of creating an ideal explanatory model. Simply 
stated, this study does not fully explain the reasons that county administrators leave their 
positions.
Recommendations for Further Research 
A review of the processes used in this study, as well as the resulting findings, 
identifies several recommendations for further research. Some recommendations are 
study design related, while others are intended to expand the body of knowledge and add 
to the literature base of appointed county administrator turnover.
First, it would be interesting to assess the effects o f the model variables on American 
counties with mid and small populations. While this research study was limited to the 32 
largest American counties with a Commission-Administrator form of government, 
considerably more work will be needed to determine whether the models contained in 
this research study are reliable in explaining appointed administrator turnover in 
American counties of varying sizes.
Second, further work needs to be done to establish whether the models put forth is 
this research study are reliable in to explaining executive turnover in government entities
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with appointed top executives other than American counties. Hence, it is suggested that 
the association o f the model variables be tested in other models o f appointed top- 
executive turnover. Examples might include municipal governments, township 
governments, special district governments, school district governments, and large 
governmental agencies or departments.
Third, the findings in this study are directly influenced by the domains that were 
included (or not included) in the theoretical models. To enhance our understanding of 
appointed administrator turnover, it is recommended that further research be undertaken 
in order to incorporate additional domains not included in this study. A number of 
potential domains come to mind, such as compensation and benefits, organizational 
communication (or lack thereof), quality o f life within the community, administrator 
attitudes and commitments towards the organization, and growth or career path 
deficiencies.
Fourth, future research might further identify additional explanatory measurements 
within the existing domains contained in this study to more accurately reflect the desired 
cause. For example, measurements pertaining to “internal” departmental budget 
allocations might afford insight into whether inner discretionary funding decisions lead to 
increased political conflict and, therefore, increased administrator turnover. Additionally, 
expanding the commission member turnover variable to a three to five-year horizon, as 
one past administrator suggested, might be more appropriate than the existing two-year 
horizon. As Interviewee #1 stated, “the seeds for the dirty deed (forced administrator 
departure) might take that long” only because the commission might not want to “give 
the public the appearance of being unstable.”
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Finally, this research study did not thoroughly assess how poor relationships occur 
between commission members and community stakeholders, and appointed county 
administrators, although a mixed-methods approach was utilized. These unanswered 
questions might be further explored using an expanded qualitative methodology.
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MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
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Dependent Variables
Model Variable Data Source
General Administrator
turnover
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
Push/Pull Administrator
turnover
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials; government, business, fraternal and 
professional organization/association newsletters and releases, and meeting minutes
Secondary: Print media, magazine and newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed articles and reviews such 
as interpretive accounts and histories; and evaluative and critical commentaries
to
to
Covariates
Domain Variable Data Source
Political
Uncertainty
1. One year percentage change in 
commission members
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
2. Rolling two year percentage 
change in commission members
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
3. Change in commission 
leadership
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
4. Commission partisanship -  
Change in party control
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
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EXHIBIT I (continued)
MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
D om ain V ariab le D ata  Source
5. Ratio o f  total property tax 
revenue to total population
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing census data 
and annual financial results
6. Percentage change in tax 
revenue
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing annual 
financial results
Government
Fiscal
Performance
7. Percentage o f 
intergovernmental transfers to 
total revenue
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing annual 
financial results
8. Ratio o f  total expenditures to 
total population
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing census data 
and annual financial results
9. Percentage change in total 
expenditures
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing annual 
financial results
10. Uninsured general 
obligation equivalency bond 
rating
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials and M oody’s Financial Services 
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories
11. One year percentage change 
in population
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing census data
Community
12. Ratio o f  total population to 
population residing in 
unincorporated jurisdictions
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing census data
Instability 13. Percentage o f non-white 
population to total population
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing demographic 
data
14. Percentage o f total 
workforce unemployed
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing demographic 
data
15. Average income Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing demographic 
data
16. Percentage o f population 
below poverty level
Primary: Government documents (both in print and web-based) containing demographic 
data
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MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
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Administrator
Profile
Variable
17. Formai education
18. Job tenure
19. Gender
20. Ethnicity
21. Origin o f  recruitment
Data Source
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories; print media, magazine and 
newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed interpretive accounts and histories, evaluative 
commentaries; biographies; government, business, fraternal and professional 
organization/association newsletters and releases, and meeting minutes_____________________
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories print media, magazine and 
newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed interpretive accounts and histories, evaluative 
commentaries; biographies_____________________________________________________________
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories print media, magazine and 
newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed interpretive accounts and histories, evaluative 
commentaries; biographies_____________________________________________________________
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories print media, magazine and 
newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed interpretive accounts and histories, evaluative 
commentaries; biographies_____________________________________________________________
Primary: Personal correspondence with county officials
Secondary: Annually published government reference directories print media, magazine and 
newspaper articles; non-peer reviewed interpretive accounts and histories, evaluative 
commentaries; biographies_____________________________________________________________
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EXHIBIT II
MODEL VARIABLES AND DATA CODING
1. General Turnover Model: Dependent variable is a categorical (dichotomous) measure o f administrator turnover, O=non-departed,
l=departed
2. Push/Pull Model: Dependent variable is a categorical (dichotomous) measure of administrator turnover, 0=pushed 
out, l=pulled out
Matrix of Covariates
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Domain Attributes Variable Method and Level of Measurement
Political
Uncertainty
1. Short-term commission 
turnover
1 year change in commission Percentage change (intervaPratio)
2. Mid-term commission turnover 2 year change in commission Percentage change (intervaPratio)
3. Commission leadership 
turnover
1 year change in chairperson 0=no change, l=change; (nominal)
4. Commission partisanship -  
Change in party control
Partisanship commission 
elections and change in party 
control
-l=non-partisan, 0=partisan elections with no 
change in party control, 1 ^ partisan elections with 
change in party control; (ordinal)
Government
Fiscal
Performance
5. County cost burden Tax revenue equity Ratio of total property tax revenue to total 
population (interval/ratio)
6. Income growth 1 year change in tax revenue Percentage change in tax revenue (interval/ratio)
7. Revenue dependency Intergovernmental transfers to 
total revenue
Percentage of intergovernmental transfers to total 
revenue (intervaPratio)
8. Financial outlay Expenditures Ratio of total expenditures to total population 
(intervaPratio)
9. Short-term stability 1 year change in expenditures Percentage change in total expenditures 
(intervaPratio)
10. Long-term stability Uninsured general obligation 
equivalency bond rating
Moody’s Financial Service rating (ordinal)
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Domain Attributes Variable Method and Level of Measurement
Community
Instability
11. Population growth 1 year change in population Percentage change (interval/ratio)
12. Scope o f jurisdiction Total population outside 
incorporated jurisdictions
Percentage o f total population to population in 
unincorporated jurisdictions (interval/ratio)
13. Ethnic diversity Non-white population Percentage o f total population (interval/ratio)
14. Econom ic conditions Unemployment rate Percentage o f total workforce (interval/ratio)
15. Affluence Income Average income (interval/ratio)
16. Poverty Poverty rate Percentage o f households below the federal poverty 
level (interval/ratio)
Administrator
Profile
17. Formal education Formal education 12=HS through 20=Ph.D. (ordinal)
18. Job experience Job tenure Number o f years in position (interval/ratio)
19. Gender diversity Gender 0=male, l=female; (nominal)
20. Ethnic diversity Race 0=white, l=non-white; (nominal)
21. Origin o f recruitment Source o f recruitment 0=inside, l=outside; (nominal)
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EXHIBIT III
■D
CD
BOND ISSUANCES (OTHER THAN UNINSURED GENERAL OBLIGATION BONDS)
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Model County Years Bond Issuance -  Type
Fresno, CA 1992-2005 Insured general obligation
Kem, CA 1992-2005 Insured general obligation
Orange, CA 1992-2005 Lease revenue
General Model San Bernardino, CA 1992-2001 Certificate of participation
San Diego, CA 1999-2005 Lease revenue
San Mateo, CA 1992-2005 Lease revenue
Santa Clara, CA 1992-2005 Lease revenue
Orange, FL 1992-2005 Tourism development tax
Fresno, CA 1992-2001 Insured general obligation
Kem, CA 1992-2005 Insured general obligation
Push/Pull Model Orange, CA 1992-2005 Lease revenue
San Bernardino, CA 1992-2001 Certificate of participation
San Diego, CA 1992- 1999 Lease revenue
Santa Clara, CA 1992-2003 Lease revenue
Orange, FL 1992-1998 Tourism development tax
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EXHIBIT IV
GENERAL MODEL BIVARIATE CORRELATION
Ind. Variable XI X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XIO X ll X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21
lY Comm Chg (XI) 1
2Y Comm Chg (X2) 0.62 1
Chair Change (X3) 0.09 0.00 1
Partisan-Partyctrl (X4) 0.06 0.08 -0.13 1
Cost Burden (X5) -0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.24 1
Income Growth (X6) -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.04 0.05 1
Revenue Depend (X7) -0.03 -0.04 0.16 -0.56 -0.40 -0.05 1
Financial Outlay (X8) -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.71 0.05 -0.06 1
STerm Stability (X9) -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.04 1
LTerm Stability (XIO) 0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.36 -0.33 -0.13 0.48 -0.20 -0.04 1
Population Chg(XII) -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.11 -0.07 0.09 -0.10 -0.08 0.15 0.08 1
Unincorpcnty (XI2) 0.02 -0.01 -0.16 0.48 0.31 -0.01 -0.18 0.40 0.04 -0.17 0.02 1
Non-White Pop (XI3) 0.02 0.03 -0.08 -0.15 0.24 0.07 -0.26 0.09 -0.02 -0.12 -0.09 -0.13 1
Unemployment (XI4) -0.04 -0.08 0.13 -0.32 -0.29 -0.18 0.25 -0.07 0.00 0.24 0.15 -0.07 -0.13 1
Per-Cap Income (XI5) -0.06 -0.10 -0.01 0.02 0.47 0.17 -0.22 0.29 0.00 -0.25 -0.34 0.01 0.41 -0.45 1
Poverty (XI6) 0.02 0.01 0.05 -0.25 -0.32 -0.11 0.19 -0.11 -0.05 0.18 0.20 -0.08 0.01 0.62 -0.65 1
Education (XI7) 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.07 -0.21 0.07 0.25 -0.17 -0.01 0.04 -0.12 -0.01 -0.27 -0.21 0.01 -0.20 1
Tenure (XI8) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 -0.07 0.04 -0.13 -0.04 -0.01 -0.15 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 -0.13 0.14 -0.18 0.05 1
Gender (XI9) -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.07 0.07 -0.20 0.10 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.18 -0.03 -0.09 1
Race (X20) -0.02 -0.02 0.11 0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.05 -0.28 0.07 -0.08 -0.04 0.16 0.11 -0.32 1
Recruitment (X21) -0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.13 -0.16 0.03 0.00 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.14 -0.06 -0.24 0.21 1
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EXHIBIT V
PUSH/PULL MODEL BIVARIATE CORRELATION
Ind. Variable XI X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9 XIO X ll X12 X13 X14 X15 X16 X17 X18 X19 X20 X21
lY Comm Chg (XI) 1
2Y Comm Chg (X2) 0.59 1
Chair Change (X3) 0.15 0.07 1
Partisan-Partyctrl (X4) 0.21 0.11 -0.07 1
Cost Burden (X5) -0.03 -0.04 -0.19 0.17 1
Income Growth (X6) 0.00 0.04 -0.12 0.01 0.06 1
Revenue Depend (X7) -0.07 -0.09 0.09 -0.12 -0.46 -0.12 1
Financial Outlay (X8) -0.02 -0.05 -0.11 0.05 0.67 0.03 -0.07 1
STerm Stability (X9) -0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.06 0.07 1
LTerm Stability (XIO) -0.01 -0.03 0.12 -0.08 -0.35 -0.16 0.43 -0.19 -0.02 1
Population Chg (X ll) -0.07 -0.09 -0.17 -0.03 0.00 0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.12 0.11 1
Jurisdiction (XI2) -0.05 -0.11 -0.17 0.05 0.27 0.03 -0.17 0.36 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 1
Non-White Pop (X13) 0.02 0.05 -0.14 0.04 0.22 0.11 -0.35 0.00 0.05 -0.23 0.01 -0.16 1
Unemployment (XI4) -0.07 -0.16 0.19 -0.05 -0.34 -0.22 0.37 -0.09 0.03 0.29 0.15 -0.07 -0.17 1
Per-Cap Income (XI5) -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.01 0.39 0.20 -0.21 0.14 0.07 -0.22 -0.29 -0.01 0.34 -0.55 1
Poverty (XI6) 0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.06 -0.32 -0.14 0.23 -0.05 -0.06 0.18 0.17 -0.10 0.06 0.66 -0.71 1
Education (XI7) 0.07 0.10 0.06 -0.03 -0.14 0.06 0.14 0.00 -0.07 -0.04 -0.21 0.16 -0.26 -0.18 0.22 -0.39 1
Tenure (XI8) 0.08 0.11 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.17 0.00 -0.03 -0.17 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 -0.15 0.10 -0.20 0.09 1
Gender (XI9) 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.14 0.01 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.14 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 -0.16 0.05 -0.07 1
Race (X20) -0.03 -0.06 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.03 -0.11 0.04 -0.17 -0.04 0.13 -0.30 0.23 0.15 0.06 1
Recruitment (X21 ) -0.12 -0.11 0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.10 0.12 -0.16 0.05 -0.14 -0.01 -0.06 -0.08 -0.15 0.26 -0.26 0.01 0.01 -0.17 0.03 1
APPENDIX I
SUPPLEMENTAL DATA SOURCES
Note: Primary and secondary data sources not specifically referenced in the body or
Bibliography Section o f this research study.
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APPENDIX II 
QUALITATIVE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
la. Do you think political uncertainty affects county administrator turnover?
lb. Why?
Ic. Do you think short-term commission turnover, mid-term commission turnover, 
commission leadership turnover and commission partisanship are good measures of 
political uncertainty?
2a. Do you think government fiscal performance affects county administrator turnover?
2b. Why?
2c. Do you think a county’s cost burden, income growth, revenue dependency, financial 
outlay, short-term stability, and long-term stability are good measures of government 
fiscal performance?
3a. Do you think community instability affects county administrator turnover?
3b. Why?
3c. Do you think a county’s population growth, ethnic diversity, economic conditions, 
level of affluence, and level o f poverty are good measures o f community instability?
4a. Do you think administrator profiles affect county administrator turnover?
4b. Why?
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4c. Do you think an administrator’s level o f formal education, tenure, gender, ethnicity, 
and origin of recruitment are good administrator profile measures?
5. Do you have any thoughts or ideas to share with regards to the factors you think 
affect county administrator turnover that are not included in this research study?
239
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abney, G. (1988). Lobbying by the insiders: Parallels o f state ageneies and interest 
groups. Public Administration Review, 48(5), 911-917.
Acock, A. C. (2005). SAS, Stata, SPSS: A comparison. Journal o f  Marriage and Family, 
67, 1093-1095.
Ammons, D. N. (1993). Leading a manager's life. In C. Newell (Ed.), The effective local 
government manager (3"^  ^ed.). In The Municipal Yearbook (pp. 199-222). 
Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
Arnold, R. D. (1990). The logic o f  congressional action. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
Arthur, M. B., Hall, D. T., & Lawrence, B. S. (1989). Handbook o f  career theory. NY: 
Cambridge University Press.
Arthur, M. B., & Rousseau, D. M. (Eds.). (1996). The boundaryless career: A new 
employment principle fo r  a new organizational era. NY : Oxford University Press.
Babbie, E. (1995). The practice o f  social research. London: Wadsworth.
Baker, T. L. (1999). Doing social research (3"^  ^ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Bandura, A. (1979). Social learning theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Bandura, A. (1986). Social foundations o f  thought and action: A social cognitive theory. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Banfield, E., & Wilson, J. Q. (1963). City politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press.
Banovetz, J. M. (Ed.). (1971). Managing the modern city. Washington, DC: International 
City/County Management Association.
Banovetz, J. M. (1995). Council-manager government’s response to economic 
development. In G. Frederickson (Ed.), Ideal and practice in council-manager 
government (pp. 213-226). Washington, DC: International City/County Management 
Association.
240
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Barber, D. M. (1988). Newly promoted city managers. Public Administration Review, 48, 
694-99.
Benston, G. (1985). The self-serving management hypothesis: Some evidence. Journal o f  
Accounting and Economics, 7, 67-84.
Benton, J. E. (2002). County service delivery: Does government structure matter? Public 
Administration Review. 62, 471-479.
Benton, J. E. (2003). The impact o f structural reform on county government service 
provision. Social Science Quarterly, 84, 858-874.
Berman, E. (1996). Restoring the bridges of trust: attitudes of community leaders toward 
local government. Public Integrity Annual, 1, 31-39.
Berman, E. (1997). Getting support from city council: City managers’ view. Public 
Administration & Management: An Interactive Journal, Vol. 2. Harrisburg, PA: 
Southern Public Administration Education Foundation, Inc. Retrieved September 6, 
2006, from http://www.pamij.eom
Bern, R. (1992). The relationships between financial reporting and the measurement of 
financial condition. Government accounting standard board, research report (Report 
No. 18), Norwalk, Ct.
Bern, R., & Seharamm, R. (1986). The financial analysis o f  government. Stanton, New 
Jersey: Prentice Flail.
Birnbaum, R. (1971). Presidential succession: An inter-institutional analysis. Educational 
Record, (Spring), 133-145.
Blanche, M., & Durrheim, K. (1999). Research in practice: applied methods fo r  the 
social sciences. Cape Town: University o f Cape Town Press.
Bommer, W. H., & Ell strand, A. E. (1996). CEO successor choice, its antecedents and 
influence on subsequent firm performance: An empirical analysis. Group and 
Organization Management, 27(1), 105-123.
Bowen, K. (2003). An argument for integration o f qualitative and quantitative research 
methods to strengthen internal validity. Retrieved December 21, 2006, from 
http://trochim.human.cornell.edU//gallery/bowen/hass691.htm
Box, R. (1993). Resistance to professional managers in American local government. 
American Review o f  Public Administration, 22, 403-418.
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Jones, B. S. (1997). Time is of the essence: Event history 
models in political science. American Journal o f  Political Science, 41, 1414-1461.
241
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., & Zorn, C. (2002). Duration models for repeated events. The 
Journal o f  Politics, 64, 1069-1094.
Boynton, R. P., & DeSantis, V. S. (1990). Form and adaptation: A study o f the formal 
and informal functions of mayors, managers, and chief administrative officers. 
Baseline Data Report 22 (Report No. 1). Washington, D.C.: International 
City/County Management Association.
Brady, G. F., & Helmich, D. L. (1984). Executive succession: Toward excellence in 
corporate leadership. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Brimeyer, J. (1993). Council-manager relations: Time for adjustment, before it is too late. 
Public Manager, 75, 10-12.
Brown, K. W. (1993). The 10-point test of financial condition: Toward an easy-to-use 
assessment tool for smaller cities. Government Finance Review, 9(6), 21-26.
Buckwalter, D. W., & Parsons, R. J. (2000). Local city managers' career paths: Which 
way to the top? In The Municipal Yearbook 2000 (pp. 17-21). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.
Cannella, A., Jr., & Lubatkin, M. (1993). Succession as a sociopolitical process. Academy 
o f  Management Journal, 36, 763-793.
Carlson, R. (1961). Succession and performance among school superintendents. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 6, 210-227.
Carlson, R. (1962). Executive succession and organizational change. Danville, IL: 
Interstate Printers and Publishers.
Carnevale, D. (1995). Trustworthy government: leadership and management strategies 
fo r  building trust and high performance. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Carroll's Annual Municipal/County Directory. (2001-2002). Washington, DC: Carroll 
Publishing.
Carroll's County Directory. (November 1995/April 1996, November 1996/April 1997). 
Washington, DC: Carroll Publishing.
Chaganti, R., & Sambharya, R. (1987). Strategic orientation and characteristics o f upper 
management. Strategic Management Journal, 8, 393-401.
Clingermayer, J. C., & Feiock, R. C. (2001). Institutional constraints and policy choice: 
An exploration o f  local governance. Albany: State University of New York Press.
242
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Clingermayer, J. C., Feiock, R. C., & Stream, C. (2003). Governmental uncertainty and 
leadership turnover: Influences on contracting and sector choice for local services. 
State and Local Government Review, 35(3), I50-I6I.
Consolidated Annual Financial Reports (1991-2005) for all counties contained within 
this research study.
Corbin, J., & Strauss, A. (1990). Grounded theory research: Procedures, canons, and 
evaluative criteria. Qualitative Sociology, 73(1), 3-21.
Cotton, J. L., & Tuttle, J. M. (1986). Employee turnover: A meta-analysis and review 
with implications for research. Academy o f  Management Review, 11, 55-70.
County Executives o f America. (2006). Access government. Retrieved August 2, 2006, 
from http://www.countyexecutives.org/aceessgov/countyform.htm
Covington, C. (1985). Development o f organizational memory in presidential agencies. 
Administration and Society, 17(2), 171-196.
Crain, W., Deaton, T., & Tollison, R. (1976). On the survival of corporate executives. 
Southern Economics Journal, 43, 1372-1376.
Creswell, J. (2003). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods 
approaches (2"‘* ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Creswell, J., Plano Clark, V., Guttman, M., & Hanson, W. (2003). Advanced mixed 
methods research designs. In A. Tashakkori, & C. Teddlie, (Eds.), Handbook on 
mixed methods in the behavioral and social sciences (pp. 209-240). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage.
Dalton, D., & Kesner, I. (1983). Inside/Outside succession and organizational size: The 
pragmatics of executive succession. Academy o f  Management Journal, 26, 736-742.
Damore, D. (2005). Issue convergence in presidential campaigns. Political Behavior, 
27(1), 71-97.
Dawis, R.V., England, G. V., & Lofquist, L. H. (1964). A theory o f  work adjustment. 
Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota, Industrial Relations Center.
Dawis, R. V,. & Lofquist, L. H. (1984). A psychological theory o f  work adjustment. 
Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Press.
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (1989). Proxy contest and the governance of publicly 
held corporations. Journal o f  financial Accounting, 12, 29-59.
243
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Decrop, A. (1999). Triangulation in qualitative research. Tourism Management, 20(1), 
157-161.
DeHoog, R., & Whitaker, G. (1990). Political conflict or professional advancement: 
Alternative explanations of city manager turnover. Journal o f  Urban Affair, 12, 367- 
377.
Denis, D. J., Denis, D. K., & Sarin, A. (1997). Ownership structure and top executive 
XuraovQx. Journal o f  financial Economics, 45{\), 193-221.
Denton, E., & Pisciotte, J. (1993). Enhancing the governing body's effectiveness. In C. 
Newell (Ed.), The effective local government manager (pp. 53-81). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.
DeSantis, V. S., & Newell, C. (1996). Local government managers’ career paths. In The 
Municipal Yearbook (pp. 3-10). Washington, DC: International City/County 
Management Association.
DeSantis, V. S., & Renner, T. (1993). Contemporary patterns and trends in municipal 
government structures. In The Municipal Yearbook (pp. 57-69). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.
DeSantis, V. S., & Renner, T. (1994). City manager turnover: The impact of formal 
authority and electoral change. State and Local Government Review, 26, 104-111.
DeSantis, V. S., & Renner, T. (1996). Structure and policy expenditures in American 
counties. In D. Menzel (Ed.), The American county: Frontiers o f  knowledge. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Devine, T. I., & Kiefer, N. M. (1991). Empirical labor economics. New York: Oxford 
University Press
Dilulio, J. D., Jr. (1994). Principled agents: The cultural bases of behavior in a federal 
government bureaucracy. Journal o f  Public Administration Research and Theory, 
^^ (3), 277-318.
Downs, A. (1967). Inside bureaucracy. Boston: Little, Brown.
Droege, S. B., & Hoobler, J. M. (2003). Employee turnover and tacit knowledge 
diffusion: A network perspective. Journal o f  Managerial Issues, 15, 50-64.
Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., & Lowe, A. (1991). Management research: An 
introduction. London: Sage.
Fee, C.E. & Hadlock, C.J. (2004). Management turnover across the corporate hierarchy. 
Journal o f  Accounting and Economics, 37(1), 3-38.
244
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Feiock, R., & Clingermayer, J. (1993, November). Institutions, incentives, and city debt. 
Paper presented at the annual meeting o f the Southern Political Science Association 
(SPSA), Savannah, GA.
Feiock, R., Clingermayer, J. C., Stream, C., McCabe, B. C., & Ahmed, S. (2001).
Political conflict, fiscal stress, and administrative turnover in American cities. State 
and Local Government Review, 33, 101-109.
Feiock, R., & Stream, C. (1998). Explaining the tenure o f local government managers. 
Journal o f  Public Administration Research and Theory, 8, 117-131.
Feiock, R., & Stream, C. (2002). The implications of local government structure for 
manager turnover and policy choice. In The future o f  local government 
administration: A tribute to William Hansel. Washington, DC: International 
City/County Management Association.
Fiorina, M. P. (1981). Retrospective voting in American national elections. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press.
Fogarty, D. J. (2006). Multiple imputation as a missing data approach to reject inference 
on consumer credit scoring. Interstat. Retrieved January 23, 2007, from 
http://interstat.statjournals.net/index.php
Fox, R., & Schuhmann, R. (2001). Mentoring experiences of women city managers. 
American Review o f  Public Administration, 37(4), 381-392.
Friedman, S. D. (1990). Succession systems in the public sector: Lessons from the 
Oklahoma department of corrections. Public personnel Management, 19, 291-303.
Gabris, G., & Kaatz, J. (1994, October). Do leadership attributes make a difference in the 
survival and perceived effectiveness patterns o f  city managers? Paper presented at the 
Southeastern Conference on Public Administration (SECOPA), Lexington, KY.
Gamson, W., & Scotch, N. (1964). Scapegoating in baseball. American Journal o f  
Sociology, 70, 69-72.
Gilbert, N. (1993). Research theory and method. In N. Gilbert (Ed.), Researching social 
life. London: Sage.
Golembiewski, R., & Gabris, G. (1995). Tomorrow's city managers: Guides for avoiding 
success becoming failure. Public Administration Review, 55, 240-246.
Goodnow, F. J. (1900). Politics and administration: A study in government. (Reprinted 
1968). New York: Russell & Russell.
245
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Gordon, G. E., & Rosen, N. (1981). Turbulence at the top: A new perspective on 
governance structure changes and strategic change. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance, 27, 227-254.
Gothard, B., & Mignot, P. (1999). Career counseling for the 2E ‘ eentury: Integrating 
theory and practice. International Journal fo r  the Advancement o f  Counseling. 21, 
153-167.
Gouldner, A. W. (1952). Patterns o f  industrial bureaucracy. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press.
Green, R. E. (1987, March/April). Local government managers: Styles and challenges. 
Baseline Data Report, Vol. 29, No. 2.
Greenberg, J., & Hillier, D. (1995, November). Indicators offinancial condition for  
governments. Paper presented at the 5*^  Conference o f Comparative International 
Governmental Accounting Research, Paris-Amy.
Groves, S. M., Godsey, W., & Shulman, M. (1981). Financial indicators for local 
government. Public Budgeting and Finance, 3, 9-21.
Groves, S. M., & Valente, M. G. (1994). Evaluating financial condition: A handbook for 
local government. Washington, DC: International City/County Management 
Association.
Grusky, O. (1960). Administrative succession in formal organizations. Social forces, 39, 
105-115.
Grusky, O. (1961). Corporate size, bureaucratization, and managerial succession. 
American Journal o f  Sociology, 67, 263-269.
Grusky, O. (1964). The effects o f succession: A comparative study of military and 
business organizations. In Janowitz, M. (Ed.), The new military. New York: Russell 
Sage Foundation.
Hall, D. T. (1986). Dilemmas in linking succession planning to individual executive 
learning. Human Resource Management, 25, 214-239.
Hall, D. T. (1989). How top management and the organization itself can block effective 
executive succession. Human Resource Management, 25(1), 5-24.
Hall, 1. R., Lippman, S. A., & McCall, 1. 1. (1979). Expected utility maximizing job 
search. In S. A. Lippman, & 1.1. McCall (Eds.), Studies in the economics o f  search 
(pp. 133-156). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Hall, J. (1976). Organization technology and executive succession. California 
Management Review, 19, 35-39.
246
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organizations as a 
reflection o f its top managers. Academy o f  Management Review, 9(2), 193-206.
Hausman, J. (1978). Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica, 46(6), 1251- 
1271.
Healy, M. C., Lehman, M., & McDaniel, M. A. (1995). Age and voluntary turnover: 
Quantitative review. Personnel Psychology, 48, 335-345.
Helco, H. (1988). The in-and-outer system: A critical assessment. Political Science 
Quarterly, 703(1), 37-56.
Helmich, D. L. (1974a). Organizational growth and succession patterns. Academy o f  
Management Journal, 17, 771-775.
Helmich, D. L. (1974b). Predecessor turnover and successor characteristics. Cornell 
Journal o f  Social Relations, 9, 249-260.
Helmich, D. L. (1975). Corporate succession: An examination. Academy o f  Management 
Journal, 3, 429-441.
Helmich, D. L. (1977). Executive succession in the corporate organization: A current 
integration. Academy o f  Management Review, 2, 257-266.
Helmich, D. L. (1980). Board size variation and rates of succession in the corporate 
presidency. Journal o f  Business Research, 8, 51-63.
Helmich, D. L., & Brown, W. B. (1972). Successor type and organizational change in the 
corporate enterprise. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 371-381.
Hernon, P. (1994). Statistics: A component o f  the research process. Norwood, NJ:
Ablex.
Hoene, C., Baldassare, M., & Shires, M. (2002). The development of counties as 
municipal governments. Urban Affairs Review, 37, 575-591.
Holland, J. L. (1973). Making vocational choices: A theory o f  careers. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Holland, J. L. (1997). Making vocational choices: A theory o f  personalities and work 
environments. Odessa, EL: Psychological Assessment Resources.
Honadale, B. W., & Lloyd-Jones, M. (1998). Analyzing rural local governments’ 
financial condition: An exploratory application of three tools. Public Budgeting & 
Finance, 18, 69-86.
247
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Huelsberg, N. A., & Lincoln, W. F. (1986). Successful negotiating in local government. 
Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
Huson, M. R., Malatesta, P. H., & Parrino, R. (2004). Managerial succession and firm 
performance. Journal o f  Financial Economics, 74(1), 237-275.
Huson, M. R., Parrino, R., & Starks, L. T. (2001). Internal monitoring mechanisms and 
CEO turnover: A long term perspeetive. Journal o f  Finance, 56(6), 2265-2297.
International City/County Management Association. (1958). Handbook fo r  councilmen in 
council-manager cities. Washington, DC: Author.
International City/County Management Association. (1991/1992-1998-1999). Who's who 
in local government management. Washington, DC: Author
International City/County Management Association. (1992-1999). Municipal yearbook. 
Vol.59-66 (1992-1999). Washington, DC: Author.
International City/County Management Association. (1995). Report o f  the council- 
manager plan task force. Washington, DC: Author.
Iowa State Association of Counties. (2006). 2005 new county officers manual. Retrieved 
July 30, 2006, from http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Management/forms/ 
formsweb.aspx
Jenks, S. (1994). County compliance with North Carolina's solid waste mandates: A 
conflict based model. PwW/Mi', 24, 17-36.
Jones, R. A. (1996). Research methods in the social and behavioral sciences (2"^ ed.). 
Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates.
Joyce, P. G. (1990). An analysis of the factors affecting the employment tenure o f federal 
political executives. Administration and Society, 22(1), 127-145.
Kaatz, J. B. (1996). City manager tenure stability: A predictive model based on perceived 
city council conflict, leadership effectiveness, and conflict resolution (Doctoral 
dissertation. Northern Illinois University, 1996).
Kaatz, J. B., French, P. E., & Prentiss-Cooper, H. (1999). City council conflict as a cause 
o f psychological burnout and voluntary turnover among city managers. State and 
Local Government Review, 31(3), 162-172.
Kaatz, J. B., & Gabris, G. (1996, June). New evidence on the causes of city manager 
termination: The salience o f council conflict versus administrative leadership. Paper
248
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
presented at the 57th National Conference of the American Society for Public 
Administration (ASPA), Atlanta, GA.
Kammerer, G. M., Farris, C. D., DeGrove, J. M., & Clubok, A. B. (1962). City managers 
in politics: An analysis o f  manager tenure and termination. Gainesville: University of 
Florida Press.
Kaplan, E. L., & Meier, P. (1958). Non-parametric estimation from incomplete 
observations. Jowrna/ o f  the American Statistical Association, 53, 457-481.
Kast, F. E., & Rosenzweig, J. E. (1979). Organization and management: A systems and 
contingency approach (3"^  ^ed.). New York: McGraw Hill
Katz, D., & Kahn, R. L. (1982). The social psychology o f  organizations (3'^ '* ed.). New 
York: John Wiley and Sons
Kesner, I. F., & Sebora, T.C. (1994). Executive Succession: Past, present & future. 
Journal o f  Management, 20(2), 327-372.
Kessel, J. H. (1962). Governmental structural and political environment: A statistical note 
about cities. American Political Science Review. 56, 61-75.
King, G., Keohane, R., & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry: Scientific inference 
in qualitative research. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kirschenbaum, A., & Weisberg, J. (1990). Predicting worker turnover: An assessment of 
intent on actual separations. Human Relations, 43, 829-847.
Klase, K. A., Pops, G. M., & Mok, J. W. (1996). County conflict and cooperation. In D. 
Menzel (Ed.), The American county: Frontiers o f  knowledge. Tuscaloosa: University 
o f Alabama Press.
Klase, K. A., & Song, S. G. (2000). Evaluating the influence of county manager form of 
government on county conflict. Public Administration Quarterly, 24, 286-305.
Klein, K. L., & Wiener, Y. (1977). Interest congruency as a moderator o f the relationship 
between job tenure and job satisfaction and mental health. Journal o f  Occupational 
Behavior, 10, 91-98.
Kloha, P., Weissert, C., & Kleine, R. (2005). Developing and testing a composite model 
to predict local fiscal distress. Public Administration Review, 65(3), 313-323.
Korrnendi, R. C. (1979). Dispersed transaction prices in a model of decentralized pure 
exchange. In S. A. Lippman, & J. J. McCall (Eds.), Studies in the economics o f  
search (pp. 53-82). Amsterdam: North-Holland.
249
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Kotin, J., & Sharaf, M. (1967). Management succession and administrative style. 
Psychiatry, 30, 237-248.
Krathwohl, D. (1993). Method o f  educational and social science research: An 
integrated approach. White Plains, NY.
Krumboltz, J. D. (1979). A social learning theory of career decision making. In L. K. 
Mitchell, A. M. Jones, & J. D. Krumboltz (Eds.), Social learning and career-decision 
making. Cranston, RI; The Carroll Press.
Krumboltz, J. D., & Baker, R. D. (1973). Behavioral counseling for vocational decisions. 
In H. Borrow (Ed.), Career guidance fo r  a new age (pp. 235-284). Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin.
Leatherman, J. C., & Deller, S. C. (2001). Building local government capacity: The 
toolbox for outreach educators. Journal o f  Regional Analysis and Policy, 37(1), 91- 
109.
Lee, T. W., & Mitchell, T. R. (1994). An alternative approach: The unfolding model of 
voluntary employee turnover. Academy o f  Management Review, 12, 51-89.
Lent, R. W., Brown, S. D., & Hackett, G. (1994). Toward a unifying social cognitive 
theory of career and academic interest, choice, and performance. Journal o f  
Vocational Behavior, 45, 79-122.
Lewis, E., & Taylor, G. (1990, April). Role and style behaviors o f United States
county administrators: Scoping backward and forward. Paper presented at the Urban 
Affairs Association Annual Meeting (UAA), Charlotte, NC.
Lewis-Beck, M.S. (1980). Applied Regression: An introduction. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Lineberry, R. L., & Fowler, E. (1967). Reformism and public policies in American cities. 
American Political Science Review, 61, 701-716.
Lippman, S. A., & McCall, J. J. (1979). Studies in the economics o f  search. Amsterdam: 
North-Holland.
Lobao, L., & Kraybill, D. (2005). The emerging roles of county governments in
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas: Findings from a national survey. Economic 
Development Quarterly, 19, 245-249.
Lofquist, L. H., & Dawis, R. V. (1969). What is job satisfaction? Organizational 
Behavior and Human Performance, 4, 309-336.
Loveridge, R. (1971). City managers in legislative politics. New York Bobbs-Merrill.
250
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Lucas, G. H., Jr., Parasuraman, A., Davis, R. A., & Enis, B. M. (1987). An empirical 
study of sales force turnover. Journal o f  Marketing. 51, 34-59.
Lundberg, C. (1986). The dynamic organizational contexts of executive succession: 
Considerations and challenges. Human Resource Management, 25(2), 287-303.
Mahler, W. (1980). Management succession planning: New approaches for the 80s. 
Human Resource Planning, 13, 221-227.
March, J., & Simon, H. A. (1958). Organizations. New York: McGraw-Hill.
March, J. C., & March, J. G. (1977). Almost random careers: the Wisconsin school 
superintendency, 1940-1972. Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 377-409.
Merriam, S. B. (1988). Case study research in education: A qualitative approach. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Marshall, C., & Rossman, G. B. (1995). Designing qualitative research (2"‘* ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Marshall, J. (1992). Building a working relationship with your elected officials. Public 
Management, 74, 17-19.
Martin, D. L. (1990). Running city hall: Municipal administration in America. 
Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
Massey, A. (2003). Methodological triangulation. Retrieved December 20, 2006, from 
http://www.freeyourvoice.co.uk/htm/triangulation
Mathis, W. (1993). What councils want from managers ... but do not tell them. Public 
Management, 75, 5-10.
MeCabe, B., Feiock, R., Clingermayer, J., & Stream, C. (2006). Turnover among city 
managers: The role o f political and economic change. Public Administration Review, 
66(1), 78-90.
McClelland, D. (1985). Human motivation. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman.
McGoldrick, A. E., & Arrowsmith, J. (1993). Recruitment advertising: Discrimination on 
the basis o f age. Employee Relations, 15, 54-65.
Menzel, D. (1992). Setting a researeh agenda for the study of the American county. 
Public Administration Review, 52, 173-182.
251
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Miewald, R. D. (1984). The origins of Wilson's thought: The German tradition and the 
organic state. In J. Rabin & J. S. Bowman (Eds.), Politics and Administration (pp. 17- 
30). New York: Marcel Dekker.
Miller, D. (1993). Some organizational consequences of CEO succession. Academy o f  
Management Journal, 36, 644-659.
Miller, G. J. (2000). Above politics: Credible commitment and efficiency in the design of 
public agencies. Journal o f  Public Administration Research and Theory, 10, 289-328.
Miller, T., & Miller, M. (1991). Citizen surveys: How to do them, how to use them, what 
they mean. Washington, DC: International City/County Management Association.
Mitchell, L. K., & Krumboltz, J. D. (1990). Social learning approach to career decision 
making: Krumboltz’s theory. In D. Brown, L. Brooks & Associates. Career choice 
and development: Applying contemporary theories to practice (2"‘’ ed). San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Mobley, W. H., Griffith, R. W., Hand, H. H., & Meglino, B. M. (1979). A review and 
conceptual analysis of the employee turnover process. Psychological Bulletin, 1, 493- 
522.
Morck, E., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1988). Management ownership and market 
valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal o f  Financial Economics, 18, 293-315.
Morgan, D. R., & Kickham, K. (1999). Changing the form of county government: Effects 
on revenue and expenditure policy. Public Administration Review, 59, 315-324.
Morgan, D. R., & Watson, S. S. (1992). Policy leadership in council-manager cities: 
Comparing mayor and manager. Public Administration Review, 52, 438-447.
Municipal Research and Services Center o f Washington (2006). Forms o f  governments. 
Retrieved October 12, 2006, from http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Management/ 
forms/form s web. aspx
Murdaugh, J. T. (2005). Succession and the police chief: An examination o f  the nature o f  
turnover among Florida police chiefs. (Doctoral dissertation, Florida State 
University, 2005). Retrieved August 20, 2006, from the Florida State University 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Web site: http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/ 
available/etd-11102005-141029/
Nalbandian, J. (1999). Facilitating community, enabling demoeracy: New roles for local 
government managers. Public Administration Review, 59, 187-197.
Nalbandian, J. (2000). The manager as political leader. Public Management, 3, 7-12.
252
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
National Association o f Counties. (2001). County revenues, a survey o f  authority and 
practice. Retrieved September 2, 2006, from http://www.naco.org/ Content/ 
ContentGroups/Publications 1 /Surveys
National Association of Counties. (2006). History o f  county government. Retrieved 
October 21, 2006, from http://www.naco.org/Content/NavigationMenu/About 
Counties/ History_of_County_Government/Default983 .htm
Newell, C., & Ammons, D. N. (1987). Role emphases o f city managers and other 
municipal executives. Public Administration Review, 47, 246-254.
Newell, C., Glass, J. J., & Ammons, D. N. (1989). City manager roles in a changing 
political environment. In H. G. Frederickson (Ed.), Ideal and practice in council 
manager government. Washington, DC: International City/County Management 
Association.
Olsson, B. (2003, June). Understanding the cultural dimension o f  career development. 
Paper presented at the 15"^  Annual m( 
economics. Aix en Provence, France.
eeting of the Society for Advancement of Socio-
Orosz, J. E. (1991). Leadership transitions o f  state government executives: A naturalistic 
inquiry o f  cases o f  state agency executive succession in Ohio. (Doctoral dissertation, 
Ohio State University, 1991). Retrieved March 2, 2007, from the Ohio State 
University Electronic Theses and Dissertations Web site: http://library.osu.edu/ 
sites/sel/ETD/ETD.php
Palumbo, D. J. (1969). Power and role specificity in organization theory. Public 
Administration Review, 29, 237-248.
Pammer, W. J., Jr., Lightle, J. K., & Watson, D. M. (2000.) Fostering cooperation in 
counties: Governing by cajole: Conversations with county managers. Public 
Administration Quarterly, 24, 305-319.
Pammer, W. J., Jr., Marlowe, H. A., Jr., Janet, J. G., & Dustin, J. L. (1999). Managing 
conflict and building cooperation in council-manager cities: Insights on establishing a 
resolution framework. State and Local Covernment Review, 37(3), 202-213.
Parsons, F. (1909). Choosing a vocation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Patton, W. D., Witt, S. L., Lovrich, N. P., & Fredericksen, P. J. (2002). Human resource 
management: The public service perspective. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Paul, A. C. (1981). Local government managers: On the job and off. Urban Data Service 
Report, 13, 1-8.
Perry, E. L., Kulik, C. T., & Bourhis, A. C. (1996). Moderating effects of personal and 
contextual factors in age discrimination. Journal o f  Applied Psychology, 81, 628-647.
253
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. (1977). Organization context and the characteristics and tenure 
oï\\osp\ia\aàmm\sXxaioxs. Academy o f  Management Journal, 20, 74-88.
Porter, L. W., & Steers, R. M. (1973). Organizational, work, and personal factors in 
employee turnover & absenteeism. Psychological Bulletin, 80, 151-176.
Prentice, R. L., Williams, B. J., & Peterson, A. V. (1981). On the regression analysis of 
multivariate failure time data. Biometrika, 68, 370-373.
Protasel, G. (1995). Leadership in council manager cities. In H.G. Frederickson, (Ed.), 
Ideal and practice in council-manager government (pp. 20-28). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association
Puffer, S., & Weintrop, J. (1991). Corporate performance and CEO turnover: The role of 
performance expectations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26, 1-19.
Raghunathan, T., Lepkowski, J., van Hoewyk, J., & Solenberger, P. (2001). A
multivariate technique for imputing missing values using a sequence o f regression 
modois. Survey Methodology, 27(1), 85-95.
Ravenstein, E. (1885). The laws of migration. Journal o f  the Statistical Society, 48, 167- 
235.
Ravenstein, E. (1889). The laws of migration: second paper. Journal o f  the Royal 
Statistical Society, 52, 241-305.
Reid, M., Kerr, B., & Miller, W. (2001). A study of the advancement of women in 
municipal government bureaucracies: Persistence of glass ceilings? Women and 
27(1), 35-53.
Reinganum, M. (1985). The effects o f executive succession on stockholder wealth: A 
reply. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20, 375-376.
Renner, T. (1990). Appointed local government managers: Stability and change. In The 
Municipal Yearbook (pp. 41-52). Washington, DC: International City/County 
Management Association.
Renner, T. (2001). The local government profession at century's end. In The Municipal 
Yearbook (pp. 35-46). Washington, DC: International City/County Management 
Association.
Renner, T., & DeSantis, V. S. (1993). Contemporary patterns and trends in municipal 
government structures. In The Municipal Yearbook (pp. 57-69). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.
254
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Renner, T., & DeSantis, V. S. (1994). City manager turnover: The impact of formal 
authority and electoral change. State and Local Government Review, 26, 104-111.
Rhodes, D., & Walker, J. (1984). Management succession and development planning. 
Human Resources Planning, 17, 157-173.
Roberts, D. D. (1988). A new breed of public executive: Top level exempt managers in 
state government. Review o f  Public Personnel Administration, 8(2), 20-36.
Rogers, B. D., & Halachmi, A. (1988). Gubernatorial transition: Variables that influence 
ehangeovers. Public Productivity Review, 72(1), 73-89.
Roth, P. (1994). Missing data: Conceptual review for applied psychologists. Personnel 
Psychology, 47, 537-560.
Salancik, G., & Pfeffer, J. (1980). Effects of ownership and performance on executive 
tenure in U.S. corporations. Academy o f  Management Journal, 23, 653-664.
Salant, T. J. (1989). Arizona county government: A study o f  contemporary issues. 
Tucson: Office of Community and Public Service, University o f Arizona.
Schein, E. H. (1992). Career anchors and job/role planning: The links between career 
planning and career development. In D, Montross, & C. J. Shinkman, Career 
development, theory and practice. Springfield, IE: Charles C Thomas Publisher.
Schlesinger, J. A. (1966). Ambition and politics: Political careers in the United States. 
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Schneider, M., & Ok Park, K. (1989). Metropolitan counties and service delivery agents: 
The still forgotten governments. Public Administration Review, 49, 345-352.
Sharf, R. S. (1997). Applying career development theory to counseling. Pacific Grove, 
CA: Brooks and Cole.
Shaw, J. D., Delery, J. E., Douglas Jenkins, G., & Gupta, N. (1998). An organization- 
level analysis of voluntary and involuntary turnover. Academy o f  Management 
Journal, 41, 511-525.
Sheehan, E. P. (2001). Affective responses to employee turnover. Journal o f  Social 
Psychology, 135, 63-69.
Sherwood, P. P., & Chackerian, R. (1988). The governor and the transition: Getting help 
and power. Public Productivity Review, 72(1), 91-105.
Simons, J., & Simmons, S. (2002). Structural conflict in contemporary cities. American 
Review o f  Public Administration, 34(4), 374-388.
255
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Smith, S. M. (2002). The role of social cognitive career theory in information technology 
based academic performance. Information Technology, 20(2), 1-10.
Stein, R. M. (1990). Urban alternatives. Pittsburgh, PA: University o f Pittsburgh Press.
Stemple, J. D., Jr. (2004). Job satisfaction o f  high school principals in Virginia. (Doctoral 
dissertation, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2004). Retrieved 
March 2, 2007, from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute Web site: 
http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/available/etd-04252004-104719/ unrestricted/ 
Stempleetd%5B 1 %5D.pdfl 04719/unrestrieted/Stempleetd%5B 1 %5D.pdf
Stillman, R. J. (1974). The rise o f  the city manager. Albuquerque: University o f New 
Mexico Press.
Streib, G. (1992). Professional skill and support for démocratie principles. Administration 
and Society, 24, 22-40.
Streib, G., & Waugh, W. L. (1991). Probing the limits o f county reform in an era of 
scarcity: A national survey of county administrators and executives. Public 
Administration Quarterly, 15, 378-395.
Sukbin, C., McCleary, K. W., & Uysal, M. (1995). Travel motivations of Japanese 
overseas travelers: A factor-cluster segmentation approach. Journal o f  Travel 
Research, 34(1), 33-39.
Super, D. (1990). A life-span, life-space approach to career development. In D. Brown,
L. Brooks & Associates (Eds.), Career choice and development. (2"^ ed.). San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Svara, J. H. (1990). Official leadership in the city. New York: Oxford University Press.
Svara, J. H. (1991). Couneil and administrator perspectives on the city manager's role. 
Administration and Society, 23, 227-246.
Svara, J. H. (1995). Dichotomy and duality: Reconceptualizing the relationship between 
policy and administration in council-manager cities. In H. G. Frederickson (Ed.),
Ideal and practice in council-manager government (pp. 3-19). Washington, DC: 
International City/County Management Association.
Svara, J. H. (1996). Leadership and professionalism in county government. In D. Menzel 
(Ed.), The American county: Frontiers o f  knowledge. Tuscaloosa: University of 
Alabama Press.
Svara, J. H. (1998). The politics-administration dichotomy model as aberration. Public 
Administration Review, 58, 51-58.
256
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Svara, J. H. (1999). The shifting boundary between elected officials and city managers in 
large council-manager eities. Public Administration Review, 59, 44-54.
The Municipal Yellow Book: W ho’s Who in the Leading City and County Covernments 
and Local Authorities Vol. 1-16 (Winter 1991-Winter 2006). New York: Monitor 
Publishing.
Thompson, J. (1967). Organizations in action. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Trow, D. (1960). Membership succession and team performance. Human Relations, 13, 
259-269.
U.S. Bureau o f the Census. Retrieved from, Web site www.eensus.gov. Last accessed 
December 31, 2006.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Retrieved from, Web site 
www.bls.gov. Last accessed January 1, 2007.
Watson, D. J., & Hassett, W. L. (2002). Long-serving city managers: Practical
application of the academic literature. Public Administration Review, 62, 622-629.
Watson, D. J., & Hassett, W. L. (2003). Long-serving city managers: Why do they stay? 
Public Administration Review, 63, 71-79.
Watson, D. J., & Hassett, W. L. (2004). Career paths of city managers in America’s 
largest council-manager cities. Public Administration Review, 64, 192-200.
Wechsler, B., & Rainey, H. G. (1988). Executive-level transition: Toward a conceptual 
framework. Public Productivity Review, 72(1), 45-60.
Weisbach, M. (1988). Outside directors and CEO turnover. Journal o f  Financial 
Economics, 19, 431-460.
Welman, J., & Kruger, S. (2001). Research methodology. Cape Town: Oxford Southern 
Africa.
Werbel, J. D., & Bedeian, A. G. (1989). Intended turnover as a function of age and job 
performance. Journal o f  Organizational Behavior, 10, 275-281.
Whitaker, G., & DeHoog, R. (1991). City managers under fire: How conflict leads to 
Xmaover. Public Administration Review, 51, 156-165.
Wiseman, W. M. (2004). The role of counties in local government reform. In P. C. 
McLaurin, Jr., & J. N. Fratesi (Eds.), County government in Mississippi, Center for  
Covernmental Training and Technology. Retrieved November 6, 2006, from
257
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
http://www.mslocalgovemment.org/ publications/county/books /2004_cgm/cgm- 
chapter_15.pdf
Worrell, D., & Davidson, W. (1987). The effect of CEO succession on stockholder
wealth in large firms following the death of the predecessor. Journal o f  Management, 
13, 509-515.
Wright, D. S. (1969). The city manager as a development administrator. In R.T. Daland 
(Ed.), Comparative urban research (pp. 203-248). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Yaffee, R. (2003, Fall). A Primer for Panel Data Analysis. Connect Information
Technology at NYU. Retrieved January 23, 2007, from the New York University -  
Information Technology Services Web site: http://www.nyu.edu/its/pubs/connect/ 
fall03/yaffee_primer.htm
Youngblood, S. A., Mobley, W. H., & Meglino, B. M. (1983). A longitudinal analysis of 
the iumover procQSS. Journal o f Applied Psychology, 68, 507-516.
Zajac, E. J. (1990). CEO selection, succession, compensation and firm performance: A 
theoretical integration and empirical analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 11, 
217-230.
Zeigler, H., Kehoe, E., & Reisman, J. (1985). City managers and school superintendents. 
New York: Praeger.
Zunker, V. (1994). Career counseling: Applied concepts o f  life planning (4*'' ed.). Pacific 
Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
258
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VITA
Graduate College 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Robert John Tekniepe
Home Address:
2221 White Mist Drive
Las Vegas, Nevada 89134-0119
Degrees:
Bachelor of Science, Business Administration, 1977 
University o f Arizona
Masters o f Public Administration, 1997 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Dissertation Title:
Turnover of Appointed County Administrators in Large American Counties
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Chairperson, Dr. Christopher Stream, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Dr. Lee Bernick, Ph. D.
Committee Member, Dr. Thom Reilly, Ph. D.
Graduate Faculty Representative, Dr. David Damore, Ph.D.
259
Reproduced witti permission of ttie copyrigtit owner. Furttier reproduction proiiibited wittiout permission.
